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The research project "Small-Scale  Fisheries of San Miguel Bay: A Multidisciplinary Analysis" 
was conducted jointly by the Institute of Fisheries Development and Research (I  FDR) of the Col- 
lege of Fisheries, University of the Philippines in  the Visayas and the International Center for Living 
Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM), both based in Manila, Philippines. 
San Miguel Bay is one of the more important fisheries of the Philippines, being a shallow produc- 
tive body of water producing large catches of fish, shrimp and other crustaceans. It  is located in the 
Bicol Region of the Philippines  towards the southern end of the island of Luzon, approximately 
400 km south of Manila, the capital city and major market for fishery products, especially shrimp. 
In  addition to  the Bay's high biological productivity, there were several other reasons why this 
site was chosen for an indepth multidisciplinary study, the first of its kind in the Philippines, if not 
all of Southeast Asia. The Bicol Region is  one of the more depressed areas of the country, with per 
capita incomes well below the national average.  For this reason, and because of the potential for 
increased production from the agricultural sector,  the Bicol River Basin Development Program 
(BRBDP), an integrated area development plan, was formulated in the early 1970s with the major 
purpose of building the necessary physical and social infrastructure to bring irrigation to the region's 
rainfed rice land. With its  subsequent responsibilities  expanding both geographically beyond the 
Bicol River basin and administratively to include activities other than rice,  the BRBDP became 
interested in the potential for incorporating fishing communities into its  development planning. The 
opportunity existed therefore for this IFDRIICLARM research project to provide some of the basic 
biological and socioeconomic information on the fisheries that would make such planning possible. 
Other reasons for selecting San Miguel Bay were related to the biology of the fishery. With a 
narrow mouth in  the north, the Bay sustains what can be identified essentially as a unit fishery, with 
almost all the fishing activity of residents around the Bay confined to the Bay itself. Moreover, bio- 
logical data were available from the 1950s, thus providing  a basis for comparison with data collected 
by this research project, and allowing the researchers to address allegations that the Bay is overfished. 
Finally, two major gear types typical of Philippine waters, gill-netters  and trawlers, compete for 
the same stocks within the Bay. This research project was designed to determine the distribution of 
total catch and revenues among major gear types, so that informed decisions regarding possible gear 
regulations could be made by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and the 
municipalities  which have responsibility for enforcing fishery regulations in San Miguel Bay and 
other fishing grounds of the country. 
In addition to  funding from l  FDR and ICLARM the project received grants from the United 
Nations University (UNU), Tokyo, Japan and the Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources 
Research and Development (PCARRD), Los BaRos, Laguna, Philippines. l  FDR and ICLARM are both 
grateful for this support because completion of this research project would have been impossible 
without it. 
The project has produced four technical reports which cover the biological, economic and 
sociological aspects of the San Miguel Bay fisheries. A fifth report synthesizes these complementary 
perspectives and discusses their implications for managing the San Miguel Bay fisheries. 
The various papers in this report analyze the economic aspects of fisheries production and mar- 
keting in  San Miguel Bay. It represents the results of data collection and analysis over approximately 
a two-year period, 1979-1981.  We  are pleased to include a paper in this volume on institutional issues 
vii related to the San Miguel Bay fisheries by Wilfrido Cruz who spent several months with the project 
team during 1981 to collect field data for his dissertation. Also, we would like to take this opportu- 
nity  to  acknowledge the contributions of Jan Michael Vakily to our data collection methods, the assis- 
tance of Gregorio Bafiacia and earlier Dennis Pamulaklakin for managing the administrative and 
logistical aspects of our field work. 
'This economic study was  implemented by a three-member team under the guidance of Dr. Ian 
Smith of ICLARM. Three research assistants-Francia  Yater, Neri Supanga and Estrella Tulay-partici- 
pated in  all aspects of the project from planning, data collection and analysis to report writing, and 
deserve the major credit for the successful completion of this study. We  have benefited considerably 
from the interaction among the project's biologists, sociologists  and economists and heartily recom- 
mend such multidisciplinary approaches. 
DR. I.R.  SMITH  PROF.  A.  MINES 
Director  Project Leader and Director 
Traditional Fisheries Program  Institute of Fisheries Development 
ICLARM  and Research (IFDR) 
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Abstract 
Objectives,  sampling and analytical methods and data collection methodology of an  economic survey of the 
small-scale fishery of San  Miguel Bay, Philippines, are discussed. The fishing community from which the majority of 
economic data were gathered is described. 
Introduction 
As  in other parts of the world, small-scale fishing communities in the Philippines have benefited 
only marginally from rural development programs since the main thrust of government policies and 
programs historically has been in the agricultural sector. Most fisheries development programs have 
focused on relatively large-scale commercial operations which are export oriented and capital inten- 
sive. Yet small-scale fisheries contribute over 60% of fishery production (excluding aquaculture) and 
involve a significant proportion of the population of the country. The sector is estimated to employ 
600-700,000 persons or about 90% of those engaged in Philippine fisheries (EDPITAF 1978). In  the 
Bicol Region alone, it is estimated that there are about 64,000 small-scale or municipal fishermen 
representing about 10% of the total population of the region (BFAR 1979). Small-scale fishermen 
in the Philippines are known as municipal fishermen.  Defined to include those using vessels less than 
3 gross tons (GT) or no vessel  at  all, they fish in marine and inland municipal waters. All other 
fishermen are considered commercial fishermen (Santos 1979; De Sagun and Bautista 1979). Since 1977 when the Integrated Fisheries Development Plan was  formulated by the Fishery 
Industry Development Council of the Ministry of Natural Resources, municipal fisheries have been 
receiving increased attention and concern from government planners. Recent attempts to improve 
the income levels of municipal fishermen have included a variety of financing schemes,  the forma- 
tion of associations and cooperatives, and extension work by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (BFAR). Unfortunately, results of these efforts have not been especially encouraging. 
Repayment rates under the various credit programs have averaged less than 10% and very few of the 
Samahang Nayons (pre-cooperatives)  formed since the early 1970s remain viable. The underlying 
causes for these problems remain unclear, but one appears to be that there is increasing evidence of 
overfishing in the form of declining yields from many of the traditional coastal fishing grounds 
upon which municipal fishermen depend (Smith et  al.  1980). These declining yields have made loan 
repayment difficult. 
Planning for the municipal or small-scale fisheries sector in the Philippines has long been ham- 
pered by an almost complete lack of economic data on the various gear types that are used by the 
municipal fishermen. There have been occasional community studies which have shed some light on 
income levels and general standards of living in fishing communities, but no results have been pub- 
lished to  date on detailed costs and returns or estimates of profitability of the major municipal gear 
types. The few economic results that have been published to date are either from extremely small 
samples or from what appear to be highly unreliable survey data. A much awaited study entitled 
"The  impact of credit on small-scale fisheries and aquaculture in the Philippines"  is being conducted 
by the Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research and Development (PCARRD). In  a 
country where fish supplies 50-55% of total animal protein, and municipal fisheries supply almost 
two-thirds of the estimated fisheries production (excluding aquaculture), this lack of economic 
information is surprising. 
One possible explanation for this paucity of economic data is that the potential of economics 
to enlighten us about the status of fisheries is not fully appreciated. It is often assumed that it is 
necessary to mount expensive exploratory fishing expeditions and surveys to determine the status 
of fish stocks and thus the potential for expanding fishing effort or the need to curtail it. The belief 
that biological information is the sole pre-requisite to fisheries management decisionmaking has led 
to domination of the field by biologists. Or possibly they have simply been more persuasive than 
economists in arguing their case. While for an undeveloped fishery, biological surveys are indeed 
necessary, economists would argue that for developed fisheries, economic data are equally as impor- 
tant, if not more so.  Moreoever, as Lampe (1980) has argued,  economic data can in many cases be 
collected more cheaply through interviews of fishermen and can provide predictions very close to 
those made through more expensive exploratory fishing methods. Similarly, Pauly9and  Mines (1  982) 
demonstrate cheaper alternative shore-based methods to conduct biological stock assessment. 
The main point to be made here is that researchers charged with assessing the status of fisheries 
overlook a gold mine of valuable information if they fail to collect catch and effort and costs and 
returnsdata from the fishing fleet(s) that have historically operated in  the fishing grounds in  question. 
Objectives 
A major purpose of this technical report was  to demonstrate the usefulness of economic data 
in assessing the status of a specific fishery as  a prelude to the difficult allocation decisions that face 
fisheries policymakers in the Philippines, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia. This objective was  pursued 
through an examination of catch, effort, costs,  returns, and price data collected through the coop- 
eration of a group of fishermen owning and operating various municipal gear types in San  Miguel 
Bay,  located in the Bicol Region of the Philippines (Fig. 1  ). LUZON  A 
N 
RAGAY  GULF 
Fig. 1. San Miguel Bay, Philippines. 
The preface of this technical report has outlined why the fisheries of San Miguel Bay were 
;elected for intensive study. The specific objectives of the economics component of the IFDR/ 
C LARM research project were: 
to determine the costs and returns of the major municipat fishing gears used in San Miguel 
Bay; 
to determine the returns to labor and capital according to the predominant sharing system 
practiced for the major gear types, and to compare these returns with the opportunity costs 
of labor and capital; 
to determine the relationship between prices received by fishermen and those prevailing in 
nearby wholesale and retail markets; 
to determine costs and returns for fish processors and middlemen and to examine the effi- 
ciency of the marketing  systems; and 
to analyze the implications of  the above production and marketing data as they relate to 
issues of allocation of fishing rights and distribution of the net benefits from the fishery. 
Implicit in the above objectives was the testing of certain data collection methodologies, particu- 
wly those related to collection of accurate price data. Municipal Fisheries Defined 
The Philippine fisheries sector, as elsewhere in the tropics, contains a myriad of gear types, 
many competing for the same  fish stocks. A legal/administrative distinction is made between 
'commercial'  fisheries, which consist of vessels in excess of 3 GT, and 'municipal'  fisheries which 
consist of the remainder, including gears which do not require the use of a vessel.  Eighteen municipal 
gear types operate within San  Miguel Bay  (Table 1). Great diversity is found within the municipal 
fisheries sector, with gear types ranging from simple hook and line and traps to 2.99-GT 'baby' 
trawlers and 'baby'  purse seiners powered by 180-hp engines. The definition of 'municipal' as 
supposedly synonymous with 'small-scale' or 'sustenance'  (a commonly used term in  the Philippines) 
does not therefore appear to be appropriate or adequate. 
Table 1. Gear types used in  San Miguel Bay (1980). 
Gear type (local name)   umber'  Percent of total 
Gill-net (various types) 
Scissor (push) net (sakag) 
Hook and line (banwit) 
Mini trawl fitik-itik) 
Stationary liftnet fbukatot) 
Fish pot (bubo) 
Longline (kitang) 
Baby trawl3 
Fish corral fbaklad) 
Crab liftnet (bintoll 
Filter nets (biakus) 
Spear gun fantipara) 
Mobile bagnet (baby basnig) 
Beach seine (sinsoru) 
Fish weir fsabay) 
Round haul seine 
Stationary tidal weir (ambak) 
Cast net4 
Total  3,547  100 
'~ears  counted between November 1979 and March 1981. See  Esporlas (1982). 
2~hese  1,515  gill-nets are used on approximately 350 gill-net fishing units. 
3~ee  text for distinction between small and medium trawlers which together comprise the so-called 'baby'  trawlers in the Philip- 
pines. Of these 95 trawlers, 75 are small (<3 GT) and 20 are medium (>  3 GT). 
4~robably  underestimated. 
We  are not the first researchers to question the adequacy of the 'municipal' and 'commercial' 
fisheries labels. Spoehr (1980) raised the same  issues when he discussed the extreme variation in 
investment required for different gear types, and the increasing separation in a management sense 
between owners and operators or crewmen as the capital intensity of the gear  increased. He pro- 
posed three categories:  small-scale, medium-scale, and large-scale with distinctions based on varia- 
tions in  the owner/crewmen relationship and investment levels. While useful for purposes of re- 
search, this breakdown is cumbersome for administrative or licensing purposes because the medium- 
scale grouping would include vessels and gear types that are licensed by different national and local 
authorities. 
All 'commercial'  gears are licensed by national authorities and all 'municipal' gears are under 
the jurisdiction of local municipalities. This separation of responsibilities has existed since Spanish 
times (pre-1900) when the 3-GT demarcation was first arbitrarily established. For this study, we 
used the overall 'municipal' label, but made some clear distinctions within that category. Distinction  was  made between municipal trawlers and all other municipal non-trawl gears. ' 
This leaves a large number of diverse gears under the municipal non-trawl label, but as  subsequent 
papers in this report show, there is a clear-cut distinction between the two groups in terms of 
profits earned. Municipal trawlers were divided into 3 groups: 
mini trawlers, which are no bigger than gill-netters, that is 0.1 to 0.2  GT, powered, as are 
many gill-netters, by 16-hp  gasoline engines; 
small trawlers, which range generally from 1 to 3 GT; 
medium trawlers, which are technically 'commercial' vessels,  and range from 3.01 to 5.0  GT, 
though they are usually registered with municipalities as 2.99 GT. 
Small and medium trawlers are commonly called 'baby'  trawlers in the Philippines. All three 
trawler types operate within San  Miguel Bay. A fourth category,  large  trawlers ('commercial' 
trawlers of 50 t or more), fish outside San  Miguel Bay though approximately 30 vessels  are 
based at Camaligan, just outside Naga City, the commercial center of Camarines Sur. Because they 
fish almost exclusively outside the Bay and the cooperation of their owners to provide data was 
thought to be unlikely, large trawlers were not included in this study. 
The Research Site 
As  indicated in Table I,  over 3,500  units of fishing gear are used in the San  Miguel Bay fish- 
eries. Not all of these are used simultaneously; the stationery liftnets, for example, operate only 
during a relatively short season  (see Supanga, this report). Also,  many fishing units use  more than 
a single gear;  a gill-netter for example, uses 5 gill-nets on average. Gill-netters  and trawlers operate 
year-round, however, between them catching the bulk of the Bay's total catch. Consequently, it 
was especially important to monitor the activities of these major gear types. The majority of gill- 
netters and trawlers are based in the three municipalities of Cabusao,  Calabanga and Tinambac at 
the southern end of the Bay. During 1979-1981, parts of Tinambac were closed to outsiders by the 
Philippine Constabulary due to the lack of peace and order. Therefore we  concentrated on Cabusao 
and Calabanga and more specifically on the major fishing barrios in these two municipalities-Castillo 
in Cabusao and Sabang in Calabanga. 
Castillo lieson thewestern bank of the Bicol River near its entrance to San  Miguel Bay  (Fig. 1). 
Sabang is on the opposite side of the river and further along the coast to the east. Castillo is the base 
for large numbers of gill-netters  and mini trawlers, the owners and crewmen of which live in the 
community. Sabang is the major landing area in the Bay for the small and medium trawlers. Both 
communities, because of their active fishing fleets, have become centers for post-harvest activities, 
primarily drying and salting. Mercedes, at  the western side of the Pacific Ocean mouth of the Bay 
has developed along similar lines. Processed fishing products from these communities are a major 
source of supply in Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur provinces. Shrimp from Castillo and Sabang 
is shipped as far as  Manila, from where wholesalers export to Japan in addition to supplyinglthe 
Metro Manila market. 
A complete overview of  the San Miguel Bay fishing communities can be found in Bailey (1982). 
The major point we wish to make here is that the San Miguel Bay fisheries are thoroughly integrated 
into  the marketeconomy, and it would be incorrect therefore to think of this fishery as 'subsistence' 
or 'sustenance'  in nature (Szanton 1971). It is our view that use of these terms to describe the 
municipal fisheries of the Philippines is inappropriate and misleading, due to the market orientation 
of most municipal fisheries. Of course there are exceptions in  more remote communities where a 
proportion  of the catch is  for the consumption of the fishermen's own households. With the exception 
'see  Pauly and Mines (19821 for a complete discussion of measurement of fishing effort of the various gear types. of some  isolated areas  in Siruma, however, the San  Miguel Bay fisheries have a strong market 
orientation. 
Castillo, the base of the economics research team,  is one of the largest fishing barrios around 
San  Miguel Bay, and is heavily dependent upon fishing. Located on sandy soil bordering mud flats 
near the mouth of the Bicol River, there are few opportunities for gainful employment other than 
fishing. A 1978 survey of Castillo's 430 households by the Ministry of Local Government and Com- 
munity Development (MLGCD 1978) found that 68% were engaged in fishing or fishing related 
activities (e.g.,  processing). During  a household survey conducted in late 1979, we  confirmed this 
heavy dependence upon fishing. A total of 211 households with one or more family members 
engaged in fishing and 106 households engaged in various forms of fish marketing and/or processing. 
Seven of these households engaged in both fishing and processing which means that in 1979,310 
households (72% of all households) in Castillo were dependent upon fishing. Over and above these 
are small numbers engaged in boat building. There are 286 fishermen in the 21  1 fishing households; 
but three quarters of the households have only one fisherman (Table 2). 
The purpose of the 1979 household inventory was to establish the extent and distribution of 
ownership of fishing assets in Castillo and to construct a sampling frame from which a sample for 
Table 2. Fishermen per household in Barangay Castillo, Cabusao. 
% of  Cumulative 
No. of fishermen  Frequency  total  frequency 
per household  (households)  households (21 1  )  (fishermen) 
costs and returns analysis could be selected. The inventory results are summarized in Table 3.  The 
21 1 fishing households in Castillo own 144 boats (bancas), of which 107 (74%) are motorized, and 
188 sets of fishing gear. Counting the 10-15 bancas owned by outsiders but operated by Castillo 
residents, approximately 155-160  bancas are used by Castillo fishermen. Gill-nets  and mini trawls 
predominate, comprising 69% of all gears in the community. 
Asset ownership is not evenly spread throughout these 21  1 fishing households (Table 4); 87 
families (41%)  own no banca; 61 families (2%)  own no gear;  and 63 families (30%0)  own neither 
banca nor gear. Therefore, while approximately two thirds of Castillo's fishing households own one 
or more fishing assets,  one third is entirely dependent upon being able to rent or borrow others' 
bancas and/or gear or working as  laborers for a share of the catch. For the Bay as  a whole, 26% of 
fishermen own neither bancas nor gear  (Villafuerte and Bailey 1982), so  Castillo's pattern of asset 
ownership is similar to that of other surrounding communities. 
The community is also characterized by a large number of fishing households that lend out 
their bancas and gear in return  for a share of the catch. Strictly speaking, these lenders are not fisher- 
men though in some cases they may be lending bancas or gear to other members of their own 
household. 
Of the 1  14 households who own motorized bancas, 35% acquired theirbancas through Develop- 
ment Bank of the Philippines (DBP) loans under the Samahang Lima scheme. The remainder were 
self-financed. According to  the Naga City DBP office, a total of 1,419  loans were granted in Cama- 
rines Sur province up to 1978, of which none have been repaid in full (Mr. Jesus Naval, DBP Plan- 
ning Department, Naga City). Though no data could be made available by DBP specifically on Castillo, there is no reason to  expect that the partial repayment rate was  much different there than 
elsewhere in the province. Consequently, a fairly substantial proportion of the community who own 
motorized bancas, acquired them cost free which may explain the observations of fishermen that 
growth in numbers of boats operating in the Bay has been rapid during the 1970s. 
Table 3. Fishing asset ownership in Barangay Castillo, Cabusao (1979). 
Number 
Subtotals  owned  l  tem 
Number 
Subtotals  owned 
I. Boats (bancas) 1 
Drift gill-net (pamating)  1 
Crab gill-net (pangasag)  19 
Motorized  107  Bottom set gill-net (palobog)  20 
Non-motorized  37 
Total 
11.  Gear 
Small trawl2 
Stationary gears 
Filter net (biyakus) 
Fish corral (baklad) 
Liftnet (bukatot) 
Mini trawl  51  Push nets lsakag)  25 
Gill-nets (sets)  78 
Fish pot (bubo)  1 
Drift gill-net (panke)  35 
Drift gill-net (palataw)  3  Total  188 
'~n  additional 10-15  bancas are used by Castillo fishermen but are owned by individuals living outside the community. 
2~wo  small trawlers began operation in Castillo during 1980 and were  subsequently included in the costs and returns study (see 
Tulay and Smith, this report). 
Table 4. Distribution of fishing assets In Castillo, Cabusao. 
Number  Percentage 
I.  Bancas  (motorized  and non-motorized) 
Families owning motorized bancats) only 
Families owning non-motorized  bancalsl only 
Families owning both motorized and non-motorized  bancas 
Families owning no banca 
Total 
11.  Bancas  (motorized  only) 
Families owning one motorized banca  79  89 
Families owning two motorized bancas  6  7 
Families owning three motorized bancas  3  3 
Families owning four motorized  bancas  0  0 
Families owning five motorized  bancas  0  0 
Families owning six motorized bancas  0  0 
Families owning seven motorized bancas  1  1 
Total  89  100 
HI. Gears 
Families owning one or more gear  150  7  1 
Families owning no gear  6  1  29 
Total  21 1  100 Castillo has three beach landing areas (Fig. 2) where middlemen and processors wait to transact 
business during landing times. There is some degree of specialization at each landing, determined 
primarily by where  the fishermen expect the buyers to be  (Table 5). For example,  fish paste 
(bagoong)  processors live near Landing Areas 1 and 3,  hence the mini trawls which catch the sergestid 
shrimp (balao)  land only at  these two landing areas and choose between them depending upon prior 
arrangements made with buyers (the so-called suki system; see  Smith et  al.  1980), or, if  they have 
no such arrangements, upon where they expect to obtain a higher price. If  the mini trawler has a 
particularly good catch of the larger shrimps (other than balao), the fisherman will land his catch 
at Area 3 since this is where the shrimp middlemen and agents  (factorador)  who buy and ship 
to Manila wholesalers are located. Gill-netters  tend to concentrate in Landing Area 2 because the 
processors who buy their catch for drying are  located nearby. Because of this specialization at 
landing areas,  fishermen tend to live near their landing area.  For example,  most gill-netters live near 
either Area  1 or 2.  During the period February 1980 to January 1981, approximately 1,000  t 
(including balao) was  landed at these three landing areas (Table 6). Thirty nine percent by weight 
was finfish; 61% was invertebrates. 
RICE 
RICE 
Fig. 2. Map of Cabusao Municipality showing Castillo landing areas. The landing times shown in Table 5 also indicate at  what time of the day the various gears 
are used. Crab gill-netters  set their nets at night and retrieve them in the early morning; mini trawlers 
operate during daylight hours, landing their catch in the early evening. The catch of stationary gears 
(filter nets, corrals, and liftnets) is brought to Landing Areas 1 and 3 in the early morning. 
Table 5. Castillo landing areas,  time and gears. 
-  --- -- 





12  noon - 2  p.m.  Gill-netters 
5  p.m.  - 7  p.m.  Mini trawlers 
12  noon - 2  p.m. 
12  noon - 2  p.m. 
5  p.m.  - 6  p.m. 
Area 3  6  a.m.  - 8  a.m. 
Gill-netters (penke) 
Gill-netters  (palubog:  1st trip) 
Gill-netters  (palubog:  2nd trip) 
Crab gill-nets 
Stationary gears 
5  p.m.  - 7  p.m.  Mini trawlers 
1  Table 6. Estimated total landings (in tonnes)  at Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
- 
Total 
Castillo landing areas2  production  Catch composition (OX) 










N  ov 
Dec 
Jan  69 .O  9.3  6.0,  84.3  17.3  82.7 
Y 
Annual total  648.6  337.8  986.4  38.5  61.3 
lExtrapolated  from actual catch and effort (#boats  landing) data collected approximately 3 days per week at each landing area. 
Extrapolation  took into account actual fishing days in each month. 
2~istinction  between landing areas 2 and 3 was  not made until a third research assistant was  hired by the project in June.1980. There is, of course, some variation in  these landing times and in the types of gear that frequent 
each landing area. Although the whole year is considered productive, the southeast monsoon (haba- 
gat) favors the operation of gill-netters while the northeast monsoon (amihan) favors the operation 
of mini trawlers. From October to  June, sergestid shrimp (balao) are the predominant species landed 
in Castillo. From June to October, mini trawlers' catches decline in  volume as many of the operators 
change their gears from the fine-mesh pamalaw to the larger-mesh  pamasa  an, the gear used for 
catching bigger shrimps (Fig. 3).  Y  ', 
Types of gear  Biml local name  I Jan  I Feb  I Mar  1 Apr  I May I June I  July  I Aug  I  Sept I Oct I Nov I Dec 1 
Mini trawl  Pamalaw =  m 
Pamasayan 0  D 
Gil tnet  Panke  1  I 
Palubog  m = 
Filter net  Biyakus  I  J 
1 
Fish corral  Sagkad 
Set bagnet  Bukatot 
Push net  Sakag 
Fig. 3. Months of operation of major gears in Castillo as  observed in 1980. 
Gill-netters  also change their gear during the year,  using panke from March to September, to 
catch primarily croakers (locally known as  abo), and palubog from October to February to catch 
mullets and herrings (known locally as  banak and tamban, respectively). The filter net (biakus) is 
a year-round operation. The stationary liftnets (bukatot) which catch primarily anchovies (dilis) 
operate during dulum, the dark phase of the moon with the aid of lamps and are highly seasonal, 
as  are the fish corrals (baklad). 
The combined effect of these gears on Castillo landings produces extreme variation in catch of 
invertebrates, especially sergestid shrimp (balao), but somewhat less variation in fish catch (Fig. 4). 
By volume, the balao catch of the mini trawlers dominates the landings (Table 6). 
Castillo is an active center for processing, particularly the drying of the gill-net catch and the 
salting of mini trawl catch into fish paste or bagoong. As  noted earlier, over 100 or approximately 
25% of Castillo's households are engaged in some form of processing or middleman activities. Most 
of the fresh fish catch is marketed in nearby Libmanan; only occasionally does Castillo's fresh fish 
reach as  far as  Naga City. Dried products, on the other hand, are marketed in Libmanan, Sipocot and 
Naga. Bagoong after salting, is sent to Pangasinan Province, north of Manila, where the fermenting 
process is completed. Recently, the Institute of Fisheries Development and Research (IFDR) of the 
College of Fisheries, University of the Philippines in  the Visayas has been introducing improved 
methods of drying and salting in an attempt to increase the value added to  these products locally, 
but there has not yet been widespread adoption of  the new techniques (Orejana 1982). 
In contrast to Castillo, which with the exception of 2 small trawlers and 51 mini trawlers is 
the base primarily of municipal non-trawl gear,  Sabang,  Calabanga is the base of the majority (74 
of 95) of the small municipal trawlers in San Miguel Bay. Because of their large catches, an even 
more intensive processing sector has evolved in Sabang. The major market for Sabang catch is Naga 
City, and part of the trawl catch is processed into fish meal used as  a feed ingredient for local pig- 
geries.  A detailed description of Sabang and particularly its marketing sector can be found in Espor- 
las ( 1  982). -------- Invertebrates 
-  Fish 
111111111111, 
FMAMJJASONDJ 
1980  1981 
Month 
Fig. 4. Castillo landings, February 1980-January 1981. 
The bulk of the economic team's  work was  conducted in Castillo supplemented by data 
gathered from a small sample of small and medium trawlers and processors from Sabang. 
Sampling Methodology 
Much of the information on Castillo in  the preceding section was gathered between 1979 and 
1981 by various survey techniques. (See Appendices for copies of the data collection instruments.) 
The only previous socioeconomic study conducted in the area (Piansay et al.  1979) covered the 
whole of Camarines Sur province and provided little detail on Castillo. 
Our data collection activities covered four distinct phases:  household inventory, landing 
and market survey, costs and returns record-keeping, and middlemen/processors survey. Table 8 
lists the data collected during each phase and the sampling methodology used in each case.  Except 
for the costs and returns record-keeping, either census or random sampling techniques was  used. In the case of the record-keeping activity, the primary criterion was the respondents should be 
willing to participate in  the tedious process of recording daily costs and earnings. The sampling unit 
was the fishing unit, not fishermen or households. Both the landing and market survey and the costs 
and returns record-keeping  spanned 12 months, though not the same  period since our limited staff 
(3  research assistants in the field) could not initiate both activities simultaneously. 
The major municipal fishing gears were included in the costs and returns record-keeping (Phase 
I  I  I)  and the sample was as  follows: 
No. fishing units 
Gill-netters (Castill01  20 
Mini trawlers (Castillo)  16 
Small and medium trawlers (Castitlo and Sabang)  13 
Liftnets (Castillo)  3 
Filter nets (Castilto)  4 
Fish corrals (Castillo)  3 
Scissor (push) nets (Castillo)  5 
Total sample size  64 
Total number of trips of these 64 fishing units was  1  1,250;  costs and returns data were collected 
from each of these trips. 
Table 7. Catch composition by month (percentage of monthly total volume) at Castillo landings. 
Bicoll  1980  1981  Full 





















































Usbon Table 8. Data sources and sampling methodology. 
Phase  Duration  Frequency  Data collected  Sampling methodology  Sample size 
I. (Household 
inventory) 
Single visit per 
household 
Number of fishermen 
per household 
Census of Castillo house- 
holds during which all 
fishing households were 
identified 
211 of 430 
households 
engaged in 
fishing  Fishing assets owned 
or used 
Sources of financing 
for owned fishing 
assets 
Sources of borrowed 





Jan.  1981 
Three times  Landed (ex-vessel) 




Data were collected from 
all vessels landing (an 
occasional vessel may 
have been missed,  but such 
weekly 
Catch per vessel 
landing 
occurrences were very 
infrequent) 
Number of vessels1 
gear types landing 








Prices of fresh fish 
from Libmanan and 
Sipocot markets 
Data were collected from 
all sellers in each market 
Varied depending 
on day 
Secondary data from the 
Philippine Fish Market- 
ing Authority (PFMA) 
Prices of fresh fish 
from Naga market 




Data were collected from 
all sellers in each 
market 







#fishing trips and 
fishing days per 
month 
Purposive sample with 
selection of respondents 
based primarily on will- 
ingness to cooperate in 
the daily record-keeping 
activity. The sampling 
unit was  the fishing 
unit, rather than indi- 
vidual fisherman or 
household 
64 fishing units 




casts, vat w of 
catch per trip/ 
fishing day 
June 1980  Single visit per 
respondent 
Fishing assets,  fixed 
costs, estimated 
life of assets, 
acquisition date 
Sample size was  approx- 
imately 20% 
IV.  (Middlemen1  March-April 




Fixed and operating 
costs, estimated 
life of fixed assets, 
daily volume 
handled, average 
daily purchases and 
receipts; certain 
attitudinal data 
regarding ease  of 
entry to business 
Randomly selected from 
list of all middlemen and 
processors purchasing 
fishery products in 
Castillo and Sabang The landing and market surveys (both of Phase  II)  covered Castillo landings and the nearby 
markets for fresh and processed products in Castillo itself, Libmanan, Sipocot and Naga City. Two 
to  three visits were made to the first three of these markets each week; one visit on the weekly 
market day, the other visits on non-market days. Naga City prices were provided by the regional 
office of the Philippine Fish Marketing Authority (PFMA) and were collected from PFMA monthly. 
The middlemen/processors survey was  conducted in Castillo and Sabang with the sample 
randomly selected from a list of all middlemen and processors in the two communities. The sample 
breakdown and size were as  follows: 
Castillo  Sabang  Total 
Processors (drying) 
Processors (salting) 
Middlemen (fresh shrimp) 
Middlemen (fresh fish) 
Middlemen (dried fish) 
Total sample size 
Analytical Methodology 
There are two parts to this study: economics of the fishery and economics of marketing. The 
essential elements of the analyses are outlined here. 
ECONOMICS OF THE FISHERY 
No historical data are available on economic aspects of the San  Miguel Bay fishery. Conse- 
quently, the analyses in the papers that follow focus on current (1980-1981)  costs and earnings for 
the major municipal gears to determine the returns to capital and labor of each gear type. Profit- 
ability is examined from two points of view.  First, return to owner is calculated in the usual fash- 
ion (see Ovenden 1961) whereby fixed and operating costs are subtracted from owners' earnings 
and the residual treated as a return to owners' own labor, capital, risk and management.  Return to 
labor is determined from the sharing system in operation for each gear type. 
Second, the possible existence of pure profits (resource rents above all costs) is calculated by 
comparing returns to labor and capital with their respective opportunity costs (Panayotou 1981  1. 
This comparison shows whether or not pure profits exist in the fishery, which users are earning 
them,  and whether there is room to expand the fishery (i.e.,  increase fishing effort) to redistribute 
the benefits. For example, if  the sum of returns to capital and labor in the fishery exceeds the 
opportunity costs of capital and labor, it would be to society's benefit to increase the amount of 
capital and labor used in the fishery ,  if the management's goal is  to simply maximize employment in 
the fishery. If  the reverse is found to be the case,  the amount of capital and labor in the fishery 
should be reduced and the excess diverted to alternative activities where they can earn more. In the 
final paper of this report (Smith and Mines), the implications of these findings for fisheries manage- 
ment and the tradeoffs among goals of maximizing employment, maximizing production, or maxi- 
mizing economic efficiency are considered. Suffice it to say  at this point that each of these goals 
is associated with different levels of fishing effort and different allocations of the catch among com- 
peting users. 
ECONOMICS OF MARKETING 
Based on price data collected at  the Castillo landings and the nearby markets, the relationship 
(if  any) among these prices is established to determine the efficiency of the marketing system to 
provide price information at  the landings (Bressler and King 1970). If no relationship can be estab- 
lished among these prices, imperfection in the marketing system is implied. Differentials  among prices are calculated to  show the mark-up by species and this differential is compared with the 
marketing costs of middlemen (see Appendices for further detail). A similar procedure is followed 
to determine the efficiency of the processing sector; that is,  price differentials between fresh and 
processed products (adjusted for weight loss in processing) are compared with the costs of pro- 
cessing. Economies of scale of processors (drying and salting) are estimated to determine the pos- 
sible role/impact of marketing  cooperatives engaged in processing. 
Conclusion 
The complete lack of historical data on economic aspects of the San Miguel Bay fisheries is a 
major handicap to  any serious analysis. Only with time series data can trends be determined. This 
economic study provides only a picture of the fishery at  a particular point in time, but a particular- 
ly valuable one because it allows conclusions to  be drawn regarding the likely distribution of bene- 
fits from the fisheries among the various competing users. 
The question of distribution of benefits is important for two reasons. First, change in this 
distribution has occurred rapidly with the introduction in  1970 of the small and medium trawlers 
which now harvest almost half the total catch of the Bay (Pauly and Mines 1982). Political pressure 
has been brought to bear on this situation through several petitions from municipal fishermen to 
government agencies, as well as to  President Ferdinand Marcos. Concerned officials are anxious to 
respond in  a responsible manner and this study's findings on the distribution of benefits should aid 
in their decisionmaking. 
Second,  an examination of benefits is important because the economics of the small-scale 
fishing units of San Miguel Bay are soon to undergo radical change. Since the mid-1970s  there has 
been a rapid influx of new capital into the fishery and much of it  was obtained by fishermen at 
little or no cost. The Samahang Lima, or Small Foreshore and River Fishermen Program of the 
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as it was more formally known, was  a national credit 
scheme that loaned over P275 million during its  4 years of operation from 1975 until its  suspension 
in 1978 (Smith et al. 1980). Nationwide, less than 1% of loans were paid off; in  the province of 
Camarines Sur, not  one of the 1,419  borrowers repaid his loan in  full. A total of P5.47 million was 
loaned to fishermen in Camarines Sur province which includes the major fishing grounds of San 
Miguel Bay,  Lake Buhi, and several smaller lakes. It was estimated by DBP that 85% of these loans 
went to fishermen in  the 5 Camarines Sur municipalities that adjoin the Bay. This means that in 
addition to private capital there was an infusion of approximately P4.5 million in public financing 
to the fishery, much of it for vessels and gear such as  those used by gill-netters. In fact, this P4.5 
million would be sufficient to  purchase over 340 complete gill-net fishing units at  current prices, or 
to replace the entire current motorized gill-net fleet of 300 units {Pauly et al.  1982). 
Although there are no hard data to  substantiate it, it appears that expansion in  the fishing power 
of the competing users exploiting San Miguel Bay has been substantial during the 5 years preceding 
this study. Because these units are now wearing out and 'free'  capital is no longer available for 
replacement, the economics that fishermen face today are quite different from the economics that 
prevailed for the few years after 1975. Though many small-scale municipal fishing units may have 
been profitable because of the DBPrs 'social financing',  they may find it much more difficult to 
remain so when private or commercial bank sources are the only means to refinance vessels and 
gear as they wear out. 
This report's attempts to analyze the economics of the fishery and distribution of benefits 
among competing users are thus very timely and have important implications for management of 
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Appendix  1 
Glossary of Local Bicol Terms 
-  a kind of transaction in which a middleman gets processed fish from processors in advance and pays 
them after the product is resold 
- northeast monsoon 
-  small rattan container which can accommodate 3-5 kg of fish 
-  cheap or bargain 
- one who buys commodities at the lowest price possible 
-  a small canoe usually used by the poorest fishermen 
-  when moon is full or waxing 
-  the volume of catch 
-  dark phases of the moon 
- southwest monsoon 
-  mending or darning of net 
- the local and general term for the net used by fishermen regardless of gear type 
- hauling of fish from the net 
-  to drop the net at  sea 
-  a structure usually made of temporary materials like bamboo walling and nipa roofing, as typically 
used by processors 
-  to go out fishing 
- (buso mayor) boat pilot, whose main task is to operate the boat and direct it to the most productive 
fishing area. This is most commonly used in reference to trawlers 
-  sharing of catch revenue after deducting all the expenses incurred during fishing including repair of 
parts and gears from the gross value of catch 
-  a fresh fish vendor 
-  a market place 
-  fish gilled in the net 
-  the process of harvesting fish from the net at  sea 
-  a rattan container which can accommodate from 10 kg up 
IMERNMIO(UAL  CENTER  FOR  UVIWB  mnc  RESOURCES  MANAGEMENT 
LIBRARY Appendix 2 
Sample Data Collection Forms Used in Record-Keeping 
and Middlemen/Processors Survey 
Questionnaire A:  costs and returns (fishing assets) 
Questionnaire 6:  costs and returns (daily trip records) 
Questionnaire C:  middlemen survey 
The following forms are samples of the types used; similar forms were used for other types of fishing units 
and for other middlemen/processors. In  general, we were pleased with the costs and returns forms though we  found 
it very difficult to collect accurate data on fishing area and time spent fishing. The middlemen/processors survey 
form was adequate for its  limited purpose, but the survey should have been implemented at  regular intervals through- 
out a one-year period to capture seasonal variation in  volume handled. 
Questionnaire A:  Costs and returns (fishing assets)  - 
Expected life 
Whether for  How acquired  (no. yrs. from  Annual 
No.  personal use/  (own  finances  Year  Acquisition  acquisition  depreciation 
A. Capital assets  Specification  owned  rented out  DBP loan, etc.)  acquired  cost  todiscard)  (costilifel 
Banca 
Motorized banca 
(length and size 
of motor) 
Non-motor banca 















B.  Other annual fixed costs 
1.  License :  P 
2.  Others  : P  =P 
P 
Total  Total 
capital 2 =  P  annual 2  =P 
cost  depreciation Questionnaire B: Costs and returns record-keeping (daily trip records). 
code no. 








do  -0  Remarks 
ishing 
ictual 















Food  -  asoline  Traveling 
Monthly 
totals ( C) = 
Average 
(  C  - 
#days  in  month)  i 
hrs 
Average  (  1  ) =  hrs  hr! 
per trip  #of  trips 
Monthly net revenue = total monthly value minus total expenses = P 
(before sharing) 








Local vendors (Freshldried) 
Part time: 
Name of R:  Age:  No. of yrs. in business:  Full time: 
I.  Investment items  Number  Acquisition  Year  Expected 










vehicles (% used 
for business? %) 
others 
If any of the above are rented out to others, what is the approximate average daily rental fee? f 
2.  Purchasedsales (for most recent active day): 
- 
Total Purchase  Total Sales 
Species  Volume  Cost  Usual or not  Volume  con  Usual or not  Where sold 
Sold wholesale or retail?  Mode of payment 
Average time before payment? 
Price difference between cash and credit 
If  wholesale, how much higher would the price be if you sold retail (in the same location) 
3. Inventory: 
What was  the quantity sorted the night before this day?  (kg) 
What quantity was  in storage (for later sale) at the end of this day?  -  (kg) 
What is the average time from purchase to sale? 
4.  Average no. of days engaged in business:  per week;  per month. 5. Operating costs (for most recent active day): 
Current year (PI  1 year ago (P) 
ice 
0  salt 
0  rice hulls 
containerJbags (if sold wlthe product) 
0  labor: 
own labor (no. of hrs.) 
family labor (no. of hrs.) 
if in kind payment? P 
hired labor (no. of hrs.) 
transportation: 
hired vehicle 
driver's fee (incl. food etc.) 
gasolineloil 
own fare (back & forth) 
freight 
equipment rental fee 
market fee 
brokerage fee (Manila) 
maintenancehepair (annual) 
bad debts (annual amount) 
miscellaneous: 
snacks for hired laborers, personal (but only 
additional % increase over normal expenses) 
cigarettes 
Have any of the above operating costs increased since one year ago? If  so,  complete final column above. 
6.  Alternative occupation: If  you were not engaged in  this business, what income generating activity would you engage in? 





8.  Why? 
9. How much capital is required to  enter this business? Appendix 3 
Program Description for Computation of Price Per Kilogram 
for Each Species in a 'Multispecies' Transaction 
Because much catch sold at the Cabusao landings as  elsewhere in the Philippines is  sold by the container rather 
than by weight, a method must be found to estimate pricelkg of each species (Pi). Data that can be collected at the 
time of the transaction are: 
total value of transaction 
container used (type and no.) 
species composition (%I. 
We  used a conversion table (see Appendix 4) to estimate the average weight of each transaction, from which 
the average weight of each species can be derived knowing species composition. To determine pricelkg by species 
required  the creation of an index of relative prices. This we  obtained through interviews of middlemen at the landing 
by asking them the price they would be willing to pay per kg for each species that day. The index thus fluctuated 
throughout the season depending upon the supply and demand for each species. The index could not have been 
determined from nearby Libmanan prices because there too fish were sold by volume and not by weight. 
The calculation of pricelkg by species requires solving the following formula for Pi: 
Total value  =  C XiPi 
=  C (XI PI + X2P2 '  .  . .  XnPn) 
where Xi  =  weight (kg) of species i 
Pi  =  price (P)  of species i 
Knowing total value,  Xi  and the relative prices from the index, it is then possible to  solve for Pi.  The following pro- 
gram solves for up to 9 species in any 'multispecies' transaction. 
Program Description 
Program Title :  Computation of price per kg by species in a 'multispecies' transaction. 
Name  :  Jan Michael Vakily 
Address  : German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)  D-6236 Eschborn, ~a~-~arnmarksj;ld  Weg  1 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Compatability : In  its present form the program can be used on a Hewlett Packard programmable calculator (HP67 
or HP97) 
Program Description, Equations, Variables etc.: 
The program computes the actual price per kg of different species sold in a single 'multispecies' transaction. 
The following information is required: total value of the transaction; a price index showing relative prices of the 
involved species (gathered from nearby market or from middlemen for example); weight per species obtained from 
total weight of transaction and species composition (%I. 
Computation  : 
corrected index(i1 
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Operating limits and warnings: 
A maximum of 9 species can be included for any single transaction. Program Listing 
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'~t  the landing we  collected observations on number of baca-baca or  tiklis per  transaction and used the conversion table to 
calculate total weight of each transaction. Gill-netters: Costs,  Returns and Sharing Systems 
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Abstract 
This paper  analyzes the costs and returns for gill-netters, the major small-scale fishing gear  in terms of numbers 
of units and fishermen employed, operating in San  Miguel Bay,  Philippines. The analysis is based on investment costs 
and daily fishing trip data collected between June 1980 and May 1981 from a sample of gill-netters based in Cabusao, 
Camarines Sur. The 20-sample fishing units made a total of 4,680  fishing trips during this period. 
Gill-net operation is described;  its seasonality, species  caught and fishing areas are discussed. The most com- 
monly used  sharing arrangements between owner and crew are  illustrated to determine the returns to capital and 
labor in the gill-net fishery. Owners earn less than their opportunity costs and crewmen earn more than their oppor- 
tunity costs; each fishing unit earns a small pure profit. 
Finally, production functions are  used  to explain variations in monthly catch.  Eighty four  percent of the 
variation in monthly catch of the gill-netters can be explained by the number o!  fishing trips and gasoline expenditure 
per trip. 
Introduction 
Various forms of gill-nets have been used by San Miguel Bay fishermen for many years. Before 
World War  I  I, at least seven different types of bottom-set gill-nets were observed, each selective 
through its  mesh size for certain species (British Admiralty 1944). These nets were known by the 
general Bicol term palubog and they were used from non-motorized boats to catch mullet, deep- 
bodied herring, various scads and sea  catfish. The majority of fishermen in the Bay,  however, con- 
tinued to use the more traditional gears such as hook and line (banwit) and longline (kitang). Gill- 
nets, including the drift gill-net (panke), became more prevalent in the early 1960s and by the end 
of that decade, gill-netters began to acquire 3 to 9-hp engines for their boats using their own finances. 
According to respondents, non-motorized  boats outnumbered motorized boats until 1975 when the 
government launched the Samahang Lima, a major credit program for small-scale fishermen through 
the Development Bank of the Philippines (see Smith et  al.,  this report, for details). Through this 
program, many fishermen were able to acquire larger engines ranging from 9 to 16 hp. By 1981, approximately 70% of all gill-netters in the Bay were motorized. In 1980, the tiger-toothed croaker 
(abo) was the major species caught by the gill-netters and also by trawlers. 
The objectives of this study were: 
to calculate the returns on investment and residual income to owners/operators of motorized 
gill-nerters; 
to  determine the returns to  labor according  to the sharing system in operation for gill-netters; 
to compare the levels of income of owners and laborers. 
Methodology 
Ninety six gill-net operators were identified during the household inventory conducted in Cas- 
tillo in late 1979. Of these,  20 fishing units (approximately 20%) were invited to participate in a 
record-keeping  activity whereby costs and returns were recorded daily for a 12-month  period. Fish- 
ing units were selected for record-keeping  based on the willingness of the owner/operator and labor- 
ers to  cooperate with the researchers. A randomly selected sample of all  fishing units was  not thought 
to be practical. 
The 20 sample respondents fell into two categories: those who previously kept records of the 
daily costs/expenses and the value of their catch, and those who did no record-keeping. Fifty percent 
of oursample were found to be keeping records of some kind but none included all the specific items 
needed for this study. Initially, only half of the 20 respondents were willing to keep their own 
records according to the format. For the other half, daily visits by the researchers were at first neces- 
sary to record the required data. Notebooks were provided to those keeping their own records, and 
collected regularly; the data were subsequently recorded in survey files and the notebooks returned 
to  the correspondents. As the record-keeping  activity progressed, its value became more apparent to 
the respondents, so that by the second half of the data collection 90% of the respondents maintained 
their own records. Using the respondentsr own records supplemented by frequent visits, complete 
costs and returns data for the 12-month period were obtained. 
Not all 20 of the initial respondents completed the 12-month cycle. After one month of data 
collection, one respondent sold his fishing unit and moved to another locality. Three additional 
respondents withdrew because they feared, despite assurances to the contrary, that the information 
they provided would be turned over to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Substitutes were 
identified for these four respondents so that the number of fishing units could be maintained at  20 
through each of the 12 months during which data were collected. It  was decided that such substitu- 
tion would be acceptable because the sampling unit was the fishing unit, not the individual fisher- 
man nor the fishing household and because  primary interest was  in the average  monthly costs 
and returns of the sample gill-netters. 
Collecting  complete daily trip information required interviewsof both the boat owner and boat 
operator in many cases since not all owners actually fish. For example, the owner could provide 
information on trip expenses and value of the catch while the operator could provide details on the 
fish-ing area,  hours actually spent fishing and the species caught. Neither operator nor owner, how- 
ever, could provide reliable data on the volume of the catch because the catch is most often sold 
unsorted and in various containers at the beach landing. As discussed in Smith and Supanga (this 
report), catch per trip data were collected separately for gill-netters at their landing based upon 
conversion tables derived for estimating the weight (in kg) of the various rattan containers (baca- 
baca, tiklis) used. Therefore, the record-keeping  data collected from owners and/or operators con- 
centrated on the trip expenses  (e.g.,  gasoline,  oil and food) and the landed value of the catch. 
Description of the Gear and its Use 
Gill-nets used in Castillo, Cabusao (Figs. 1 and 2) are curtain-like nets consisting of a set of one 
or more pieces of rectangular net made of nylon twine. Fish capture is effected by gilling  or entangling the fish in  the net. There are two kinds of gill-net used in Castillo depending upon the fishing season, 
namely drift gill-net (panke) and bottom-set gill-net (palubog). Both are operated from a boat 
(banca) by  a crew of three fishermen. Of these three fishermen, one is the boat pilot (maestro) 
whose main job is to  operate the engine and direct the boat to the most productive fishing area. 
Glass floats 
I +Float  line 
Fig. 1. A bottomset gill-net (palubog). Source:  Umali (1950). 
I  I 
-sinker  line 
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Fig. 2. A drift net Ipankel. Source: Umali 11950). 
Boat pilots are experienced fishermen who can easily detect where the fishes are. They are either 
the son or a close relative of the boat owner whom he can trust. These factors, plus the responsibility 
of the pilot in leading the crew are the main reasons why many boat owners provide part of their 
own share of the catch revenue to the pilot. The other two crew members take care of casting and 
hauling the net. 
Drift gill-nets (panke) are only mid-water deep (6-14 m) and free to move with the current. 
Fishing begins at  about 4 a.m.  and lasts for an average of 9 hours per trip which includes travel time, 
fishing and marketing of catch at the landing. The length of each drift gill-net is 100 m and on 
average 10 units are joined to form a single long net. To check for possible catch, the fishermen 
scout along the set gear,  looking for unusual movement of the floats on any portion of the net. The fishermen stop fishing either when they have a large catch or when they must return to the landing 
place to sell their catch; selling begins at  about noon. If their catch is insufficient during the first, 
second or third haul, they may make up to 5 hauls a trip. On the average, drift gill-netters  make 
only one trip per day. 
Bottom-set gill-nets (palubog) are set close to  the sea floor, perpendicular to the current with 
weights at both ends of the lower part of the net. Floats are tied to  the float line to extend the net 
vertically. Using wooden plungers and bamboo poles, the fishermen drive the fish towards the net. 
Haulingstartsassoon  asenough fish have been gilled. Because the major species (mullet and herring) 
caught by the bottom-set gill-net are sold on a consignment basis to prearranged middlemen or 
processors, there is no designated landing time for operators of this gear,  unlike for those of drift 
gill-netters. 
Gill-netters  are operated year-round. The net may be changed from drift net to bottom-set 
depending on the fishing season.  Drift gill-nets are used from March to September which coincides 
with the habagat or southwest monsoon. Bottom-set gill-nets are used from October to February 
during amihan or the northeast monsoon. 
The major species caught during the southwest monsoon by drift gill-nets are tiger-toothed 
croaker (abo), whiskered croaker (pagotpot), deep-bodied  crevalle (salay-salay) and hair tail (lankoy). 
The first two comprise 82% of the total catch. During the northeast monsoon,  the bottom-set 
gill-net catches two major species:  mullet (banak) and herring (tamban), together comprising 99% of 
the catch. Some of the minor species caught by this gear are small whiskered croakers (pagotpot) 
and deep-bodied crevalle (salay-salay). Details of the biological aspects of the gill-net fishery and its 
catch are found in Pauly and Mines (1982). 
Costs and Returns 
CATCH AND EFFORT 
Monthly catch data (in kg) from February 1980 to January 1981 were collected from Castillo 
landing area I  I  where the majority of Castillo's gill-netters land their catch (see Fig. 2 in Smith and 
Supanga,  this report). This period does not coincide with the timing of the record-keeping  effort 
data collected from the gill-netters  but is presented simply to provide an indication of the seasonal 
variation in catch and the annual catch levels. Average catch per fishing trip for 12 months begin- 
ning February 1980 is shown in  Table 1. Catch per trip ranged from 27.5 to 61.4 kg and averaged 
45.3 kg. This information was used primarily by the project's biologists (see Pauly and Mines 1982) 
Table 1. Average catch and effort of gill-netters, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. N = 20 fishing units making a total of 4,680 
trips. 
1980  1981  Annual  Monthly 
Effort  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  totals  average 
No. of days in month  30  30  31  30  31  30  31  31  28  31  30  31  365  30.42 
No. of Sundays  44544  5444545  52  4.33 
No.ofpotentialfishingdays26  27  26  26  27  25  27  27  24  26  26  26  313  26.08 
No. of actual fishingdays  20  21  23  20  21  16  9  11  18  22  18  20  219  18.25 
No. of non-fishing  days  66366  9  18  16  6  4  8  6  94  7.83 
No. of fishing trips  20  22  24  22  26  21  9  12  18  22  18  20  234  19.50 
Catch 
Catch per trip (kg)  54.3  56.0  45.1  37.4  27.5  28.0  33.5  52.1  61.4  44.0  59.0  45.8  544.1  45.3 to estimate total catch from gill-netters in the Bay. The economic analysis based on the record-keep- 
ing data focused on costs and returns rather than catch data, which could not be obtained from 
respondents for reasons cited in the introduction to  this paper. 
Fishing days and trips were more frequent from March to October, ranging from 18 to 23 days 
and 18 to 26 trips, compared to  those from November to February, which ranged from 9 to 18 days 
and 9 to 21 trips. During the 12-month period, the average gill-netter made 234 fishing trips in 219 
fishing days. Operating costs and returns data frqm the sample fishing units (n = 20) thus covered 
4,680  fishing trips. 
There were many reasons why gill-netters did not fish every day of the year.  Fishermen rarely 
went fishing on Sundays, but preferred to rest at home 6-r engage in various forms of recreation, such 
asseeing moviesin nearby Libmanan, going to  the cock fighting arena,  or playing cards or volleyball. 
Reasonsfor not fishing on weekdays included in the order of their relative importance: bad weather, 
enginelboatlgear trouble, sickness,  crew changes,  unstable market and local beliefs in "bad  luck". 
"Bad  luck"  in fishing is a common idiomatic expression used by fishermen when,  despite their 
efforts, good weather and adequate gear,  they catch less than other fishermen who exert the same 
amount of effort with similar gear. Sometimes this "bad  luck" is attributed to fishing on religious 
holidays or with boatsfgear not properly blessed by the village priest. 
During the period February 1980-January 1981,39 days (non-Sundays) were counted as too 
rough for gill-netters to fish. After deducting 52 Sundays and 39 bad weather days during this 
period, 274 days remained. The average gill-netter fished 219 or 80% of these days. 
Fishermen viewed the market as unstable when they were unable to locate buyers to buy their 
catch at  a "fair"  price on a cash basis. Cash payment for catch was very important to the fishermen 
because they needed money for the next trip's operating expenses,  particularly fuel. 
Regardless of the reason for not going out fishing, Castillo gill-net fishermen had no alternative 
occupation during non-fishing days. A few days each month were spent in boat and gear repair, but 
in general there was  a lack of alternative work in Castillo. During bad times when non-fishing  days 
passed successively and the crew ran out of money for their family's food and other needs,  they 
asked the boat owners for loans. These are repaid from their share of the catch when fishing resumes. 
The boat owner's  loans to his crew assure that his crew will be loyal. Frequent transferring of crew 
from one boat to another is symptomatic of poor relationships and attitudes of both boat owners 
and crew, though crew composition of gill-netters tends to be more or less stable in most cases. The 
concept of utang na loob (reciprocity of good acts done by one person for another) still dominates. 
Another reason why boat owners lend money to their crew in spite of their debts is that if  they do 
not grant another loan, it is likely that the crew would transfer to another boat leaving behind their 
unpaid debts. Similar observations have been made about Laguna de  Bay fishermen near Manila by 
Jocano and Veloro (1976). To avoid such situations, boat owners keep granting loans to their crew 
and when catch improves, they enforce strict collection of debts. This way,  both parties' needs are 
served and safeguarded. The system, though viewed by some as exploitative, can be a means of 
reducing risk. To resolve the exploitation issue, one should examine the levels of indebtedness and 
the possible presence of any hidden interest rates. 
INVESTMENT COSTS 
Considering the income levels of fishermen in the San  Miguel Bay area,  entry into a gill-net 
operation requires a moderately high initial investment for the fishing unit (Table 2). The 20 gill- 
netter respondents invested an average of P10,525  for their banca, engine, gear and other equipment. 
These fishing units were acquired during the 1970s with the individual's average investment cost 
increasing as the years passed. Current replacement cost for a complete gill-netter unit including 
storage shed is P15,610,  or P12,610  without the storage shed. 
A gill-net owner usually owns several sets of drift gill-nets and bottom-set  gill-nets. During the 
1970s, one drift net set  (panyo) had an average cost of P313. Owning an average of 9 sets,  a gill-netter Table 2.  Average investment and replacement costs for gill-netters, Castillo, San Miguel Bay,  1980-1981. 
Av.  Av.  Av. annual  Av. annual  1981 
Total no.  Av. no.  acquts~t~on  expected  depreciation  depreciation  replacement 
owned by all  owned per  cost per  life  per item  per respondent  cost per item 





drift gill-net sets  189  9  313  3  104  939  350 
bottom-set gill-net sets  187  9  328  3  109  984  380 
Miscellaneous 
rattan baskets  319  16  5  .5  10  160  5 
tubs  4  .2  42  1  42  8  60 
storage shed  3  .15  2,167  12  190  36  3,000 
Average total acquisition  Average total annual 
cost per respondent3  PI  0,525  depreciation per 
respondent  P2,871 
Current average total 
replacement cost per 
respondent4  PI  3.01 2 
-  - --  ---  - -  - 
'~vera~e  annual depreciation per item = average acquisition cost per item + average expected life. 
2~verage  annual depreciation per respondent = average annual depreciation per item times average number owned per respondent. 
'~vera~e  total acquisition cost per respondent = 1  (averageacquisition cost per item times average number owned per respondent). 
4~urrent  total replacement cost per respondent = 1  (current replacement cost per item  times average number owned per respondent). 
invested 82,817  for nets. One set of bottom-set gill-nets was  8328, or P2,952  for the average 9 sets 
owned. The bottomset gill-net is slightly more expensive than the drift gill-net because the former 
has heavier lead weights and needs an anchor, and because the net has a slightly smaller mesh size. 
Average total investment for nets alone was 85,769  or 55% of the total investment for the average 
fishing unit. To replace these nets in 1981 would cost 86,570,  or 50% of the current average total 
investment cost. The cost of nets has,  therefore, appreciated at  a rate slower than those of other 
items, particularly engines. 
The most commonly used type of engine is a Briggs and Stratton gasoline engine of 9 to 16-hp 
range. Eighty five percent of our respondents use a 16-hp engine; 10% use  10 hp; and 5% use 9 hp. 
The average acquisition cost for these engines was 82,615  or 25% of the average total acquisition 
cost per respondent. Engine costs, however, have risen considerably in the last few years, and a 
16-hp  engine now costs 83,700  and a 10-hp engine, 83,400. 
The banca used is usually made of marine plywood and is relatively narrow and lightly con- 
structed (Fig. 3). The average banca is 12-m long and 0.7-m wide, and is equipped with outriggers 
on both sides for stability. The average acquisition cost for a banca is PI  ,728  or 16% of the total 
investment cost for a fishing unit. Replacement cost is currently 82,200. 
Only three of the 20 respondents own a storage shed or kamalig, a structure made of light 
materials like bamboo for walling and nipa for roofing. The small number of kamalig owned indicates 
that the storage shed  is not a necessary item for operating a gill-netter. Most gill-netters store their 
.  fishing equipment in the house of the owner or even just in the boat in the absence of a kamalig. 
For the average gill-netter, this item and other miscellaneous items such as tubs and rattan baskets 
(baca-baca and tiklis) make up less than 4% of the investment costs. Fig. 3. Gill-netters landing their catch at Castillo, Cabusao. 
The total investment required for the average gill-net fishing unit (P13,012)  is slightly less than 
the P15,000  lending limit that has characterized recent credit programs for municipal fishermen. Of 
our 20 respondents, five or 25% acquired one or more of their fishing items through the credit pro- 
grams of the Development Bank of the Philippines or other such lending agencies. These programs 
have done much to increase the extent of motorization in the municipal fishing fleet of San  Miguel 
Bay and increased fishing effort as a result. 
FIXED COSTS 
Certain fixed costs are incurred whether the fishing unit operates or not because they relate to 
"sunk"  capital investment which cannot be retrieved without undue loss (Panayotou 1981). In the 
case  of gill-netters fixed costs consist mainly of depreciation of the fishing assets and the license fee 
for their use. 
Average total annual depreciation per gill-net fishing unit was  P2,871  (Table 2).  This amount 
must be reserved for eventual replacement of fishing assets after they wear out. Two kinds of annual 
licenses that must be paid by each gill-net owner are the mayor's permit of P20 per operator and the 
operating license of P40 per fishing unit yearly. Earnings must be high enough to cover these fixed 
costs in addition to  operating costs if fishing Is to continue in the long run. 
OPERATING COSTS 
Operating costs such as gasoline, oil, parts, repair and maintenance, food, labor cost and other 
cash costs depend on the extent of use of the fishing unit. In the case of gill-netters, no labor cost is incurred because the crew, or partners as they are called locally, receive their payment in the form 
of a share of the value of the catch. Because these operating costs vary with the use of the fishing 
unit, they are considered variable costs. 
On the basis of the total operating expenses per fishing trip (Table 3) during 1980-1981, two- 
thirds was for the purchase of gasoline. The increase in gasoline price during 1980-1981  from P3.50 
to P5.5511 has had a significant impact on operating costs. This 67% increase in the price of gasoline 
resulted in  a 45% increase in the average operating costs per trip over this 2-year period. 
Table 3. Average operating costs per fishing trip, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. N = 20 fishing units making total 4,680 trips. 






Deducted before sharing 
gasoline 
oil 
repair and maintenance1 
food 
others (cigarettes, etc.) 
Subtotal  74  96 
Deducted from owner's share 
spare parts'  3  4 
Total operating costs per trip  77  100 
-  -  -  -  - 
Expenses for  net and engine spare parts that exceed P50  are paid by the owner after sharing. Expenses that are less than P50  are 
considered as  repair and maintenance costs and are deducted from the total value of the catch before sharing. 
A common practice in the Castillo area  is that gasoline and oil are advanced to the fishermen 
by local businessmen. There is no gasoline station in Castillo and gasoline must be brought from 
Libmanan in 55-gallon drums. At any one time up to five businessmen are engaged in the selling of 
gasoline while doubling as shrimp middlemen or as processors. The gasoline is purchased in Libmanan 
for P5.0511 and is resold in Castillo for P5.5511. The cash outlay of these gasoline dealers for a 
full 55-gallon drum is approximately P1,050 from which they earn a net return of P102. Out of this 
they must pay their expenses in transporting the gasoline to Castillo and the empty container back 
to Libmanan, so this return appears reasonable. 
It  is not through the.simple sale of gasoline, however, that these businessmen earn their income. 
If  the fishermen are unable to pay cash in advance, the gasoline dealers are willing to  accept payment 
in kind at  the end of the day. Fishermen indebted to gasoline dealers in this way claim to receive 
about 10% less than the prevailing market price for their catch. This reduction in price paid by the 
gasoline dealerlprocessor produces an  extremely high rate of return for the lender and a credit 
charge to the fisherman that is probably exorbitant by most standards. 
This hidden interest charge can be calculated as follows. Assuming that each gill-netter requires 
nine liters of gasoline per day, the gasoline dealer would advance the equivalent in kind of P50. 
During the 1980-1981  period (from Table I),  the average gill-netter caught 47.7 kglday, the average 
landed price of which was P3.15lkg (Table 4) or total value of P150.30. A 10% reduction in the price (P0.321kg) is equivalent to a reduction in  sale value of P15.03. The gasoline dealer/processor 
has therefore advanced P50 in return for which he receives a saving in expenses of PI  5.03 or a daily 
return on operating capital of 30%! 
A common money-lending scheme in the Philippines is known as 5:6  (i.e.,  borrow P5 today, 
repay P6 within 2 weeks). The credit advances by these gasoline dealers in Cabusao are providing a 
return that even exceeds the already high 20% return of the 5:6 schemes where the risk of non- 
payment is probably just as high. That the fishermen do not themselves purchase their own gasoline 
from Libmanan is probably related to the large capital outlay (>  P1,OOO)  needed and transport 
expenses required to purchase the gasoline in Libmanan. Certainly complaints from fishermen about 
their dependence on these gasoline dealers were frequently heard. The sithation deserves more study 
to determine the true nature of costs and risks borne by the gasoline dealers and the benefits derived 
by fishermen of assured gasoline supply. 
Table  4.  Monthly  average  price  per  kg  (in  pesos)  received  by 














Weighted average pricelyear  3.15 
Note: All data come from Table 1 using the formula: 
Total value of catch (av.lboatlmonth) 
(catch per day x # days fishing) 
Sharing Systems 
Monthly operating costs are summarized in  Table 5. These costs are deducted from the total 
value of the catch before the sharing system of owners and crew is applied. One of the two most 
common sharing systems used by Cabusao gill-netters (System A) is based on a basic 50-50 division 
of the net revenue (value of catch less operating expenses) with equal shares accruing to the owner, 
on the one hand, and to the crew as  a group,  on the other hand (Fig. 4). Fifty five percent of the 
sampled gill-nettersfollowed  System A.  Forty five percent applied a variation of this system (System 
B)  whereby the owner gave  10% of his own share (equivalent to 5% of the net revenue) to the 
boat pilot, or maestro (Fig. 5). 
Owner-operators generally followed System A,  thus retaining for themselves both the boat 
owner share and the share for being one of the fishing partners. However, one cannot categorize 
owner-operators  and non-fishing owners according to  the sharing system they used because 40% of 
the non-fishing owners also used this basic 50-50 sharing system and did not provide an  incentive to the boat pilot. The remaining 60% provided such an  incentive. A more complete discussion of 
sharing systems and causes for their variation can be found in Villafuerte and Bailey (1982). 
Based upon these two systems and the data from our sample, it is possible to calculate the 
income earned by owners, boat pilots and crewmen (laborers) under these two basic sharing systems. 
Table 5.  Monthly costs and returns of gill-netten,  in  pesos, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
1980  1981  Annual  Monthly 
June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  totals  average 
Total value of 
catch 








Monthly net revenue 
(before sharing) 
Average total value of 
catch per fishing day 
Net revenue 
(P76.22)  u 
of boat owner  Share of crewmen 
Fig. 4.  Sharing system of net revenue of gill-netters, Castillo, San Miguel Bay,  1980-1981. 
Sharing  system  A:  basic  50-50  sharing  system  for  Cabusao  gill-netters on a daily basis 
(1990-1981) with no  incentive given to  the boat pilot  by the owner (N = 11). 
'Note that these costs are for a daily basis in contrast to  Table 3 which shows operating 
costs on a per trip basis. Fig. 4 shows the daily sharing under System A whereby the total value of catch per fishing day 
(P149.22) is allocated among owner, a boat pilot and 2 crewmen (partners).  The crewmen (partners) 
and boat pilot each earn approximately PI  3lday and the owner earns P38.11, or three times as 
much as the boat pilot. However, the owner must pay the fixed costs (e.g.,  licenses, depreciation) 
and any costs for major spare parts out of his net income. If  the owner goes fishing with his gill- 
netter, he retains not only his share as owner but also one 16.7% crew share.  Usually he does not 
keep an additional 5% share for acting as the boat pilot although one of our respondents did so. 
In contrast, Fig. 5 shows the division of the daily net revenue when the boat pilot receives an 
added incentive share from the non-fishing owner (System  B). For those gill-netters  using this system, 
crewmen earn PI  1 (almost P2 less than under the first system) while the boat pilot earns over P14, 
or almost half the net income of the boat owner. The net income of boat owners under System B is 
22% less than the boat owner net income under the alternative System A which is most often used 
by owner-operators. 
Table 6 summarizes the monthly income accruing to owner-operators, non-fishing  owners, boat 
pilots and crewmen under the two sharing systems. Note that the income shown for owners repre- 
sents the balance of their share after sharing and that they must still pay depreciation and other 
fixed costs out of this share. 
Of the 20 gill-netters, 11 were owner-operated  and 9 were borrowed and operated by a boat 
pilot. There wasno significant difference between the two in terms of number of actual fishing days, 
fishing trips, catch per trip or total value of catch per fishing day. Owner-operated gill-netters fished 
slightly less frequently (223 dayslyear) than those of non-fishing owners (234 dayslyear). Owner- 
operated gill-netters, however, had lower average operating expenses per trip and thus higher income 
especially for the owner but also slightly higher for each member of the crew. 
Average total value of 
catch per fishing day 
(P151.151 
1 




Share of boat owner 
boat owner 
(P29.771  (P14.341  (PI  1.03)  (P11.031 
Fig.  5. Sharing system  of  net revenue of gill-netters, Castillo, San  Miguel Bay,  1980- 
1981. Sharing system B: daily sharing system with boat pilot receiving incentive share 
from boat owner (N = 9). 
'~ote  that  these  costs are  for  a daily  basis  in contrast to Table 3 which shows 
operating costs on a per trip basis. Table 6. Comparison of  monthly  net  incomes in pesos earned by owners, boat pilots and crew under alternative sharing systems, 
Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Sharing System A  Sharing System B 
50-50 sharing  50-50 sharing  All 
without added incentive  with added incentive  gill-netters 
for boat pilot (n = 11  for boat pilot (n = 9)  (n = 20) 
No. of fishing days per month 





-  -  -  - -- -  -  - - 
'owners  must still pay fixed costs and certain major operating costs out of their net income. See text for discussion of return to 
capital of owners. 
The 20 respondents could be classified as  follows: 35% owner-operated; 25% boat-pilot operated 
but with no incentive share from the owner; and 40% boat-pilot operated with 10% of the owner's 
share going to the boat pilot. Boat pilots who received no additional incentive share were usually 
the sons of owners,  so  the incentive share was  not thought necessary due to such a relationship. 
Sharing of the net revenue is once a week,  most often after the owner has been paid by the 
processors for the catch sold to the processor during the preceding week. Sharing of net revenue on 
a daily basis only occurs when the owner has the cash readily available, which is infrequent. 
In addition to the sharing of the cash net revenue, most gill-netters also set aside up to  4 kg of 
the daily catch for their own consumption. This amount of fish (approximately  8% of the total daily 
catch of the average gill-netter)  is also divided according to the sharing system in use.  Non-fishing 
owners and owner-operators  would receive 1.8 and 2.7  kg,  respectively. Crewmen and boat pilots 
would receive 0.7  and 0.9  kg,  respectively, the imputed value of which would be P2.20-2.80 daily. 
In the cases of ordinary crewmen and boat pilots, this income in kind represents 15% of their daily 
income from fishing. 
Returns to Capital and Labor 
Because of the various sharing arrangements used by gill-netters, and other fishing gear operators, 
it  is misleading to simply calculate costs and returns for the fishing unit as  a whole. Instead, returns 
to  owners (capital)  and to crewlpartners (labor) based on the various sharing systems were calculated 
and then compared with the appropriate opportunity costs of capital and labor. In this way, it can be 
determined whether there is any pure profit remaining in the San  Miguel Bay gill-net fishery, while 
at thesame time providing sufficient information to  guide those who may be interested to invest in a 
gill-net fishing unit. 
RETURNS TO CAPITAL 
As shown in Table 6 (based on Figs. 4 and 5), the net income of owners depends upon the 
sharing system they practice. Owners (excluding their possible boat-pilot share as owner-operators 
which is a return to labor) earn P690 monthly if  no incentive is given to the boat pilot or P544 
monthly if  incentive is given. These average monthly earnings add up to ?8,270  and P6,549  annual earnings, respectively. Weighted according to the sample, the average gill-net owner earned a net 
income of P7,524 during the 12-month  study period (Table 7). 
From this net income, it.is necessary to  deduct fixed costs, and maintenance and repair expenses 
not covered before sharing to determine the annual residual return to owner's capital, labor and 
management. This averaged 83,251  for our sample gill-netters or 8270lmonth. 
To see  if  any pure profits (as defined in Smith et al.,  this report) are earned by the gill-net 
owners, the opportunity costs of their own capital and labor must be deducted from the residual 
return. Boat owners in the gill-net fishery on average incurred a pure loss of P96 in 1980-1  981. 
1981. 
It is important that this pure profit (or loss) not be confused with the rate of return on invest- 
ment that is commonly reported in  costs and returns studies. The rate of return is commonly calcu- 
Table 7. Annual returns to capital in pesos for gill-netters, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Sharing System A  Sharing System B  All 
without incentive  with incentive  gill-netters 
for boat pilot (n = 11  )  for boat pilot (n = 9)  (n = 20) 
No. of fishing days per year 
Dailv net income of boat owners 
Annual net income of boat owners 
Annual costs of owner 
Fixed costs 
mayor's fee  20 
license fee  40 
depreciation2  3,549 
Total fixed costs  3,609 
Variable costs 
repair and maintenance  664 
Total variable costs  664 
Total fixed and variable costs  4,273 
Residual return to owner's capital, 
labor and management 
Less opportunity costs 
of investment capital3  947 
of own labor4  2,400 
Total opportunity costs  3,347 
Owner's pure profit (loss) 
From Figs. 4 and 5. 
2~ased  on current replacement costs (Table 21,  because it is assumed the owner will need to set aside this amount annually to 
replace his fishing unit or pans thereof as  they wear out. 
3~ased  on 9% of acquisition cost (Table 2). 
4~alued  at  P4O/man-day,  and  5 dayslmonth,  and representing work  performed by the owner related to purchase of  inputs, 
repair and maintenance. lated by representing the residual return to owner's capital and management (after deducting own 
labor opportunity cost) as a percentage of invested capital and/or replacement cost. In  fact, studies 
often fail to deduct the opportunity cost of the owner's labor which results in a greatly overstated 
return on it~vestment  (see examples cited in Smith et al. 1980). 
In the case  of gill-netters, the opportunity cost of the owner's  labor was  calculated based on 
the amount he would have earned in fish processing (P401day see  Yater et  al.,  this report), the 
most likely alternative activity for a boat owner, and on an estimated 5 days spent per month on 
work related to his fishing unit (e.g.,  purchase of supplies, repair and maintenance) which amounts 
to P2,400 annually. 
The rate of return, based on average acquisition costs of the present gill-net fishing fleet, is 
Residual return -  labor o~oortunitv  cost 
acquisition cost 
calculated as follows: 
Rate of return  = 
For the individual currently considering an investment in a gill-netter, acquisition cost would 
be higher (P13,012) and rate of return would be lower (6.5%). 
To account for the alternative uses for which the owner could have used his capital, this rate of 
return on investment must be compared to the opportunity costs of capital. If the rate of return is 
higher than the opportunity cost of capital, he is making the best use of his investment. In  the case 
of gill-netters, it was determined that the opportunity cost of the owner's  capital is that amount 
which he could have earned by putting his capital into the local rural bank where he could have 
earned 9% annual interest. 
The rate of return on investment of the current fleet (8.1%) and the rate of return of a potential 
entrant (6.5%) are both lower than the opportunity costs of capital and the owners of gill-netters 
thus, on average,  incurred a pure loss in 1980-1981. Interestingly, incentives for boat pilots, while 
increasing the income of pilots, apparently failed to increase the residual return and pure profit of 
owners. 
RETURNS TO LABOR 
As with capital, the returns to labor can be compared with their respective opportunity costs 
(Table 8). The actual income earned by labor is shown in  Table 6. To calculate the annual opportunity 
cost of labor for boat pilot and crew with which to compare this actual income, it was  necessary to 
first estimate the total number of days in the year engaged in actual fishing and in related activities 
such as mending nets and repairing boats. The latter tasks are performed by the crew without com- 
pensation. It  was  estimated that the crew spend on average 2.5  dayslmonth or 30 dayslyear engaged 
in these activities. The total number of dayslyear that fishermen work is approximately 250. The 
second data required are estimates of the daily opportunity wage  for labor. A figure of PlOlday was 
used, which is the daily earning of an ordinary carpenter and also the wages  of ordinary laborers 
who work on some of the fixed fishing gears such as the fish corrals in the vicinity of Castillo. 
On average (Table 8), the boat pilot and crew earn more than their opportunity wage.  Based 
on a crew sizeof 3 (1  boat pilot and 2 partners), the pure profit to labor over and above opportunity 
costs per gill-net fishing unit is P707. 
RETURNS TO THE FISHING UNIT 
Combining the pure losses of boat owners with the pure profits of labor provides a small pure 
profit of P611 to the average fishing unit (Table 9). It  is important to note that this amount, which is very modest, accrues to the current fishing fleet. New entrants, who would be faced with a higher 
investment cost and thus a higher opportunity cost for their capital (PI  ,I7 1 vs.  P947) would only 
earn a pure profit of approximately P400, although there are apparent differences between profit 
and loss depending on the sharing system used. Those units without incentive to the boat pilot 
(these boats are generally operated by the owner or a close family member) on average earned pure 
profits while those units with incentive to the boat pilot (90% owned by non-fishing owners) 
incurred losses because of their higher operating costs,  a fact for which no explanation is evident. 
Table 8. Annual returns to labor in pesos for gill-netten, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
-- 
Sharing System A  Sharing System B 
without incentive  with incentive  All 
to boat pilot  to boat pilot  gill-netters 
(n=  11)  (n = 9)  (n = 20) 
No. of fishing dayslyear 




Annual net income 
Less opportunity cost2 
Pure profit (loss) 
Crew partners (2) 
Daily income 
Annual net income 
Less opportunity cost3 
Pure profit (loss) 
Pure profit (loss) to labor 
per fishing unit3 
Represents days of unpaid labor by the pilot and crew performed in maintenance and repair of the fishing unit estimated at 2.5 
daysimonth. 
'~ased on an  opportunity cost of PlOiday, the daily earning of an  ordinary carpenter in Castillo. See  text for calculation of rele- 
vant days. 
3~ased  on a crew of 3 consisting of 1 boat pilot plus 2 crew. 
Table 9. Pure profit (loss) in pesos for gill-netters, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Sharing System A 
without incentive 
to boat pilot 
(n = 11) 
Sharing System B 
with incentive 
to boat pilot 
(n = 9) 
All 
gill-netten 
(n = 20) 
Pure profit (loss) to 
owners capital  1 
Pure profit (loss) to 
labor2 
Pure profit (loss) per 
gill-netter fishing 
unit  1,509  (562)  61  1 
From Table 7. 
'~rorn  Table 8. Variability of Catch 
Data from 20 respondents for 12 months total 240 monthly observations of catch, effort, 
revenue and costs. Using  these data and managerial characteristics of the respondents (age, education 
level,  years experience in fishing), an  attempt was  made to explain variations in monthly catch 
levels. Logarithmic functions best described the data, and two (log-log)  specifications  are reported 
here. 
The first specification was  as follows: 
Y = f (T, A,  F,  E,  P) 
or in log-log form, 
Logy= Loga+P,  LogT+P2 LogA+&  Log F+P4 Log E+P5 LogP+e 
where  Y  = 
a  = 
T  = 
A  = 
F  = 
E  = 
P  = 
e  = 
total catch per month 
constant 
number of trips per month 
age of respondent 
years of fishing experience 
education level 
engine horsepower 
error (disturbance)  term 
Results were as follows: 
Log Y  = Log 0.828 + 1.441 Log T + 0.035  Log A + 0.01 2 Log F + 0.01 1 Log E + 0.1 58 Log P  + e 
s.e.  -  -  0.067  0.1 60  0.059  0.079  0.166 
t  -  461.3  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.90 
R~  =  0.67 
F  =  96.53 
From the above equation, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding the impact of the 
various effort and managerial variables on variations in catch: 
A total of 67% of thevariation in  catch per month can be explained by the five explanatory 
variables included in the equation (R~  = 0.67). The overall fit of the equation is good 
judging by the high F-value. 
Of the five explanatory variables, only number of trips (T)  has a significant impact on 
catch (Y). The coefficient is significant at the 0.01% level. 
0  None of the other four explanatory variables (age of fisherman, years of fishing experience, 
education level or engine horsepower) has any impact on catch variability. In  all cases,  the 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. The results for engine horsepower are 
actually not surprising because all of our respondents used motorized bancas,  with little 
variation in engine size. 
Of side interest, the hypothesis that fishing effort (number of trips per month) would be 
affected by household size of the respondent was also tested but rejected. 
With these  results it was  further hypothesized that variations in monthly catch could be 
explained by the number of trips and the average gasoline expenditure per trip. That is, where  Y  =  total catch per month 
T  =  number of trips per month 
G  =  average gasoline expenditure per trip (PI 
e  =  error (disturbance) term 
or in log-log  form, 
Log Y  =  Loga + 0,  Log T + P2  Log G + e 
The results were encouraging and provided greater explanatory power than the first specifica- 
tion. 
Log Y  =  Log 0.025 + 1.069 Log T + 0.906  Log G + e 
s.e.  -  -  0.05  0.056 
t  -  -  449.67  260.49 
R  -  -  0.84 
F  =  639.98 
The coefficients of both number of trips and gasoline expenditures were highly significant. 
These results indicate that 84% of the variation in monthly catch of gill-netters can be explained by 
the number of trips and by the amount of gasoline expenditure per trip. 
Conclusion 
The preceding sections have documented the economic status of the gill-netters of San  Miguel 
Bay, and have shown the precarious position of both owners and crewmen involved. Owners earn 
incomes of P270lmonth but  this is less than the opportunity cost of their own capital and labor 
inputs. Income to labor is low, ranging from P200 to 260lmonth depending upon the sharing 
system in use and upon the individual's role in the crew (i.e.,  boat pilot or crewman). However, even 
this absolutely low level of income exceeds the opportunity wage of labor, thus indicative of the 
extremely limited employment alternatives in the San  Miguel Bay area. 
Gill-net fishermen have demonstrated their adaptability to the changing seasons and relative 
species abundance by their shifts from gear to gear during the year.  In addition to the documented 
shifts from drift gill-nets to bottom-set  gill-nets, a small number of gill-netters uses a mini-trawl net 
(pamalaw) during the balao (sergestid shrimp) season. Twenty five percent of the Castillo gill-netters 
used a mini  trawl at  one time or the other during  the year (primarily during the period December- 
February), but this type of shift occurs almost exclusively among a few gill-netters located near the 
southern base of the Bay. Moreover, the majority of gill-netters even in Cabusao and Calabanga 
apparently do not wish to  subject their boats to  the additional  strain caused by towing a mini trawl. 
Therefore, the additional earnings (and costs) from this activity were not included in this study of 
the gill-netters. 
One final point relates to the recent rapid motorization of the municipal fisheries of San 
Miguel Bay. Because none of the loans made to  San Miguel Bay fishermen under the Development 
Bank of the PhilippinesSmall  Foreshore and River Fishermen program (also known as the Samahang 
Lima program and not to be confused with the more recent Biyayang Dagat credit program) were 
repaid in full, gill-netters, along with other gear types,  have benefited from substantial capital 
subsidies in the recent past. Expansion of the fleet in the mid-1970s was thus much more rapid than 
would have been the case  had capital had a cost. With the engines and boats purchased with this free 
credit now in need of replacement, the true economics of the fishery (as reflected in the analysis in this paper) will come into play. With more limited credit now available, and with competition from 
other more profitable gears,  expansion in numbers of gill-nets  will undoubtedly slow down, though 
the fleet will continue to provide positive but low incomes to owners and crew. 
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Abstract 
Costs and returns of three major stationary gears of Cabusao, San  Miguel Bay, Philippines, are analyzed. The 
gears discussed include fish corrals, liftnets and filter nets. Systems for allocation of fishing rights are presented and 
the returns of capital and labor determined based on the sharing system practiced for each gear. 
During the observation period, the fish corrals and filter nets earned pure profits in excess of their opportunity 
costs and the liftnets incurred pure losses. 
Introduction 
Stationary gears form an important part of the municipal fisheries of San  Miguel Bay, Philip- 
pines. As of 1981 there was  a total of 320 stationary gears in the Bay consisting of 89 fish corrals, 
171 lifrnets and 60 filter nets. In addition to these major types, there were also smaller numbers of 
tidal weirs and semi-permanent  barricades which because of their lesser importance were not included 
in this study. 
These stationary gears remain much the same  as when they were first introduced into the Bay 
many years ago.  Energy saving as  they are, they represent a 'traditional' form of technology that has 
been very popular over the years and which, due to  the recent increases in fuel prices, will undoubt- 
edly remain popular for years ta come, 
As  pointed out by Spoehr (1980),  the fish corral (saykad in Tagalog and Bicol languages) is an 
ancient invention and many were already in use in the Philippines when the Spaniards arrived in the 
1500s. Until the 1930s it was the most important commercial fishing gear  in  the country, including 
San  Miguel Bay (Herre 1927; Umali 1937). Numerous types of fish corrals exhibiting  various designs 
are used from shallow to deep waters (Spoehr 1980). They all use a barricade to guide the fish into 
the inner chambers where they are trapped (Fig. 1  ).  In San  Miguel Bay, shallow water types pre- 
dominate. Their contribution to  the total catch of the Bay has declined considerably since World Fig. 1. Fish corral (baklad, also known as sagkad. Source: Umali (1950). 
War II with the motorization  of the municipal fishing fleet and particularly with the introduction 
of trawling. In the 1930s, Cabusao fishermen claimed that P500 was  sufficient to erect a fish corral. 
Prior to 1970, the netting material used for the corral was  an  improvised bamboo screen (locally 
known as  banata), but during the 1970s polarex material (plastic screen) was  introduced. Current 
investment cost (approximately P10,OOO)  is comparable to  that required for other municipal gear 
such as  a motorized gill-net unit. 
Set liftnets (bukatot in Bicol) that currently operate in San  Miguel Bay are also ancient fishing 
devices, though their reintroduction to San Miguel Bay in their present form is apparently quite 
recent (Fig. 2). Liftnets take many forms (Umali 1950; Spoehr 1980) and the Philippine basnig 
[a mobile liftnet usually operated from a vessel exceeding 3 gross tons (GT)],is thought to have 
evolved from earlier stationary liftnet types.  Every year during the southwest monsoon a large 
basnig fleet is based at Mercedes at the mouth of San Miguel Bay but these vessels operate mainly 
outside the Bay. In  the past, they used to operate within the Bay but it has now become too shallow 
for their nets which extend below the vessel during fishing. Although no historical data are avail- 
able, respondents say  that the stationary liftnet made its appearance in San  Miguel Bay  in the early 
1960s, with Cabusao fishermen adopting it in 1967. Due to its  small size, it is able to operate in 
the shallower depths where basnig do not operate. Currently, the stationary liftnets concentrate in 
the 4-7 fm (7.3-12.8 m) area in the center of the Bay. 
Like the fish corrals, filter nets (biyakus)  have also been prevalent in the Bay for many years. 
Filter nets are relatively simple gears used in shallow waters against the tide. In the 1930s, the gear 
was essentially mobile and could be removed from the water at  the end of the day's operation. At 
that time the gear consisted simply of two poles with the net tied between them. By the 1940s, in 
Cabusao the gear evolved into a more substantial structure with up to 25 supporting poles and 
became a stationary gear (Fig. 3). It  remains a much cheaper gear than the fish corrals and stationary 
liftnets. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the economics of these three stationary gears. The 
focus is on costs and earnings to determine the returns to  capital and labor for each of the three 
gears. Fig. 2. Stationary liftnet (bukatod. 
--  ~- 





Fig. 3. Filter net (biyakus). Source: Umali (1950). 
Operation of Stationary Gears 
FISH CORRALS 
Fish corrals in San Miguel Bay are constructed in well sheltered waters along the shore and 
rivers. A major concentration of fish corrals is in the Looc River (actually an estuary) between 
Tinambac and Siruma. A second concentration is near the mouth of the Bicol River. This gear  is 
most productive during full moon (bulanon) or when it is waxing. Fish corrals also operate during 
new moon (dulum) or when it is waning, but the bunt is hauled only once instead of the usual 
twice daily. Fish corrals operate seven  months per year during the southwest monsoon, usually starting in March and ending in September. Those gears operating near Tinambac have a somewhat 
longer season because they are located in more sheltered areas.  The most common species caught 
are:  anchovies (dilis), small  herring (bulinao), deep-bodied crevalle (salay-salay), deep-bodied 
anchovies (tigi), shrimps (bilugon) and blue crabs (kasag). 
. , 
LI  FTNETS 
The stationary liftnet (bukatot) consists of a platform  set on posts in  waters between 4 and 7 fm. 
The structure is made of the trunks of anahaw palms and bamboos. Liftnets are operated during 
the dark phases of the moon with the aid of lights to attract schools of fish. Fish attraction usually 
takes 2-3 hours. The light's intensity is reduced when enough fish have been detected to encourage 
the fish to move nearer the surface of the water towards the light. Hauling is simply done by lifting 
the net, and the catch is then transferred to  a boat where the species are sorted. An average of three 
hauls are made each night. Like the fish corral, this is a seasonal type of gear  operating from 4-7 
months per year depending on the weather. The usual species caught are similar to those caught by 
the fish corral: anchovies,  small deep-bodied herring (tamban), small herring, deep-bodied crevalle, 
and squid (pusit). 
FILTER NETS 
Filter nets (biyakus) are usually located at the mouths of rivers with the mouth of the net 
facing the current. The gear  has no non-return  valve but relies on the strength of the current to 
make escape  of the catch difficult. Unlike the fish corrals and  liftnets, the filter nets are used 
year-round, although the peak  season  is the same  as  that of the other stationary gears  (March- 
September). Like the fish corral, the filter net is most productive during the full moon, at which 
time fishermen will make two trips to the gear during the night to haul the net and harvest the 
catch. Single trips are made at other times. The proximity of the gear to shore also allows fishermen 
to use this gear even during times when the catch is very low, unlike the fish corrals and liftnets for 
which the purchase of gasoline is required to operate the bancas to reach the gear. The catch of the 
filter nets is known as halo, or 'mixed' species such as  small anchovies, croakers, shrimps, occasional 
blue crabs, tiny shrimps (balao) and trash fish (diaco). 
Methodology 
Data on fishing gear economics were collected through a record-keeping  activity involving a 
small sample of gear owners and operators who were accessible from the site of our research station 
in Castillo, Cabusao. The Looc River was  unfortunately too far away to include in the sample. 
The period during which data were collected was June 1980 to May  1981. Based on our house- 
hold survey conducted in Castillo during the late 1979, all owners and operators of these stationary 
gears were identified. We  identified three fish corrals, three liftnets (the owners actually lived out- 
side the barrio) and 23 filter nets. All three fish corrals, three liftnets and four of the filter nets were 
included in  the sample,  and their owners were asked to keep daily records of their fishing activities. 
When two of the three fish corrals stopped their operation in October 1980, two others from a 
nearby barrio were substituted so  that the full 12-month  fishing cycle could be monitored. Both 
owners and operators of these gears were interviewed to assure completeness of data. 
To avoid repetition and aid comparison the following sections discuss important aspects of 
the analysis for all three gears together. 
Catch and Effort 
Fish corrals and liftnets are seasonal gears while the filter net is operated year-round (Table 1  ). 
The catch from the filter net is collected on the average every two days. The gear  is used on about 
190 days per year. More than one trip is made to the gear on several of these days,  however. Decem- Table 1. Catch and effort of stationary gears sampled in the Cabusao area, 1980-1981. 
1980  1981  Annual  Monthl 
June  July  Aug.  Sept.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec.  Jan.  Feb.  Mar.  Apr.  May  totals  average  Y 
Fish corral 
No. fishing days  24  23  20  16  13  25  24  145  20.7 
No. non-fishing days  6  8  11  15  Not  operating  18  6  6  70  10.0 
No. fishing trips  30  30  30  21  17  37  44  209  29.9 
Total catch (kg)  1,038  1,185  916  928  398  684  1,410  6,559  937.0 
Catch per fishing day (kg)  43  52  46  58 
Catch per trip (kg)  35  40  31  44 
Liftnet 
No. fishing days  10  14  24  7 
No. non-fishing days  20  17  6  23 
No. fishing trips  10  11  24  7 
Not operating 
Total catch (kg)  541  1,233  1,727  433  3,934  983.5 
Catch per fishing day (kg)  54  88  72  62 
Catch per trip (kg)  54  88  72  62 
Filter net 
No. fishing days  15  18  15  21  14  15  18  18  10  15  16  15  190  15.8 
No. non-fishing days  15  12  15  9  17  15  13  13  20  16  14  15  174  14.5 
No. fishing trips  17  22  16  23  15  17  18  20  10  21  23  23  225  18.8 
Total catch (kg)  472  616  356  514  509 387  306  307  105  434  541  688  5,235  436.2 
Catch per fishingday (kg)  32  34  24  25  36  26  17  17  11  29  34  46  27.4 
Catch per trip (kg)  28  28  22  21  34  23  17  15  11  21  24  30  22.8 
'~verage  for months of operation only. 
ber to February are particularly lean months when the catch is  well below the average. Monthly catch 
averaged 436 kg during the 1980-1  981 period, equivalent to almost 28 kg per fishing day and 23 kg 
per trip from the shore. 
Both the fish corral and the liftnet were more productive on a daily basis (when they operated) 
than the filter net, but both are operated only part of the year. Fish corrals were operated only for 
seven months during the observation period, and liftnets for only four months. Rough weather in 
April and May 1981 was the reason that the liftnet operators did not resume fishing. The normal 
liftnet fishing season runs from late March to October, or approximately seven  months, and thus 
normally coincideswith  the season of the fish corrals which catch essentially the same species. Being 
further offshore, however, the liftnet is more susceptible to damage and is more difficult to reach 
during rough weather and in 1981, the fishermen decided not to construct their gear until after May 
(the end of our record-keeping  project). The volume of catch per month for the two gears was 
approximately the same  (937 and 983 kg,  respectively), but the catch per fishing day and per trip of 
the liftnet was  considerably higher. 
As  is the case with other fishermen, those who use stationary gears usually do not fish on 
Sundays. The number of active fishing days is also regulated by the phases of the moon as explained 
earlier. 
Costs and Returns 
INVESTMENT COSTS 
Stationary gears  require levels of investment that are somewhat less than the investment 
requirements for the major mobile gears,  such  as gill-netters and mini trawlers. By this criteria, therefore, they can be considered very much within the municipal fisheries sector in that the amount 
required to set up one of these gears falls within the lending limits (815,000) of most credit pro- 
grams for municipal fishermen. 
Of the three gears discussed,  the filter net has the lowest investment cost (Table 2). Almost 
half of the cost of the gear is  the bamboo structure itself and recent increases in the price of bamboo 
(50% in two years) have had a significant impact on investment costs which in total have increased 
approximately 40% since 1980. Current replacement cost of the entire unit, including a non-motor- 
ized banca is 83,535.  Because expected life span of the gear structure is short, annual depreciation 
costs represent over 40% of current replacement costs. 
The fish corrals included in our sample are typical of those used in San  Miguel Bay but, by 
nationwide standards, are small. They have no impoundment area but rather a leader that leads 
directly into the bunt. Their average investment cost is approximately 2.5 times that of the filter 
net. The current replacement cost of the average assets of the owner of a fish corral (not all owners 
have a complete set of all items) is approximately P9,000  (Table 3). Again, due to rapid deprecia- 
tion of the gear structure and the net, annual depreciation per respondent is quite high (85,539). 
Table 2. Average acquisition cost, replacement cost and annual depreciation for Cabusao filter net fbiyakus). 
Average no.  1982 
owned per  Per unit  Average  replacement  Expected  Annual 










'~nnual  depreciation is based on 1982 replacement cost,  using straight-line method with zero-salvage cost.  US$1.00  = P8.00 
(in 1982) 
Table 3. Average acquisition cost, replacement cost and annual depreciation for fish corral fbaklad or sagkad). 
Average no.  Average  1982 
owned per  acquisition cost  Replacement cost  Expected  Annual 
l  tem  respondent  per item (PI  per item (P)  life  span (years)  depreciation (P)' 
Gear structure 











Average total acquisition 
cost per respondent3  :  6,755 
Average total replacement 
cost per respondent4  :  9,083 
Average total annual depre- 
ciation per respondent5  :  5,539 
'~nnual  depreciation is based on 1982 replacement cost using straight-line method with  zero salvage cost. 
2~orty  percent of the respondents owned a motorized banca; 60% owned a non-motorized banca. The costs shown for this item 
are for the 'average'  banca. 
3~verage  total acquisition cost per respondent = x  (average acquisition cost per item x average number owned per respondent). 
4~verage  total replacement cost per respondent = I; (1982 replacement cost per item x average number owned per respondent). 
'~verage total annual depreciation per respondent = Z  (annual depreciation per item x average number owned per respondent). The liftnet is the most expensive of the stationary gears used by Cabusao fishermen (Table 4). 
As with the other two gears, the increase in price of bamboo has resulted in a higher total replace- 
ment cost (812,190).  In the case  of the liftnet, ihcreased engine prices have also had an effect, 
more so than for the filter net and fish corral both of which are close enough to the shore to be 
reached by non-motorized  bancas. 
Table 4. Average acquisition cost, replacement cost and annual depreciation for liftnet (bukatotl. 
Average no.  1980  1982 
owned per  Per unit  Average  Replacement  Expected  Annual 
I  tern  respondent  cost (PI  acquisition cost (PI  cost (P)  life span (years)  depreciation (PI' 
Gear structure  1  I  ,900  I  900  2,750  1 
Motorized banca  1  4,750  4,750  5,950  5 
Net  1  1900  1,900  2,090  2 
LPG lamps  4  307  1,228  1,350  4 
Baskets  5  9  45  50  1 
Totals  9,823  12,190  5,373 
'~nnual  depreciation is based on 1982 replacement cost, using straight-line method with zerosalvage cost. 
FIXED COSTS 
Under fixed costs, it is necessary to include all those expenses which are incurred independently 
of the daily operation of the gear.  In  the case of stationary gears, these costs include depreciation 
of fishing assets,  any interest payments for borrowed capital used to purchase the assets,  and any 
license fees or permits required  to operate the gear. Some argue in favor of including the opportunity 
cost of capital (the interest foregone) as a fixed cost (Panayotou 1981) but we  have chosen instead 
to deduct it from the residual return to owners after sharing because it demonstrates more clearly 
the opportunity cost concept. However, it is important to bear in mind that it is the sum of both 
capital investment costs and fixed costs (less depreciation, but including the opportunity cost of 
capital) that represents the cost of investing in a fishery, and that both fixed costs (including 
depreciation) and operating costs must be covered if  the fishing unit is to make a profit. 
There is one category of fixed cost that deserves special emphasis because it is peculiar to 
these stationary gear types. In  each fishing community around San  Miguel Bay, there is  a senior 
fisherman known as the amonojador, whose function is to advise on and give permission for the 
erection of any stationary gear  within municipal waters (see Cruz, this report). In addition to 
identifying potential locations for new gear,  he is also responsible for resolving disputes that may 
arise between owners from time to time. The amonojador thus has an important function as allo- 
cator of fishing rights in  the municipal fisheries, at least as  far as stationary gears are concerned. 
For this service in Castillo, he is paid PI0  annually by gear owners, although we have heard of pay- 
ments as high as 8100 in  other locations. 
The role of the amonojador has undoubtedly declined in importance since the introduction of 
more mobile gear types such as gill-netters and trawlers, but the fact that such a system still exists 
implies that at least in some communities a traditional system for allocation of fishing rights exists. 
There  is another reason this system is breaking down,  however, and this relates to population 
growth. Asked whether the amonojador system limits fishing effort in any way by denying permis- 
sion to erect stationary gears, the ex-mayor of Calabanga replied, "No,  because everyone in our 
community has the right to fish (and eat) no matter how poor we  all are." 
Fishing rights are apparently acquired through a tradition of use,  and highly productive  sites 
for stationary gears rarely change hands. Although in  some communities in the Philippines, fish 
corral sites are subject to bidding by prospective operators, such is not the case in Castillo, nor in 
other communities of San  Miguel Bay. Municipalities thus fail to take advantage of a bidding 
mechanism that they are legally empowered to establish under Presidential Decree 704 and which 
would provide them with a share of the rent from the resource. OPERATING COSTS 
Major operating costs for the fish corral and the liftnet include the costs of gasoline for the 
bancas to reach the gear and of kerosene (or LPG) to operate the lights (Table 5). However, only 
the liftnet has significant operating costs (PI20  daily); the operating costs of the fish corral and 
the filter net are only P38 and P5.60 daily, respectively. Unlike most other gears in the municipal 
fisheries sector, owners of fish corrals do not now use  a sharing system to divide the catch value 
with their partners as they did in the past. Rather, the owner pays a fixed daily wage  rate of PI0 
to each of two laborers. Hence, a daily labor expense of P20 is shown under operating costs. Because 
these operating costs depend on the operation of the gear,  they are often referred to as  variable costs 
in contrast to the fixed costs discussed earlier. 
These operating costs are subtracted from the daily value of the catch and the resulting net 
revenue (Tables 68)  is divided among owners and crewmen according to the sharing system being 
practiced. 
Table 5. Average operating costs per fishing day for stationary gears sampled in  the Cabusao area,  1980-1981. 
Gear type 
I-ish corral  Liftnet  Filter net 
Gasoline  7  18  41  34  -  - 
Gas (kerosenelLPG)  4  11  33  28  0.50  9 
Oil  -  1  1  -  -  - 
Labor  20  53  -  -  -  - 
Repairslparts  2  5  4  3  1.40  25 
Others (includes food and cigarettes)  5  13  41  34  3.70  66 
Total  38  100  120  100  5.60  100 
Table 6. Costs and earnings of fish corrals (baklad) sampled in  the Cabusao area,  1980-1981. 
1980  1981  Annual  Month1 
June  July  Aug.  Sept.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec.  Jan.  Feb.  Mar.  Apr.  May  totals  average  1 
Total value of 
catch (PI  2,242  2,603  1,558  1,997  not operating  1,731  2,867  3,177  16,175  2,311 
Total operating 
expenses (variable 
costs) in P  1,058  960  669  551 
Gasoline  215  221  102  114  69  130  176  1,027  147 
Gas (LPG)  1  04  88  71  66  48  100  108  585  84 
Labor  480  460  400  320  260  500  480  2,900  414 
Repairslparts  88  43  10  -  -  19  -  160  23 
Others (includes 
food and 
cigarettes)  171  148  86  51  48  117  86  707  101 
Monthly net 
revenue (P13  1,184  1,643  889  1,446 
Average price 
(PI received 
per kg4  2.16  2.20  1.70  2.15  4.35  4.19  2.25  2.47 
'~vera~e  for months of operation only. 
*~abor  is paid a PI0 daily wage rather than a share of the net revenue. 
%'his  amount represents the owner's share because labor has already received its share in  the form of  a daily wage. 
%otal  value of catch +total catch per month (from Table 1). Table 7. Costs and earnings of stationary liftnet (bukatot) sampled in the Cabusao area,  1980-1981. 
1980  1981  Annual Monthly 
June  July  Aug.  Sept.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec. Jan.  Feb.  Mar.  Apr.  May  total  average1 












Monthly net revenue 
(before sharing) (P) 
Average price (PI 
received per kg2 
1,242  2,362  5,368  985  not operating 
l~vera~e  for months of operation only. 
2~otal  value of catch +total catch per month (from Table 1). 
Table 8. Costs and earnings of filter nets (biyakus) sampled in the Cabusao area,  1980-1981 
1980  1981  Annual Monthly 
June  July  Aug.  Sept.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec.  Jan.  Feb.  Mar.  Apr.  May  totals  average 
Total value of 
catch (PI  604  1,233 
Total operating 
expenses (variable 
costs) in P  67  120 
Gas  (LPG)  7  19 




cigarettes)  51  69 
Monthly net 
revenue before 
sharing (PI  537  1,113 
Average price 
(PI received 
per kg1  1.28  2.00  1.65  1.45  .98  1.13  1.58  1.26  1.15  1.49  1.67  1.52  1.47 
'~otal  value of catch +total catch for the month (from  Table 1). 
PRICES RECEIVED 
The average monthly price received by owners or operators can also be calculated for each 
gear from the catch value (Tables 6-8) and total catch (Table 1). These prices indicate that the 
stationary gears are catching low-priced  species (Tables 6-8). Average prices for the fish corral and 
liftnet which catch similar species, were P2.47 and P2.53,  respectively. During March and April, the 
fish corral operators received in excess of P4/kg, and we suspect that this may be due to the fact 
that the liftnets did not operate during this period due to rough weather. The average monthly 
price received by filter net owners or operators was only PI  .47/kg, reflecting the low value of their 
mixed catch. Sharing Systems 
The sharing system formerly used for fish corrals in Castillo was  locally known as socio-indus- 
trial. As  the term suggests, a partnership was involved. The owner provided the initial capital for 
constructing  the fish corral and purchasing the necessary equipment and the crew provided the labor. 
Over time, part of the share that normally went to labor was withheld by the owner as  laborer's 
contribution to  the investment cost until 50% of the investment cost was  paid for. The crew's contri- 
bution to  capital investment was  made on a regular basis.  For example, if  there were five fishing days 
in one week,  the crew received shares for two days and the owner withheld the other three. The 
owner and crew would then eventually be equal partners sharing the net revenue 50-50 after deduct- 
ing operating expenses. 
According to Castillo fishermen, this unique sharing system began to break down about 1970 
and by 1980 was  replaced by a system of daily wage  payment to labor. Under the earlier sharing 
system, the crew  had complete responsibility for handling the gear  and selling the catch since 
owners often did not go fishing. The owner had to rely exclusively on his partners. Untrustworthy 
partners apparently resorted to selling part of their catch elsewhere to the detriment of owners. 
The seasonal nature of the fish corral's use contributed to this behavior because it led to lack of 
permanent partners. Nowadays, owners themselves handle the selling and disposal of the catch. 
Partners (who are now only laborers) are paid PI0  daily after the catch is disposed. The monthly 
net revenue figures shown in Table 6 therefore represent the owner's share after the labor payment 
is made part of the operating costs. This daily sharing system for fish corrals is shown in Fig. 4. 
In contrast, filter nets and stationary liftnets use the basic 50-50 sharing system that is common 
to other municipal gears. Partners who provide the labor for these two gears thus share in the risks 
of poor catch (and the windfalls of good catch) unlike the fish corral laborer who gets PI0  daily 
regardless of the value of the catch. The liftnet crew usually consists of 4 members; one buso mayor 
(leader of the crew) and three laborers. Most owners of stationary liftnets do not go fishing. The 
buso mayor receives an  incentive share from the owner (equivalent  to 5% of the net revenue) in 
addition to his share as  a regular crewman (Fig. 5). 
Depending upon its  size, the filter net requires only one or two fishermen to operate. Conse- 
quently, whether any sharing system is used depends upon whether or not the owner goes fishing 
himself. In the former case,  the full net revenue accrues to the owner. In the latter case,  the net 
revenue is divided 50-50 between the owner and partner(s). In our sample, 50% of the filter nets 
were owner-operated  and 50% were operated by partners. The sharing system of those gears using 
partners is shown in Fig. 6. The filter nets represented by this diagram were more productive than 
those which were owner-operated.  The owner-operated gear  had an average daily net revenue of 
P31.55,  all of which went to the owner. The owner's share of net revenue for the larger filter nets 
(Fig. 6) was P19.39 if  he did not go fishing or P29.09 if  he took the place of one of the two laborers. 
Average total value 
of catch per fishing day 
(PI  11.64) 
Fig. 4. Daily sharing system for fish corrals (1980-1981).  This is a fixed wage system for labor. 
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Fig. 5.  Daily sharing system for stationary liftnets (1980-1981). 
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Fig. 6. Daily sharing system for filter nets owned by non-fishing  owner and using two fishermen (1980-1981). 
50%  Net revenue 
($38.77) 
50% Returns to Capital and Labor 
The normal procedure for calculating costs and returns is to treat the production unit (in  this 
case the fishing unit) as  a whole. In this paper, however, the net incomes of owners and partners 
(laborers) are treated separately as representing returns to capital (after deducting fixed costs) and 
labor, respectively. The residuals are then compared with the respective opportunity costs to deter- 
mine whether pure profits or losses are being earned by the stationary gears. 
MONTHLY INCOME 
The previous section presented incomes on a daily basis; Table 9 summarizes the income data 
on the more usual monthly basis. It is important to note that neither the income of owners nor the 
income of laborers shown in this table represents their true earnings. In the case  of owners, certain 
fixed costs must be paid out of monthly net income; laborers are expected to work free of charge 
a few days each month on gear  maintenance and repair. One final point is that the monthly net 
income figures shown in Table 9 represent those months when fishing took place (seven months 
for the fish corral; four months for the liftnet; and 12 months for the filter net). These monthly 
incomes are sustained year-round only if  the fishermen involved shift to other gears,  as is often 
the case. 
In addition to their incomes through the wage or sharing systems, fishermen who man these 
stationary gears are also able to supplement their families' diet by fishing with hook and line from 
the gear  structure. We have no estimate of the value of these in-kind earnings. 
Table 9. Monthly net incomes in pesos of owners and partners (laborers) for stationary gears, Cabusao area, 1980-1981. 
Fish  Filter nets using 
corrals  Liftnets  1 fisherman1  2 fishermen 
No. months of operation 






Busornayor  n/a  230  nla  nla 
Other laborer  207  164  nla  173 
'owner-operated  only. 
'owners  must still pay for fixed expenses out of their monthly net income. 
3~ssumes  that the owner also serves as busornayor or leader of the crew. 
RETURNS TO CAPITAL 
These can be calculated by deducting the pertinent costs from the share of net revenue that 
accrues to owners. This share is shown as  annual net income of gear owners in Table 10 for each of 
the stationary gear types. From this amount must be subtracted all fixed costs such as depreciation 
and the various licenses and permits. Depreciation is calculated on the straight-line zero-salvage-value 
method and is based on the 1982 replacement costs of the gear on the assumption that the owner 
must set aside this amount annually if  he is to be able to replace his gear as  it wears out. Unlike 
gill-netters (see Yater, this report), the owners of stationary gears incur no further operating costs 
after sharing. Routine maintenance and repair are either charged as an  operating expense before 
sharing or, if  not, we  assume that the depreciation is sufficient to cover them. It  is important to 
avoid double counting  of maintenance and repair (Elliston 1978). Subtracting these fixed costs from Table 10. Annual returns to capital in pesos for stationary gears, Cabusao area, 1980-1981. 
Fish corrals  Liftnets  Filter nets1 
No. fishing days per year 
Daily net income of gear owners 
Annual net income of gear owners 







Residual return (loss) to owner's 
capital, labor and management: 
Less opportunity costs: 
of investment capital3 
of own labor 
Total opportunity costs: 
Owner's pure profit (loss): 
'~vera~e  for both 1-man and 2-men filter nets, in contrast to Fig. 6 which represents 2-men filter nets only. 
2~rom  Tables 2-4. Based on current replacement cost. 
3~ine  percent of average acquisition cost as  in Tables 24. 
the annual net income of gear owners leaves the residual return (or loss) to owner's capital, labor 
and management. To determine pure profit the opportunity costs of labor and capital are subtracted 
from this residual. If  the amount remaining is positive, a pure profit (rate of return in excess of the 
opportunity cost of capital) is earned; if it is negative there is  a loss. 
Opportunity cost of capital isestimated to be 9% of the original investment cost, or the amount 
of interest that can be earned on savings at the local rural bank in Cabusao. It represents the income 
foregone because the fisherman chose to invest his capital in fishing gear,  rather than put it in the 
bank. 
Opportunity cost of the owner's  own labor represents the income foregone by working for no 
remuneration on his fishing gear  instead of in an alternative income-generating  activity. We estimate 
that owners spend 16,10 and 12 days per year on work related to their fish corrals,  liftnets and 
filter nets, respectively, over and above their actual fishing time (if  any). This time includes such 
activities as purchase of bamboo, supplies and preparation of food for the crew. An opportunity 
cost of P40 per day (the daily income for a fish processor) was used to estimate the annual oppor- 
tunity cost of owner's  own labor. These amounts along with opportunity cost of capital were 
subtracted from the residual return to owner's  capital, labor and  management to estimate pure 
profit or loss. 
After taking all these fixed and opportunity costs into account, our results show that owners 
of fish corrals and filter nets earned a pure profit while the owners of stationary liftnets incurred 
a loss during the study period. 
Because we  thought that 198081 may be an  unusual year for the liftnets, we  attempted to 
calculate the hypothetical owner's  profit or loss had the season extended the full seven months. 
In a normal year,  monthly catch may be higher in the 'missedr months than in the four months 
we  observed. Based upon trawler catch of anchovies (the major species caught by liftnets) which 
was twice as  high during March-May than during June-September and assuming constant operating 
costs per fishing day, annual net income of owners would increase to P7,465.  Thus they still incur a pure loss of P556. Crew income would have almost doubled, however. There are further indica- 
tions that these Cabusao liftnets were atypical in 1980-1981  from a 1982 feasibility study conducted 
by the Land Bank of the Philippines by the Tinambac Rural Workers organization which showed 
that liftnets would be profitable (B. Cervantes, pen. comm.).  For that study it was  assumed that 
groups of liftnet operators would share the use of bancas, thus reducing their individual costs, and 
increasing profitability. 
RETURNS  TO  LABOR 
In addition to  work actually performed during the fishing operation, laborers also assist with 
net repair and other maintenance chores for which they receive no remuneration. To obtain a clear 
picture, therefore, of whether labor is earning an  income comparable to that which can be earned 
in other activities these additional days must be taken into account (Table 1  1). 
The opportunity cost of labor was estimated to be PI0  per day which is the wage  that an 
ordinary carpenter is paid in Cabusao. It also represents the amount that an ordinary laborer on a 
fish corral would be paid for one day's work. 
Table 11. Returns to labor in pesos for stationary gears,  Cabusao area,  1980-1981. 
Fish corrals  Liftnets  Filter nets1 
No. fishing days per year 
No. gear  repair days per year 
Total working days per year 
Major fisherman (bus0 mayor) 
Daily income 
Annual net income 
Less opportunity cost2 
Pure profit (loss) 
Other fisherman (laborer) 
Daily income 
Annual net income 
Less opportunity cost 
Pure profit (loss) 
Pure profit (loss) to labor 
per fishing unit: 
nla 







'~vera~e  for both 1-man and 2-men filter nets, in contrast to Fig. 6 which represents 2-men filter nets only. 
'~stimated to be PI0  per working day (fishing plus gear repair). 
3~rew  consisting of 2 ordinary laborers. 
4~rew  consisting of 1 buso mayor plus 3 ordinary laborers. 
'crew  consisting of 2 ordinary laborers. 
The resulting comparisons show that the buso mayor on a liftnet earned more than his oppor- 
tunity wage. The other fishermen (laborers) on corrals and liftnets earned slightly less than their 
opportunity costs and those using filter nets earned slightly more. Taking the whole gear  crew 
complement into account, laborers on liftnets and filter nets earned a small pure profit; laborers on 
fish corrals were losing relative to their opportunity costs. The labor requirement of the fish corrals 
is sporadic by season and by phase of the moon covering only a few hours of each fishing day and 
therefore may permit other part-time employment (C. Bailey, pers. comm.). Consequently, a some- what lower labor opportunity wage than PI0  daily may be more appropriate for these gears,  in 
which case the pure loss to labor would disappear. 
RETURNS TO THE FISHING UNIT 
Taking pure profits and losses of both capital (Table 10) and labor (Table 11) into account on 
an annual basis, we found that fish corrals and filter nets earned pure profits of P3,431 and P1,215, 
respectively, while during the period of study, stationary liftnets in the Cabusao area incurred pure 
losses of P4.2  1  1. 
Conclusions 
The costs and earnings of the three major stationary gears that operate in San  Miguel Bay-fish 
corrals, liftnets and filter nets have been documented in the preceding sections.  Incomes of ordinary 
fishermen who work these gears range from PI64  to P207 per month during those months when 
the gears are operating. The filter nets operate year-round, but during the months when liftnets 
and fish corrals do not operate, fishermen who normally work them seek employment with other 
gears.  Earnings from these gears are thus highly seasonal for owner and crewmen alike. 
There are some interesting contrasts between the liftnets and the fish corrals. Both fish for 
much the same species,  though the catch per fishing day of the liftnet is 50% higher. They also 
receive comparable prices per kg of catch. The much higher operating costs of the liftnet (it  is the 
most energy intensive of the three stationary gears), however, result in losses.  Lower energy costs 
contribute to  substantial profits for the fish corral. The sharing systems are quite different, with 
fish corral laborers paid a daily wage and the liftnet crew sharing in  the more common 50-50 sharing 
system. The co-existence of profits to owners of fish corrals and wages  lower than opportunity costs 
to  laborers implies an imbalance in the sharing of proceeds that can only be maintained by the power 
of owners. 
The high (relative to other gears) profits of owners of the fish corrals may relate to the ownersr 
role in the community. In many cases,  these owners are processors who invest in fish corrals to 
assure themselves of supply for their processing (salting) activities. Often processors are the finan- 
ciers behind the visible fish corral operators, who have borrowed bamboo and other materials 
in-kind from the processors to  whom they sell their catch at  a lower price. The sharing system for 
fish corrals thus favors owners over laborers. 
Over and above the possible benefits in the form of higher prices that may have accrued to fish 
corral operators due to reduced competition from liftnets, these pure profits earned by owners of 
fish corrals and filter nets may be a function of their stationary nature in that their existence in a 
body of water makes it impossible for others to use the same space. Common property and open 
accessconditionsdo not hold in this case  (but there may be significant externalities from overcrowd- 
ing), and if  either municipalitiesor amonojadors are actually limiting access,  we  would expect to find 
such pure profits occurring. However, we  found no evidence to show that restrictions were being 
placed on access.  If  they were,  we  would have expected to find that either the license or permit 
fees or the amonojador's fee were higher than their presently low levels. 
It appears  that  a combination of numerous factors including advantages of  location, low 
operating costs and the failure or unwillingness of the licensing authorities to extract more of the 
rent (pure profit) of the fishery for themselves contribute to  the higher pure profits of fish corrals. 
At present there appears to be no relationship between licensing fees and gear  profitability as far as 
stationary gears are concerned, and municipalities may be missing an opportunity to increase their 
revenues through increased license fees for fish corrals, especially. 
Finally, it should be noted that unlike the mobile gill-netters and mini trawlers which have 
fishing ranges throughout the Bay, these stationary gears may be characterized by locational differ- 
ences in catch and profitability. While Cabusao gill-netters and mini trawlers are believed to be 
representative of the Bay as a whole, our stationary gear sample is probably less so. References 
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Abstract 
Push  nets operated by fishermen  in the vicinity  of Cabusao,  San  Miguel Bay,  Philippines, are  described.  In 
comparison to most other small-scale fishing gears of the Bay, investment costs for push  nets were very low. Daily 
income was  less than the local opportunity wage,  most fishermen apparently using the gear  only on a seasonal and 
part-time  basis. 
Introduction 
Push nets (sakag), sometimes known as scissor nets, are operated by single fishermen at wading 
depths (Fig. 1). The nets are pushed along the bottom. Operation of this gear  is highly seasonal 
because large waves make its use difficult. The major species caught by pushnetters in Cabusao are 
sergestid shrimps (balao). 
According to old-time fishermen, the gear  has evolved from a two-man  seine locally known as 
sarap, Before mini trawlers appeared in San  Miguel Bay,  fishermen claimed that daily sarap catches 
could reach 50 kg or more. Because the sarap catch declined after the introduction of mini trawlers, 
the push net was developed to allow a fisherman to operate without a partner and at reduced cost. 
A small sample (n  = 5) of the 25 push-net operators in Castillo, Cabusao, identified during our 1979 
survey was studied and the findings reported briefly here. 
Costs and Earnings 
Among all the gears studied in the project, the push net had the lowest average investment cost 
of only slightly more than P200 (Table 1). Except for the cost of bamboo, this investment cost has 
not increased substantially since the units of our respondents were acquired. Annual depreciation 
for the average unit was approximately P56. 
During the survey period, June 1980-May 1981, the Cabusao push nets operated for only three 
months, June to August 1980. During these three months, push nets were used by respondents for a 
total of 44 days or 15 dayslmonth. Average catch was 6 kglday and consisted mostly of balao with 
occasional larger shrimps. 
The operators, most of whom worked on a permanent basis with balao processors, should be 
considered part-time seasonal fishermen who relied on push-net fishing only to supplement their household income. Once the rough seas of the northeast monsoon began, they devoted themselves 
full-time to working for the processors of the balao catch of the mini trawlers or to other activities. 
The average daily value of the push-net catch during the study period was  only P13.80,  or 
P10.40 after expenses for food, cigarettes and kerosene were deducted. There were no license fees 
for the push nets, but pro-rating  the annual depreciation from Table 1 over the 44 days of operation 
and deducting it from 810.40 left a daily net revenue of only P9.10. This income was slightly less 
than the opportunity cost to labor, or the daily wage  (P1O.OO)  that could be earned in alternative 
unskilled occupations in the Cabusao area during 1980-1981. Since 80%0 of the push nets in the Bay 
were operated by residents of Cabusao and Calabanga in areas similar to those of our respondents, 
(Esporlas 1982) we  believe that their daily income was comparable to that of our sample, though 
they may have operated for a longer season. 
Table 1. Investment costs and annual depreciation in  pesos for Cabusao push nets. 
Average  Expected  Average annual  Average 
Average  acquisition  life  span  depreciation  depreciation 
l  tem  no. owned  codunit  (years)  per item  par fishing unit  1 







Average acquisition cost  Total annual depreciation 
per push-net operator  20  1.40  per fishing unit  55.90 
l~vera~e  depreciation per fishing unit (rounded to  nearest P0.10) = average annual depreciation per item time$  average number of 
each item owned. 
Wooden shoe 
Floating basket  Bamboo poles 
Fig. 1. Sakag, a push net for catching shrimps. Source: Umali (1950). References 
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Abstract 
Mini trawlers are  the smallest trawlers operating in San  Miguel Bay, Philippines. This paper examines the costs 
and  earnings of this type of gear  and offers explanations for the high pure profits earned.  Variations in catch and 
incomes are related to differences in the various sharing systems and to variations in  fishing effort. 
Introduction 
The mini trawler, or mangquerna, was  introduced to Castillo, Cabusao in the early 1950s by 
fishermen from the community of Vinzons in the neighboring province of Camarines Norte. Vinzons 
fishermen still migrate annually to  San Miguel Bay during  the sergestid shrimp lbalao) season (Novem- 
ber to March) when mini trawler catch is  at  its peak. 
Mangquerna is the most widely used local term for this type of gear,  though there are more 
localized terms, such as  bancuerna (Barcelonita, Cabusao), itik-itik (Castillo, Cabusao) and kuto- 
kuto (Tinambac). According to  older fishermen in  Castillo, its local name (itik-itik) was derived from 
itik (duck) due to the tendency of mini trawl operators to congregate during a good catch, just as 
ducks do when a feed source is located. 
This paper reports on the costs and earnings of mini trawlers in San Miguel Bay. 
As  of 1980, there were 188 mini trawlers located in the Bay, not counting those from Vinzons 
which fish within the Bay at  certain times of the year (Esporlas 1982). Fully 51 or 27% of those 
located within the Bay in 1980 could be found in Barrio Castillo. Castillo and other communities 
at  the southern base of the Bay are the centers for the processing into shrimp paste or bagoong of 
that portion of the mini trawl catch that consists of balao. 
In 1979, however, the records of the municipal treasurer in Cabusao showed only 36 registered 
mini trawlers in all barrios of the community, so  apparently many mini trawlers failed to register with the municipality and to pay the necessary license fee. Since the 1980 registry was not available, 
our 1979 inventory of fishing units in Castillo became the basis for estimating the number of mini 
trawlers in the community. Because so  many of the mini trawlers had failed to register with the 
municipality, we had difficulty in  persuading mini-trawler owners to  participate in the study. Many 
were afraid that the data collected would be turned over to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BI  R). 
Consequently, we  were unable to use random sampling techniques, but instead identified a 30% 
sample (n = 16) of these Castillo mini-trawler owners who were willing to participate in  the costs 
and earnings study. 
Data were collected from these owners through a 12-month  record-keeping  exercise from June 
1980  to  May 1981. Prior to  the monitoring of their daily costs and returns, interviews were conducted 
with each owner to determine their investment costs.  Notebooks were provided to each respondent 
and data were collected and recorded either on a daily or a weekly basis depending upon the cooper- 
ation of each respondent. 
At the start,  16 fishing units were monitored. Within a few months, units had to be dropped 
from the sample. Three units were sold to new owners who declined to participate in the record- 
keeping survey; the fourth suffered a major engine breakdown and because the owner was sick and 
could not afford to repair the engine, the vessel no longer went out fishing. These four units were 
replaced by four other units which had records of their costs and returns dating back to June 1980 
when the study started. There were no subsequent dropouts and the sample size was maintained at 
16 throughout the study. Data were collected from a total of 2,992  fishing trips. 
Operation of the Gear 
Mini trawlers are the smallest of the various trawlers operating in San Miguel Bay. Although 
smaller than the small and medium trawlers (see Navaluna and Tulay, this report), the net shape, 
material used and mode of operation is similar. Mini trawlers on the average are 10.5  m long, 0.9 m 
wide and are generally powered by 16-hp Briggs and Stratton gasoline engines (Fig. 1). Unlike the 
banca used by gill-netters, the mini trawler has no outriggers. Trawling speed is very slow, estimated 
to be 1 knot (1.85 kmlhr) (Vakily 1982); therefore, very few fish are caught along with the shrimp. 
Mini trawlers are manned by a crew of two. Of our sample, only two were owner-operated  while 14 
(88%) were each operated by a pilot and a crewman retained by the owner. The limited number of 
owner-operators  can probably be explained by the fact that operating a mini trawler is extremely 
hard work, undertaken by younger fishermen (or family members) who may not yet have the 
capital to purchase their own fishing unit. 
Mini trawlers use two types of nets, the pamalao and pamasayan which have the same body but 
differ in the mesh size and material used at  the cod end. The cod end of the pamalao consists of a 
fine-meshed screen like that used for mosquito nets. The pamasayan is made of nylon with a cod end 
mesh size of 17 knots. On the average these nets have a headline length of 4-5.5 m for the upper 
rope and 5-6 m for the lower rope (Fig. 2). 
The pamalao  is used from September to  June, the southwest monsoon period, when the tiny 
sergestid shrimps (balao) are  abundant (Fig. 3). The pamasayan  is used to catch larger shrimps 
primarily during July and August, when balao are not as prevalent. Mini trawlers choose between 
the two nets depending upon their predicted catch. Switching by mini-trawl  operators from one net 
to the other occurs during the months of May to June and September to October because the onset 
and decline of the balao is never exact. In this manner, the mini trawlers are able to operate through- 
out the year. 
The Castillo mini trawlers operate throughout the shallower areas of the Bay. Though they are 
legally required astrawlers to fish beyond the 4-fathom (7.3 m) mark, since their main objective is to 









Fig. 2. Mini trawl gear  is similar to that of larger otter trawlers but with smaller mesh. 
Body 
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Fig. 3. Seasonality of gear use by mini trawlers. in 500 m of the shoreline in Barcelonita, Cabusao. The mini trawlers generally do not fish beyond 
the 7-fm (12.8 m) mark because of their short towing rope and small net. 
Other methods are also used to catch balao. The most common is a small scissor net (hudhud) 
pushed by one man at wading depths. This gear  is similar to the scissor or push net known as  sakag 
used to  catch balao and other species of shrimp that are cooked, dyed red, sun-dried and then shipped 
to Manila. Push nets operate for only a few months each year, however (see Supanga, this report). 
Motorized push nets are used in other shrimp fisheries in  the Philippines (e.g.,  Laguna de Bay) but 
are not used in San Miguel Bay in large numbers or with any regularity. 
Catch and Effort 
A typical fishing trip for a mini trawler lasts only one day. Fishing for the balao using the 
pamalao net is primarily a daytime fishery, with the mini trawlers leaving the shore at 5 a.m. and 
returning between 3 and 4 p.m.  Fishing using the pamasayan net is at night often until 3 to 5 a.m. 
the following morning. Only during one month (June 1980) did mini trawlers on average make more 
than one fishing trip per day (Table 1). 
The average number of trips per year was  187 with little variation from month to month. After 
adjusting for Sundays which are rest days in Catholic communities like Castillo, the average mini 
trawler fished on 60% of the 313 potential fishing days during the 12-month period, June 1980-May 
1981. If  a mini trawler fished on a Sunday, Monday was  a rest day because most fishermen believe 
that when Sunday fishing is good,  Monday catch will be poor. 
Although average fishing effort (as measured by number of trips) showed only a small variation 
throughout the year, average monthly catch per fishing unit ranged from a low of 480 kg in August 
1980  to a high of 4,365  kg in January 1981 (Table 1  ).  As will be discussed in the next sections, how- 
ever, average gross incomes per fishing unit did not vary as  much as  average catch because when 
catch was  low prices per kg were higher. This was  due to the presence of larger shrimps in the catch 
during the months of July-September. Average catch per mini trawler was  slightly over 25 t for the 
12-month period, or 2.1 tlmonth. 
There was considerable variation in  effort (no. of trips) and in catch between fishing units, how- 
ever (Table 2). For the 12 months the number of trips per fishing unit ranged from 119 to 224. 
Average catch per trip ranged from 86 to 200 kg,  and annual catch ranged from 14.4 t (fishing unit 
no. 11) to 35.7 t (fishing unit no. 2). 
Variation in number of trips (and monthly catch) can be explained by a number of factors, 
including engine breakdowns (1 major case) and vessel damage during typhoons (3 cases) involving 
fishing units 8,  11 and 12. The variation in catch per trip can be explained by the following factors: 
age  of the owner-operator1 (or the boat pilot if  the owner did not fish himself), years of fishing 
experience, education level of the owner-operator or boat pilot, and the gasoline expenditure per 
trip. Mathematically, this relationship can be expressed as: 
PPPP  Y=aA1  E2s3G4e 
or in log-log form2 : 
Log Y = Logcx + PI  Log A + 0,  Log E + P3  Log S + P4  Log G + e 
Due to  the arduous work on a mini trawler, age was hypothesized to have a negative impact on catch. 
2~og-log  specification resulted in a higher R~ than the linear specification. Table 1. Catch and effort of mini trawlers, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
1980  1981  Annual  Monthly 
June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  total  av. 
Effort 
No. of days in month  30  31  31  30  31  30  3  1  31  28  31  30  3  1  365  30.4 
No. of Sundays  4  4  5  4  4  5  4  4  4  5  4  5  52  4.3 
No. of potential fishing days  26  27  26  26  27  25  27  27  24  26  26  26  313  26.1 
No. of actual fishing days  16.7  15.4  15.4  13.6  18  14.4  14.7  15.3  16.0  17.8  13.7  15.9  187  15.6 
No. of non-fishing days  9.3  11.6  10.6  12.4  9  10.6  12.3  11.7  8.0  8.2  12.3  10.1  121  10.5 
No. of fishing trips  16.8  15.4  15.413.6  18  14.4  14.7  15.3  16.0  17.8  13.7  15.9  187  15.6 
Av. catchlfishing unit (kg)  1,344  748  480  588  2,014  3,240  2,970  4,365  3,136  3,168  1,554  1,456  25,063  2,089 
Catch per trip  81  49  31  43  112  225  202  285  196  178  113  92  -  136 
Catch per fishing day  80  49  31  43  112  225  202  285  196  178  113  92  -  135 
Table 2. Annual catch and effort of mini trawlers by fishing unit, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Fishing units 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
Effort 
No. of days in a year  365  365  365  365  365  365  365  365  365  365  365  365  365  365  365  365 
No. of Sundays  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52  52 
No.ofpotentialfishingdays  313  313  313  313  313  313  313  313  313  313  313  313  313  313  313  313 
No.ofactualfishingdays  184  211  206  191  176  175  169  180  276  199  150  119  210  212  195  172 
No. of non-fishing days  129  102  107  122  137  138  144  133  87  114  163  194  103  101  118  141 
No. of fishing trips  179  209  204  188  174  175  171  179  224  199  150  119  210  212  195  172 
Catchlfishingunit (kg)  25,187  35,703  33,969  32,080  34,750  30,393  15,481  24,800  23,069  17,067  14,384  21,707  21,278  18,309  22,483  20,663 
Catch per fishing day  137  169  165  170  197  174  91  138  102  86  96  182  101  86  115  120 
Catch per trip  142  171  167  171  200  174  92  139  103  86  96  182  101  86  115  120 where 
Y  =  average catch per trip 
A  =  age  of the fisherman (owner-operator or boat pilot) 
E  =  years of fishing experience of the fisherman (owner-operator or boat pilot) 
S  =  years of formal education of the fisherman (owner-operator  or boat pilot) 
G  =  average gas  expenditure per trip 
e  =  error term 
Average catch per trip (Y)  and average gas  expenditure per trip (G) are monthly averages. A 
dummy variable to cover seasonality effects was  not included. Total number of observations for this 
estimation was  therefore 192 for the 16 fishing units in  the sample. 
The estimated equation using ordinary least squares  multiple regression techniques was: 
Log Y  = Log  ,348 -  .334 LogA +  .080 Log E + .063 Log S +  1.041  Log G 
s.e.  -  -  (.I891  ( .084)  (.238)  (.064) 
t  -  -  1.76  0.95  0.26  16.33 
F  =  70.37 
~2  =  .60 (Adjusted R2 = -59) 
Sixty percent of catch variation per trip can thus be explained by the four explanatory variables 
included in the specified equation. The overall fit of the equation is good. All the coefficients have 
the expected signs,  including age  which was  hypothesized to have a negative impact on mini-trawler 
catch. Gasoline expenditure per trip is highly significant (p  > .01). The coefficient for age  is signifi- 
cant at  the 10% level, and since older fishermen are less likely to be mini-trawler operators in the 
first place, the results support the contention that younger fishermen, all other factors being equal, 
are likely to be more successful than older mini-trawl operators. Fishing experience and formal 
education of operators have no apparent impact on catch levels. If  mini trawlers do in fact group 
together when shrimp are located, then it is not surprising that experience and education have no 
effect on catch per trip, since all nearby fishing units will benefit from the success of the more 
experienced fishermen in identifying good fishing locations. 
Gasoline expenditures per trip are a measure of fishing effort since all mini trawlers in the 
sample are approximately the same size and use identical engines. Increases in  gasoline expenditures 
could be due to  either longer search time, or longer trawling time or both. According to the estimated 
equation, a 10% increase in gasoline expenditure will result in a 10.41% increase in catch, all other 
factors (age, education and experience) being equal. Average gasoline expenditure per trip during 
1980-1  981 was  P91.27; average catch per trip  was 136 kg. Therefore, the added cost of a 10% increase 
in gasoline expenditure would be P9.13;  the added return expected would be  136 kg x 10.41% = 
14.16 kg, valued at  P21.66 (average price per kg of mini trawler catch was PI  .53/kg during the study 
period). The added expenditure would produce an added net revenue of P12.53.  In  the following 
sections dealing with costs and returns, a particular group of mini trawlers that took advantage of 
this added net revenue by fishing longer will be identified and some explanations for this different 
behavior will be put forward. However, it is necessary to first discuss the costs of owning and operat- 
ing a mini trawler. 
Investment Costs 
The major items that are required for a mini-trawl fishing unit are the boat, engine and pamalao 
and pamasayan nets, including otterboards (Table 3). Together, these items comprise 93% of the 
current replacement cost (P9,187) of a mini-trawl unit. Other items include various containers, store- Table 3. Average investment costs of mini trawlers, Castillo, San  Miguel Bay, 1981. 
Av.  Replacement 
Av .  acquisition  cost (1981  Av.  Annual depreciation 
no.  costlitem  per item  expected  per item1 













Average acquisition  Average replacement  Average annual depreciation 
cost per mini-trawl unit3  =  P5,298  cost per mini-trawl unit4 =  P9,186  per mini-trawl unit5  =  PI  ,496 
~ased  upon 1981 replacement cost.   or most respondents, the cost of the otterboards was  included in the cost of nets. 
3~quals  (av. no. owned x av.  acquisition cost per item). 
4~quals  C (av. no. owned x av.  replacement cost per item). 
5~quals  1  (av. no. owned x annual depreciation per item). 
house (five of 16 respondents used a storehouse separate from their own house), flashlights and 
anchors ( 14 brave souls of 16 respondents used no anchor). 
Asshown in  Table 3, there is a significant difference between the acquisition cost of the average 
fishing unit of our 16 respondents and the current replacement cost of the same  set of items. The 
average length of current ownership of boats and engines in the sample units was  3.3  and 3.9  years, 
respectively. The oldest boat was  purchased in 1972 and the oldest engine in 1973, indicating that 
these items can have a long life if  well cared for. Respondents believed boats could, on average,  last 
nine years and engines,  10 years.  In fact several of the boats and engines used by respondents were 
acquired second-hand; all boats were purchased through own finances. Thirty eight percent of the 
engines were financed through the Development Bank of the Philippines. 
All respondents used 16-hp Briggs and Stratton gasoline engines,  13 respondents own engines, 
one rents his engine and the other two use mortgaged engines. These mortgaged engines are owned by 
others who, in return for a cash payment of approximately P500, lend their engines to operators of 
mini trawls. Their engines can be  redeemed upon repayment of the amount borrowed without 
interest. The engine lender thus receives a cash loan for no interest (except wear and tear on his 
engine), and the engine borrower uses an engine for only the cost of interest foregone on his P500 
cash payment. 
A mini-trawler unit can thus be acquired for less than a gill-net unit (see Yater, this report). 
Based on current replacement costs,  annual depreciation costs for the average mini trawler is P1,496, 
assuming a straight-line basis and zero-salvage value. 
Value of Catch 
As  mentioned earlier, the monthly catch value for the average mini trawler varies less than the 
monthly catch itself due to the presence of larger shrimps with high prices from June to September. However, at  its peak in January, monthly value of catch is still more than double the lower values 
obtained from June to September (Fig. 4). Although such variation is typical of each season, the 
peak apparently does not always occur during the same  month each year. One determining factor 
is the weather. The average monthly value of catch per mini trawler during the period of study was 
P3,209. 
Operating Costs 
Operating expenses are deducted from the gross value of the catch, yielding the net revenue 
which is divided between the owner and crew depending upon the sharing system that is used. 
Not surprisingly, the major operating expense for mini trawlers is gasoline, which is 78.6% of the 
total (Table 4). An average of 16 liters is consumed per trip. Food is  the second major operating 
expense. Because only the larger shrimps are iced, expenses for ice are very low. Some units in the 
sample used no ice at  all during the whole period of study. However, it is  a common practice for 
middlemen to provide ice free to mini trawlers as  part of an agreement to assure supply of shrimps 
so absence of an expense for ice in  our respondent's records does not necessarily mean no ice was used. 
The production system for mini trawlers can only be understood if  its links to suppliers and 
middlemen are explained, In addition to ice, shrimp middlemen and balao processors also provide 
gasoline in advance to mini trawlers (and to other motorized vessels) based in Castillo in return for 
the right to buy the catch. There are at  least five regular gasoline suppliers for the mini trawlers in 
Castillo and several others who also sell gasoline during the peak months of the pamasayan season. 
In  some cases,  the whole operation of input supply, production and processing is  vertically integrated. 
To cite an example, an individual may own a small fleet of mini trawlers of five to six vessels, engage 
in buying and selling of shrimps and crabs and sell gasoline and other fishing accessories. 
Average  month1  d2  h( 
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Fig. 4. Average  monthly volume and value  of catch of mini trawlers,  Castillo, San  Miguel Bay, 
June 1980-May 1981. Table 4.  Average monthly operating expenses and net revenue in  pesos (before sharing) of mini trawlers, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
1980  1981  Annual  Monthly 
June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  total  average 
Total value of catch 
per fishing unit  2,377 
Total operating expenses 
per fishing unit  1,554 
gasoline  1.291 
oil  37 
repairlpartsl  24 
food  159 
miswllaneous 
(cigarettes, ice12  43 
Monthly net revenue 
per fishing unit 
before sharing (PI  823 
Average pricelkg 
received3  1.76 
'some  owners but not all include minor repair and maintenance  costs as  pan  of the operating costs rather than pay for them out of the owner's 
>so  includes payment for occasional labor to assist with nat or boat repair or to  dive to recover nets entangled on underwater objects. 
Average price received is not the average prlce of balao, but the average per kg of the whole catch which also includes some larger shrimps. 
4~eighted  average by volume caught per month. 
; share. 
The capital requirement and risks for a middleman with these various activities is quite sub- 
stantial which explains the small number of individuals in Castillo who can function in this manner. 
Gasoline is purchased in 55-gallon drums from Libmanan at P5.0511 (1981 price) and transported 
by private jeepney to Castillo where it is resold at P21.00/gallon (equivalent  to P5.5511).  If  the 
middleman is engaged in buying and selling shrimps, gasoline would be advanced to the operators 
of mini trawlers to assure a steady supply of shrimp. Agents may also be retained and paid a 10% 
commission to purchase shrimps. Iced shrimps and blue crabs are shipped to Manila 400 km  away in 
styrofoam boxes via the bus or privately-owned  jeepneys. A jeepney  is used for shipments of four or 
more styrofoam boxes. The bus from Naga City is used for small shipments. In either case,  a regular 
buyer in Manila receives the shipment and is responsible for selling the shrimp. Payment is made to 
the Castillo businessman after the sale of the shrimp. The actual transfer of funds is made when the 
jeepney makes the next trip or by bank transfer between Manila and Naga.  Other fishing equipment, 
engine parts and nets to supply the businessman's own boats are purchased during trips to Manila 
where prices are lower. 
The Castillo businessman purchases ice to preserve the shrimp he sends to Manila from the 
Naga City ice plant (which is the closest to Castillo) at  P20.00 per block which is transported to 
Castillo in the back of a jeepney.  Rice husks and sacks are used to minimize melting. What is not 
needed for the Manila shrimp shipments is resold to other middlemen at P36.00 per block (1981 
price). The jeepney  takes shrimp to Naga for shipment on the bus and brings ice to Castillo on 
the return trip thus optimizing  the use of the jeepney. 
The few Castillo businessmen who engage in these multifarious  activities require significant 
amounts of capital to keep their businesses operating smoothly. Advances to mini-trawler operators 
is one method by which regular supply is assured. Although balao processors do not need the Manila 
outlet for their product and timeliness of shipments is less of a problem, they too assure supply by 
providing advances,  both cash and in kind, to mini-trawler operators. Because the per trip operating costs of mini trawlers (Table 5) are higher than those for any 
other gear in the community, mini-trawler operators in many cases believe they have little choice 
but to tie themselves to particular businessmen. For most mini-trawl operators their entire produc- 
tion unit, their inputs and their market outlets are all controlled by local businessmen. Whether 
this arrangement is exploitative or not is debatable;at  least a regular, though fluctuating income for 
the crew of mini trawlers is assured. 
Sharing Systems 
The income of owners and crew of mini trawlers depends upon the sharing system used. The 
basic system of sharing divides the net revenue (gross income minus operating expenses) equally be- 
tween the owner and the crew. In  Castillo, however, there are three variations of this basic system 
that indicate  ways by which owners successfully provide incentive to their crew. For example, owners 
can offer to (1) increase the share of the pilot and/or (2)  shoulder more of the routine repair and 
maintenance costs themselves. 
The first of the three variations (variation A) is that in  which the pilot receives 10% of the 
owner's share,  or 5% of net revehue in addition to his share as a member of the crew (Fig. 5). The 
daily incomes of the partner (ordinary crew) and the pilot under this system are 819.46 and P23.35, 
respectively. The owner must still pay for fixed costs (depreciation, licenses, etc.) and certain 
variable costs (major repair and maintenance) out of his daily income of 835.03. Five (31%) of the 
16 mini trawlers in our sample used this sharing system. 
Another five (31%) mini trawlers used a sharing system (variation B) whereby repair and main- 
tenance expensesare paid by the owner out of his share rather than as an operating expense (Fig. 6). 
This system,  however, did not apparently have the desired effect of increasing incomes of either 
crew or the owner. In  fact, daily incomes were lower (but not statistically lower) than daily incomes 
that crew and owners received under the first sharing arrangement. Because the former group fished 
more often on average (16.6 vs.  13.9 dayslmonth), monthly incomes for the two groups were the 
same  (Table 5). We  examined the average volume of catch, value of catch and price received of the 
10 mini trawlers in these two sharing system groups and found no significant difference between the 
two. We  therefore concluded that this particular method of incentives to crew is ineffectual. 
The remaining six mini trawlers in our sample practiced a sharing system (variation C)  whereby 
20% of the owner's share (equivalent to 10% of the net revenue) is given to the pilot (Fig. 7). This 
incentive from the owner is thus twice as large (in percentage terms) as the incentive payment made 
under variations A and B.  Minor repair and maintenance expenses are treated as operating expenses, 
as they were in variation A. This group of mini trawlers has significantly higher gross income and 
owner and crew income than the other two sharing system groups. The daily incomes of the partner 
and pilot are  P29.22  and 840.90,  respectively; owner's  income is 846.76. Despite the fact that 
average prices received were slightly lower than for the other two groups, this added incentive to the 
pilot appears to have the desired effect of increasing incomes of both owner and crew. 
This third group of mini trawlers tended to fish longer than the other two groups; their fuel 
expenses were on average 87.50 higher per trip, implying they either searched or fished for about 
one hour longer than the other two groups. This third group of mini trawlers are all owned by a single 
owner who is  also a businessman of the type described under the previous section on operating costs. 
He has very little pilot turnover and claims to have been able to attract the best pilots in Castillo. 
His pilots, who average 25 years of age,  areapproximately 10 years younger on average than those of 
the other two groups, implying that older age  is not an  advantage for the strenuous work required of 
pilot and crew of a mini trawler. He also pays occasional bonuses to his crew. Finally, his boats are 
better maintained than those  in the other groups. Three of the boats in the other groups were 
damaged or had engine trouble and unfortunately for two of them, these problems occurred during the peak of the balao season. A combination of factors, including the added incentive provided by 
this sharing system,  therefore produces added benefits to owner and crew alike. 
Average monthly incomes received by owners and crew under these three sharing systems are 
shown in Table 6. The usual sharing day for mini trawlers is Sunday since this is a rest day, but there 
are occasional variations depending upon the crew's  need for cash and the owner's cash position. If 
the owner has not yet been paid by his shrimp buyers, the sharing is postponed but with the owner 
providing for the daily maintenance of the crew's families. 
Table  5.  Average  operating expenses  per  trip for  mini trawlers. 
Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981 (187 trips per year). 
Percent of 
Cost (PI  total operating cost  fishing day 
(P187.73) 
Gasoline  91.27  78.6 
Food  12.52  10.8 
Cigarettes, ice and other 
miscellaneous 
expenses  6.35  5.5 
Repairlparts  3.27  2.8 
Oil  2.76  2.4 
fishing day 
NM revenue 













Fig.  5.  Revenue  sharing  systems  of  mini trawlers, Castillo,  San 
Miguel  Bay,  1980-1981. Variation A:  daily sharing system,  with 
minor repair and maintenance costs treated as  operating expense 
(n  = 5). 
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Fig.  6.  Revenue sharing  systems  of mini trawlers,  Castillo,  Sari  Fig.  7.  Revenue  sharing  systems  of mini trawlers,  Castillo,  San 
Miguel  Bay,  1980-1981. Variation B:  daily sharing system,  with  Miguel  Bay,  1980-1981. Variation C:  daily  sharing system  with 
all repair and maintenance expenses paid by owner out of owner's  additional incentive share to pilot (n = 6). 
share  (n = 5).  Includes minor repair and maintenance.  . Table 6. Monthly average  incomes of owners, pilots  and  partners  (ordinary crewmen)  of mini trawlers, Castillo, San  Miguel Bay, 
1980-1981, under various sharing systems. 
Sharing systems1 
All 
Variation A  Variation B  Variation C  mini trawlers 
(n = 5)  (n = 5)  (n = 6)  (n = 16) 
Average no. fishing dayslmonth  13.9  16.6  15.9  15.6 
Monthly income (P) 
non-fishing owners2  487  477  743  580 
pilots  325  318  650  445 
partners  270  265  465  342 
'see  Figs. 5-7 for details. 
2~efore  deduction of fixed and variable costs borne by owner. 
Returns to Capital and Labor 
To determine whether any excess profits (pure profits or rent) exist in the mini-trawler fishery, 
all remaining fixed, variable and opportunity costs must be subtracted from the incomes that are 
earned by owners and crew after sharing. Owners incur all three of these costs and crew incur oppor- 
tunity costs. For this study, we  have chosen to represent any pure profits remaining to owners as a 
return to capital and any pure profits remaining to crew as a return to labor. Together, these returns 
represent pure profits or returns to  the fishing unit. 
RETURNS TO CAPITAL 
After deducting all remaining fixed and variable costs from the P6,960 annual income of owners, 
a residual of 185,184  remains (Table 7). This residual represents the return to the owner's capital, 
labor, management and risk. Further accounting for the opportunity costs of the owner's capital and 
own labor results in a pure profit to owners of P2,821 annually per fishing unit. The opportunity 
cost of capital is the interest foregone (9%) on the capital invested when the mini-trawler unit was 
acquired. The opportunity cost of the owner's  labor is the income foregone (estimated at P38.501 
man-day) during those 4 dayslmonth when he must engage in work to support his fishing unit. 
RETURNS TO LABOR 
In addition to actual fishing days, boat pilots and partners spend an average of 4 dayslmonth 
working without remuneration on repair and maintenance of their fishing units. Adding these days 
to  actual fishing days results in crew working  a total of 235.2 dayslyear on average (Table 8). We  used 
a daily wage of PI0  to estimate the opportunity cost of labor for pilots and partners of P2,352 
annually. Deducting these amounts leaves a pure profit for labor of P4,740  for the average mini- 
trawl unit. 
RETURNS TO THE AVERAGE FISHING UNIT 
Summing up the pure profits of owners and crew results in a pure profit for the average mini 
trawler of P7,561 annually (Table 9). 
Excess profits of this amount should be sufficient to  attract new entrants into the fishery. 
Although the mini-trawler fleet in San Miguel Bay has indeed expanded rapidly during the 1970s 
due in part to the availability of subsidized credit, there is no evidence of a rush to  this gear by Table 7. Annual returns to capital of mini trawlers (in  pesos), Castillo, San Miguel Bay,  1980-1981. 
All mini trawlers  All mini trawlers 
No. of fishing dayslyear  187.2  Variable costs 
Daily income of owner  37.18  ,  maintenance and repair 
rental fees2 
Annual income of owner  6,960 
Subtotal 
Annual costs of owner 
Total fixed and variable costs 
Fixed costs 
Residual return to owner's capital, 
mayor's fee  labor and management 
license fee1 
depreciation  Less opportunity costs 
Subtotal  investment capital3 
own labor4 
Total opportunity costs  2,363 
Owner's pure profit  2,821 
Based on current replacement costs (Table 3). 
2~wo  owners rented a boat and engine, respectively, for a short period while their own equipment was  being repaired. 
3~ased  on 9%  of acquisition costs. 
4~epresents  work performed by owners in support of their mini trawler. Estimated at 4 dayslmonth and P38.501day.  based on 
daily earnings from processing, the activity foregone. 
Table 8. Annual returns to labor of mini trawlers (in  pesos), Castillo, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Boat pilot  Partner  Per fishing unit 
No. of fishing mandayslyear 




Less opportunity cost1 
Pure profit 
Estimated at PI0  per day. 
Table 9. Annual pure profit for mini trawlers (in pesos), Castillo, 
San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Pure profit of owners (capital) 
Pure profit of labor 
Pure profit per fishing unit 
fishermen presently operating less profitable types. The possible reasons relate primarily to the fact 
that work on a mini trawler is much more arduous than on other gear types. The average fishing 
trip lasts longer than that of a gill-netter for example. Also, the daily operating capital requirements 
of mini trawlers are the highest among the municipal fishing gears,  with the exception of the small 
trawlers which really belong in a different category (see Navaluna and Tulay, this report). Finally, the monthly income of owners and crew is highly variable from month to month unlike those of 
gill-netters which tend to be more stable. These factors produce a premium to those involved in 
owning and operating mini trawlers. In conclusion, it is recommended that these aspects of barriers 
to entry and pure profits in the mini-trawl fishery be examined in more detail to determine whether 
this fishery offers potential for absorbing capital and labor from those other fisheries in San Miguel 
Bay which are far less profitable. 
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Abstract 
Small and medium-sized trawlers are among the more recent gear  innovations in San  Miguel Bay, Philippines. 
This paper examines the economics of these two types of trawlers. Investment and operating costs of each type are 
presented, and the various sharing systems are used to determine the income of owners and crewmen. These incomes 
are compared with their respective opportunity costs. Small trawler fishing units were found to be earning significant 
profits in excess  of their opportunity costs.  Medium-sized trawler fishing units were  found to be  earning less than 
their opportunity costs.  Reasons for the difference between the economic performance of the two trawler types are 
discussed.  Finally, the paper discusses means by which trawler owners attempt to increase their profits and minimize 
risks through crew selection and management, choice of landing site,  and ownership of more than one fishing unit. 
Introduction 
Trawling operations have been going on in  San  Miguel Bay for a considerable time. In 1936, the 
Japanese beam trawl was  introduced in the Bay, and was  used until the Japanese occupation of the 
Philippines during World War  I  I, when much fishing activity was curtailed (British Admiralty 1944). 
After the war,  the otter trawl was  introduced; it slowly gained acceptance and eventually 
replaced the Japanese beam trawl. By the early 1950~~  most trawl fishermen were using the otter 
trawl (Estanislao 1954). These large trawlers were of the same type as those operating outside the 
Bay at present. Sabang,  in Calabanga was their landing site until the early 1970s. However, because 
of the problem of not being able to bring the trawlers near the shore due to shallow water and also 
the lack of protection during typhoons, their landing base was  moved to Camaligan,  16 km up the 
Bicol River near Naga City. 
Although some of the smaller trawlers continued to use the Sabang landing site, there was a 
lull in  trawling activity in the community. It was about 1972 when the so-called "baby"  trawlers 
that are now based in Sabang started to increase in number. "Baby"  trawlers include the two cate- 
gories of small and medium-sized trawlers (see Smith et al.,  this report). Small trawlers are those in 
the 2-3 GT range; medium-sized trawlers are generally in the 3-6 GT range. The purpose of this study was  to determine the costs and returns of small and medium-sized 
trawlers based on the sharing systems used by each and to examine returns to capital and labor. It 
also aimed to provide data on trawlers for comparison with data on other gears used in the Bay. 
Methodology 
The study was conducted from June 1980 to May 1981. Sabang, Calabanga, the port for the 
majority of small and medium trawlers, was the main data collection site. Eight small trawlers and 
three medium trawlers made up the Sabang sample. Two small trawlers, which had recently begun 
operations at Castillo, Cabusao, were also included. 
The sources of data were trawler owners who were willing to cooperate in the record-keeping 
activity. These  respondents were  kind enough to lend their logbooks in which all the itemized 
expenses and the value of the catch were recorded. These logbooks were considered reliable because 
they were the same ones used in recording the sharing of income among owner and crew. The owners 
could not arbitrarily change the entries because the crewmen knew the amount of their expenses and 
their catch. 
tnWaIly,~operators  were reluctant to  show their financial records. This reaction was expected 
because they had to protect their business interests, considering that trawler operations deal with a 
lot of money compared to the catch value of non-trawl gears. The cooperation of owners was won 
by explaining the purpose of the study and assuring them that the data would be considered strictly 
confidential and that no individual would be identified as the source of data once the results of the 
study were published. 
The sample of 13 rj-awlers represented 14% of the 95 small and medium trawlers operating in 
the Bay at  the time of this study and made a total of 1,679 trips during the 12 months under study. 
Description of the Gear and  Its  Operation 
The otter trawl net used by both small and medium trawlers is conical in form, widest at  the 
mouth and tapering to the cod-end, deriving its name from the characteristic use of otterboards. 
Two towing ropes of equal length are connected to the otterboards which are in turn tied to the 
wings of the net. The two otterboards, with the aid of strategically located floats and sinkers, keep 
the net wide open during fishing operations. 
In operation, the net is set in the water first together with a pair of long towing ropes and then 
the otterboards (Fig. 1). The boat runs first at  a very slow speed to allow the gear to take its correct 
shape before increasing to its normal dragging speed of about 2-2.5 knots. The net is dragged for 1-4 
hours but 3 hours is the usual length of time, afterwhich it is hauled manually. The whole operation 
is repeated through the course of each fishing trip. Four to six men crew the small and medium 
trawlers operating in San Miguel Bay. 
In  Sabang,  two kinds of trawl nets are used: the panghipon or pamasayan (for shrimps) and the 
pangisda orpanghoya (for fish). In Castillo, a third type, the pamalao (for small shrimps) is used. 
These nets differ in design and also in the species they catch because of their different mesh sizes. 
The pangisda, which is designed for fishes,  has a high opening. On the other hand, the panghipon 
has a low but wide opening because shrimps are buried in the mud. These openings are determined 
by the length of the headrope, which is about 17.0 rn in the pangisda and 8.2  m in the panghipon. 
The pangisda and panghipon nets are  modified German type and Norwegian type models, 
respectively. The pangisda net has cod-end mesh sizes (stretched)  of 23-28 mrn, as compared to 
19-23 mm in the panghipon. However, the fishermen usually double the cod-end with a smaller- 
mesh net (8 mrn) which they call a "screen"  and which is intended to catch anchovies. 
Thepamalao of Castillo is used to catch sergestid shrimps (known locally as balao) or alamang 
(see Tulay and Smith, this report). The net has an 8-mm mesh. The 75 small trawlers (79% of the total) are those below 3 GT which are not allowed to  fish in 
waters shallower than 4 fm (7.3 m) (Fig. 2). The 20 medium trawlers (21% of the total) are those of 
3 GT or more which must fish in waters beyond 7 fm (12.8 m) (Fig. 3).' 
Average monthly catch of the trawlers remained roughly the same in both monsoon periods; 
535 tlmonth during the southwest monsoon and 51  5 tlmonth during the northeast monsoon. Total 
catch of these 95 trawlers during the 12 months was  6,316 t, or 66.5 t per vessel. See  Pauly and 
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Fig. 1. 'Baby' trawl gear. 
Fig. 2. A small trawler, San Miguel Bay, 1980. 
Fig. 3. Medium-sized trawler under construction. 
 nothe her class of trawler, the rnangquerna or itik-itik used in catching sergestid shrimps or balao, was classified as  mini trawler. Costs and Returns 
FISHING EFFORT 
Trawlers in Sabang usually start in the morning, between 5 and 7 a.m.,  and return in the early 
afternoon of the next day. Their catch is sold on the same day from 2 to 4 p.m. Sometimes one fish- 
ing trip lasts for only one day,  in which case the catch is sold the following morning between 5 and 
6 a.m.  However, 2-day trips are the most common. 
When conditions are fine, there are usually three 2-day fishing trips per week; Sunday is always 
a rest day. There are times however, when, due to mechanical troubles of the boat, engine or gear, 
and when there are typhoons, the fishermen are idle for days or even weeks.  In one year, the Sabang 
trawlers fished for an average of 250 fishing days representing 68% of the 365 days of the year or 
80% of the 313 potential (365 minus 52 Sundays) fishing days per year (Table 1). An average of 11 
trips (or 21 fishing days) were made by these trawlers per month. There was only slight variation 
throughout the year in the number of trips per month. 
The weight of the catch per trip was  not available because these data were not recorded in the 
owners' logbooks. Instead, the value of the catch was  recorded, averaging 81,871  per trip or 8948 
per fishing day. The value of catch per trip ranged from 81,542  in August to 82,136  in May (Table 1  ). 
Small trawlers in Castillo usually fish for one day and one night. When pamalao nets are used 
for small shrimps, fishing takes only a day because the fishermen usually do not take ice on the trip. 
In contrast to the active Sabang trawlers, the two from Castillo fished only 144 days during the 
year,  representing only 46% of the 313 potential fishing days (Table 2). One reason was that one of 
the units operated in only nine months of the year due to major repairs and hull modification. Other 
reasons for non-operation  were engine trouble, holidays, rough weather conditions and expectation 
of poor catch. 
INVESTMENT COSTS 
Complete investment cost data were obtained from four Sabang-based trawlers. The average 
acquisition cost of three small trawlers and one medium trawler in Sabang was  P35,125  (Table 3). 
This amount included the cost of the boat, engine, nets, rattan fish baskets locally called tiklis, 
galvanized tubs and styrofoam containers. All four units were acquired through owner finance. Each 
of the three small trawlers was  10.8 m x 1 .I  m (approximately 2.75 GT). The medium trawler 
measured 17 m x 1.5 m (5.4 GT). The three small trawlers were acquired in 1970, 1976 and 1980 
and the medium trawler in 1978, an average age  of five years. 
The acquisition costs of the other seven trawlers in the Sabang sample were not obtained. How- 
ever,  because they were of comparable size,  their acquisition costs would be approximately the 
same depending upon the year of their acquisition. Replacement costs for these Sabang trawlers 
have increased substantially. In 1981, a new trawl fishing unit would have cost P60,775  or almost 
75% more than the average acquisition cost. A medium trawler would cost approximately 81  5,000 
more than a small trawler. Acquiring a new boat is becoming difficult because of the rising cost of 
all materials needed. In  an attempt to reduce costs,  owners now consider buying reconditioned truck 
engines rather than marine engines. The cost of lumber has also increased in recent years to  the point 
that owners are sometimes alleged to buy illegal logs coming from the Bicol National Park which are 
smuggled across the Bay. 
Because they were purchased second-hand, the acquisition costs of the two Castillo small 
trawlers averaged only P15,840  (Table 4). One of these trawlers used a 75-hp Fuzo engine while the 
other used a 240-hp lsuzu engine, both second-hand. The former was  bought through loans and the 
latter through owner finance. 
OPERATING COSTS 
The operating expenses incurred in trawling operations included diesel fuel, oil, repairs and 
parts, ice and food. Miscellaneous expenses,  such as those for salt, fee for the guard, cigarettes, and Table 1. Monthly average effort, operating costs and returns (in  pesos) for small and medium trawlers, Sabang,  San Miguel Bay,  June 1980-May 1981.  00 
h) 
1980  1981  Annual  Monthly 
June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  total  av. 
No. of days in the month (year) 
No. of fishing days 
No. of non-fishing  days 
No. of fishing trips 
Av. no. of partners per trip 
Total catch valueltrip 
Total catch valuelfishing day 
Total catch value 








Broker (5%  total catch value)' 
Engine maintenance (1  0% total 
catch value) 
Monthly net revenue 
Owner's net share1 
Crew's total share 
pilot (maestro1 
machinist 
2  (individual ordinary crewman  ) 
all ordinary crewmen2 
total crew share 
 h he owner's total share equals his share as  an owner plus the broker's fee because the owner (or his family) serves as  the broker. 
2~he  number of ordinary crewmen varied from 3 to 4 per boat. Table 2.  Monthly average effort, operating costs and returns (in pesos) for small trawlers, Castillo, San Miguel Bay, June 1980-May 1981. 
1980  1981  Annual  Monthly 
June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  total  av. 
No. of days in  the month (year) 
No. of actual fishing days 
No. of non-fishing days 
No. of fishing trips 
Av. no. of partners per trip 
Total catch value 








Engine maintenance (reserved) 
Engine maintenance (used) 
Difference* 
Monthly net revenue 
Owner's  net share 






 he difference between the amount reserved for engine maintenance and the amount used is added to the owner's  share after the pilot's  share has been deducted, the amount of 
which becomes the owner's  net share.  Positive sign of the difference indicates that not all of the resewed amount for engine  maintenance was used, thus increasing the owner's share. 
Negative sign means that more was spent for engine maintenance than the amount reserved for it, resulting in  a decreased income of  the owner. Table 3. Average investment costs in pesos of four small and medium trawlers in  Sabang, San Miguel Bay. 
Average  Average  , Average  Annual 
number  acquisition  Replacement  expected  depreciation1 
owned  costlitem'  costlitem  life (years)  per item 
Trawler  1  18,000  39,750  13  3,058 
Engine  1  8,600  1  1.000  5  2,200 
Nets (including 1 set 
of otterboards)  4  1,625  2,000  1  2,000 
Rattan baskets ftiklid  35  9  9  .08  108 
Galvanized tubs  3  70  70  .25  280 
Styrofoam boxes  18.75  80  80  .25  320 
Average acquisition  Average replacement  Average annual 
cost per trawl  cost per trawl  depreciation per 
fishing unit2  P35.125  fishing unit3  P60.775  fishing unit4  P23.878 
~ased  upon 1981 replacement cost. 
2~quals  z  (average acquisition cost per item x average number owned). 
Equals 1  (replacement cost per item x average number owned). 
'I~quals  z  (annual depreciation per item x average number owned). 
Table 4.  Summary of acquisition costs,  replacement costs and annual depreciation in pesos for small and medium trawlers in Sabang 
and Castillo, San Miguel Bay. 
- - -  -  - --  -  - 
Average acquisition  Average replacement  Average annual 
cost per fishing unit  cost per fishing unit  depreciation per fishing unit 
Small trawler (Sabang)  28,400 
Small trawler (Castillo)  15,840 
Medium trawler (Sabang)  55,270 
 he main reason Castillo small trawlers have a much lower annual depreciation rate than the Sabang small trawlers  is because 
they operate  less  frequently.  Consequently,  many  items,  especially  nets,  containers and the engine last longer, thus reducing the 
annual depreciation. 
matches were also considered to be operating expenses. All these operating costs were deducted 
from the total value of the catch before sharing. 
Of the P1,054  average expenses per trip of the Sabang-based trawlers (Table 5), fuel was  by far 
the major cost (73% of the total). With an average diesel consumption of 239 liters per trip, at 
F3.2011,  trawlers spent P765 per trip on fuel alone. Consequently, they are adversely affected when 
there is an increase in the price of fuel. During the one-year duration of this study, the price of fuel 
rose twice, once in August 1980 and the second time in March 1981. In less than a year, diesel price 
increased from P2.5011 to P3.2011,  or by 28%.  Interestingly, as shown in Table 5,  fuel expenses per 
trip increased only slightly during the year, implying that trawlers cut back on their fuel consump- 
tion as price increased. 
The second major operating expense was the cost of food for the crew (PI08 per trip) which 
was  paid for by the owner, but deducted as an operating expense before sharing. Part of the catch 
was also consumed while at  sea. 
Ice was  another important item in the trawling operation, accounting for 8% of the total 
operating expenses.  Its importance lies in the fact that the catch is perishable and its value depends 
greatly on freshness. 
The only other major item was cost of repairs and parts, which included maintenance and 
materials used for the nets and the boat (but excluding the engine) and also the labor used to repair Table 5.  Average operating expenses  (variable costs) in pesos  per trip of small and medium trawlers, Sabang, San Miguel Bay, 1980- 
1981. 
1980  1981  Ave.1  Per- 
June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  trip  centage 
Fuel  754  725  615  679  827  757  790  729  772  844  898  792  765  72.6 
Oil  9  803  7  2  3  7  7  2  2  0  4  0.4 
Repairlparts  88  109  123  56  66  69  75  63  78  21  71  197  85  8.1 
Ice  7  1  73  67  80  86  73  76  71  82  98  89  104  81  7.7 
Food  102  103  92  96  102  111  120  106  108  132  112  113  108  10.2 
Miscellaneous  16  10  3  12  17  14  18  11  10  5  12  10  11  1.0 
Total  1,040  1,028  900  926  1,105  1,026  1,082  987  1,057  1,102  1,184  1,216  1,054  100.0 
them. These expenses averaged 8% of the operating expenses or about P85 per trip. These expenses 
, were not incurred every trip. Nevertheless, an additional sum (1  0% of the total value of the catch) 
was  reserved for engine maintenance and thus deducted before sharing. 
Castillo-based trawlers had much lower operating expenses per trip (83,315lmonth for 11.1 
trips or approximately P300 per trip), although the distribution of expenses was  similar to that of 
Sabang trawlers. 
Sharing Systems 
Sharing of income from small and medium trawlers was  usually done every one or two weeks 
depending on the preference or need of the crew and the owner and the accumulated value of catch. 
Though the general framework of the sharing system was similar for all small and medium 
trawlers, there were some differences. The sharing systems illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5 were used by 
10 out of 11 small and medium trawlers in the Sabang sample. The shares for the broker and for 
engine maintenance were deducted before the other expenses were deducted; these shares bore less 
risk than those of the owner and the crew. The share of the engine maintenance was  reserved for 
keeping the engine in good condition which included spare parts and labor or buying a new one. 
The owner kept this 10% share regardless of the amount actually spent for these purposes. During 
1980-1981, for the average trawler in Sabang,  the total engine maintenance reserve was  P23,640. 
Since a new engine could be purchased for Pll-14,000,  it would seem highly unlikely that annual 
maintenance costs would have used up all this reserve fund. It appears, therefore, that owners could 
add significantly to their income when the reserve was  not used. Data were not available on the 
amount of the reserve used, so  for purposes of this analysis the o.wners1 income was not adjusted 
upwards. It  is important to note, however, that owners'  incomes are likely to be higher than those 
reported here. 
The broker's fee (5%)  is the compensation for selling the catch through secret whisper-bidding 
called bulungan. More often than not, the owner or a member of his family served as the broker so 
this share was  added income to the boat owner. 
After the shares for the broker and engine maintenance and the operating expenses were 
deducted, the net revenue was divided equally between the owner and the crew. Ten percent of the 
owner's share (or 5% of the net revenue), was given to the pilot as incentive for being the leader of 
the crew. This additional amount was shared by the pilot with the machinist at his discretion and 
usually amounted to about one-third of the pilot's incentive share or 1.5% of the net revenue. 
The members of the crew, of whom there were usually five on the small trawlers including the 
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Crew's total income: P160.15 
Fig. 4. Sharing system of small trawlers  (n = 8) in Sabang,  San  Miguel Bay (daily averages, June 1980- 
May 1981). 
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Crew's total income: P107.45 
Fig.  5.  Sharing system of  medium trawlers  (n = 3) in Sabang, San Miguel Bay (daily averages, June 
1980-May 1981  1. received 10% of the net revenue, while the machinist and the pilot earned 11.5% and 13.5%,  respec- 
tively. The percentage share of each fisherman was  less when there were six crew as in medium 
trawlers. 
The total share of the owner was 45% of the net revenue plus the brokerage fee if he acted as 
broker. The amount set aside for engine maintenance also went to  the owner for his use when needed. 
One of the medium trawlers in the Sabang sample used a different sharing system in which the 
pilot received added income from the share of the crew. Instead of dividing the 50% crew's  share 
equally by the number of crewmen (6), it was divided by 6.25.  Each crewman received one share or 
8% of the net revenue (as distinct from 8.33% shown in Fig. 5), while the pilot received 1.25 shares 
or 10%. Added to the 5% the pilot received from the owner, he received a total of 15%. 
A second difference in  this sharing arrangement was that the owner, instead of the pilot, provided 
the additional fee for the machinist. The amount shared to the machinist was  at the discretion of 
the owner but was approximately 3% of the net income. So,  the total share of the machinist was 
11%. The owner thus received a smallershare, 42% of the net income as compared to 45% in the more 
common arrangement. The purpose of this sharing arrangement was  to provide added incentive to 
the pilot and machinist in the hope that the net revenue of the boat would increase. Even though 
the percentage shares of the owner and ordinary fishermen were  lower, a higher net revenue could 
produce higher incomes. The data showed that this trawler did not produce higher profits for the 
owner or higher incomes for the crew. 
As  can be seen,  daily incomes of the small-trawler owners and crew were considerably higher 
than the incomes earned by those operating medium trawlers. This was  primarily due to the higher 
operating costs of the latter. 
There are  two major distinctions between the sharing arrangement of the two trawlers in 
Castillo (Fig. 6). First, because the pilot also served as the broker, he received a broker's fee from 
the owner. Owners provided a total of 15% of their share (7.5% of the net revenue) to  the pilot. 
Second, as part of the ordinary crew complement the crew hired a non-sharing crewman who was 
paid a daily wage of PI0  per trip, (or P20 for 2 trips if both day and night fishing trips were made) 
regardless of the catch. The normal complement of Castillo small trawlers including the pilot and 
hired fisherman was  four and the hired crewman was  paid out of the crew's 50% share of the net 
revenue. While this arrangement increased the percentage share of the regular crewmen from 12.5% 
to 16.67%, it also increased their risk. In fact, on several occasions when catch was particularly poor, 
it was observed that after the regular crewmen paid the hired fisherman his daily wage,  there was  no 
income left for themselves. However, over the full year, they earned more using this system than if 
the hired fisherman had been a regular member of the crew earning a full crewman's share (Fig. 6). 
Table 6 summarizes the monthly income earned by owners, pilots, machinists, ordinary crew- 
men and hired crewmen under these various sharing arrangements. To make these calculations, it 
was assumed that the eight small trawlers (Fig. 4) and three medium trawlers (Fig. 5) in the Sabang 
sample represented the total 58 small and 15 medium trawlers of Sabang and that the two small 
trawlers in Castillo (Fig. 6) represented only themselves. The income figures of each group were 
therefore weighted accordingly to show the monthly incomes for all small and medium trawlers in 
San Miguel Bay. Note that the net income figure for owners was  not the same  as owner's profit 
because depreciation and other fixed costs must still be deducted, nor have the broker's fee or engine 
maintenance reserve been taken into account (see next section). 
Returns to Capital and Labor 
Because all owners of small and medium trawlers were non-fishing owners, their income, after 
deductions of their costs, was treated as return to capital. The income of crewmen was treated as 
return  to labor. Any excess over and above the opportunity costs of capital and labor thus represented 
pure profit in the trawl fishery of San  Miguel Bay. Table 6. Summary  of monthly incomes of Castillo and Sabang trawler owners and crew in  pesos after sharing (June 1980-May 1981  1. 
Sabang small  Castillo small  Sabang medium  All small and medium 
















'weighted averages (see text). 
2~11  owners are non-fishing owners. This income figure does not include the broker's  fee  (Sabang trawlers only) nor the reserve 
for  ngine maintenance.  Depreciation and other fixed costs have not  yet been deducted. 
'Includes  income for serving as broker. 
Average total value of 
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Crew's total income = P81.72 
Fig.  6.  Sharing system  of small  trawlers  (n = 2) in Castillo, San Miguel Bay (daily averages, June 
1980-May 1981  1. 
RETURNS TO CAPITAL 
Trawler owners derived income from three sources: their share of the net revenue, the broker's 
fee and theengine maintenance reserve (Table 7). For all small and medium trawlers this total income 
averaged almost P65,000 for the year June 1980-May 1981. 
The major fixed cost was depreciation, and on the assumption that owners must set aside an 
amount from their earnings to replace their trawling units, this was based on current replacement I  Table 7.  Average annual returns in pesos to owners of small and medium trawlers, Castillo and Sabang, San  Miguel Bay (June 1980- 
May 1981  ). 
Sabang small  Castillo small  Sabang medium  All small and medium 
trawlers  trawlers  trawlers  trawlers1 
Annual net income of owners 
from share of net revenue  32.700  10.860  21,948 
from broker's fee  11,437  n/a  12,720 
from engine maintenance reserve  22,870  7,257  25,437 
Total income  67,007  18,117  60,105  64,631 
Annual costs 
Fixed costs 









Total variable costs 
Total fixed and variable costs  46,190  16,199  58,352  47,852 
Residual return to owners' capital, 
labor and management  20,817  1,918  1,753 
Less opportunity costs 
of investment capital4 
of own labor5 
of family labor6 
Total opportunity costs  8,442  3,506  10,860  8,794 
Owners' pure profit (loss)  12,375  (1,588)  (9,107)  7,985 
'~eighted~verage  (see text at end of sharing systems section). 
'From  Table 4. Based on replacement cost. 
3~ee  text for derivation. 
4~ine  percent of average acquisition cost. 
5~or  Sabang  trawlers  based  on one  day  own labor per trip at P40lday (this includes activity as  broker); for Castillo trawlers 
based on one day per week at P35lday. 
'For  Sabang trawlers only, based on 113 day family labor per trip at PI  7.501day. 
costs, not the lower acquisition costs. If based on acquisition costs, current owners would not be 
putting aside sufficient reserve funds to replace their vessels and gear. 
The major variable cost assumed by the owner was  engine maintenance. As  mentioned earlier, 
there was  no concrete evidence to indicate whether the full amount of the engine maintenance 
reserve was  used for this purpose. Expenses data were obtained only for the two small trawlers in 
Castillo. Here, actual expenses were approximately 75% of the amount reserved. Sabang trawler 
crewmen were asked if they were happy or unhappy with the withholding of 10% of the total value of the catch for engine maintenance reserve; their responses were inconclusive. Consequently, it was 
assumed that on the average the full amount of the reserve was used for engine maintenance. The 
only other variable costs for Sabang trawler owners were small bonuses given to crewmen when the 
catch was especially good, and nominal taxes paid on the catch. 
After deducting these fixed and variable costs, a substantial residual income remained for the 
owners of small trawlers in Sabang.  Small trawlers in Castillo and medium trawlers in Sabang 
returned only small amounts to their ownersr capital, labor and management. 
To determine whether or not an investment in a small or medium trawler was  more profitable 
than alternative investment opportunities, this residual return to owners' capital, labor and manage- 
ment was compared to the opportunity costs of owner's capital and labor. The opportunity cost of 
capital was based upon the amount of interest (9% per annum) that the trawler operator would 
have earned had he put the amount he invested in  the trawler unit (the average acquisition cost) 
into a savings account with the local rural bank. An investor considering an investment in a small or 
medium trawler should base  his opportunity cost of capital upon the interest foregone on the 
current replacement cost. For small trawlers especially, the opportunity cost of capital would be 
double the amount shown in Table 7 because 1980-1981 replacement costs were twice as high as 
the average acquisition cost in the sample (see Table 4). Since the opportunity cost of capital for 
medium trawlers exceeded the residual return to owners even before taking the owner's own and 
family labor into account, it is readily apparent that an investment in a medium trawler would not 
be wise. 
However, after deducting the opportunity cost of owners' own and family labor for the small 
trawlers of Sabang, a substantial pure profit of over P12,000  remained, indicating  that these trawler 
units were highly profitable. The opportunity costs of owners' labor were based upon the observa- 
tion that owners spent one full day of labor per trip of their trawler, serving as  broker and under- 
taking other tasks related to the operation of the unit. 
The two small trawlers of Castillo came close to covering all their costs,  and since both were 
being remodeled for continued fishing, their owners believed that they would be potentially profit- 
able in the future. The owners of medium trawlers in Sabang,  however, were generally not planning 
to replace their vessels,  and the survey resultsgiveadequate reasons. In  contrast and consistent with 
our results, more small trawlers were currently being built in Sabang. 
RETURNS  TO  LABOR 
The contribution made by labor to pure profits of the trawlers was  determined by comparing 
the income of the crew to the opportunity costs of labor (Table 8). Crew income was determined 
by the sharing system; the annual income figures shown for pilots, machinists and ordinary crewmen 
were based on the number of fishing days per year times the daily income of each. As with crewmen 
on other gears,  trawler crewmen also spent some of their non-fishing  days repairing and maintaining 
the fishing unit. There was no difference between small and medium trawlers in Sabang, but crewmen 
of Castillo trawlers provided a greater number of gear  repair days as a proportion of fishing days, 
possibly because the Castillo trawlers had both been purchased second-hand by their current owners. 
Labor opportunity costs were higher in Sabang than they were in Castillo. An ordinary crewman 
could earn BlO/day in Castillo as  a carpenter or working with a processor; the same jobs and others, 
such as tricycle driving, paid PI5  daily in Sabang. Therefore, the daily opportunity wage of ordinary 
crewmen was estimated to be PI0  in Castillo and PI5  in Sabang. The opportunity wage of boat 
pilots and machinists in Sabang was estimated to be P201day. The higher labor costs in Sabang were 
a direct result of the presence of trawlers and the alternative opportunities they provided. Owners 
of gill-netters in the vicinity were forced to give 60% of the value of their catch to their crew (as 
distinct from 50%) to  attract crewmen (Villafuerte and Bailey 1982). Deducting the annual equiva- 
lents of these daily opportunity costs from the incomes earned by crewmen left their pure profit (or 
loss), and when summated, gave the pure profit (loss) to labor per fishing unit. Table 8. Average annual returns in pesos  to labor of small and medium trawlers, Castillo and Sabang,  San  Miguel Bay  (June 1980- 
May 1981  1. 
Sabang small  Castillo small  Sabang medium  All small and medium 
trawlers  trawlers  trawlers  trawlers1 
Labor requirements 
No. of fishing dayslyear  250 
No. of gear  repair days/year2  4  1 










Pure profit (loss) 
Ordinarv crewman 
Daily income  29.1 2  23.24  16.28  26.40 
Annual income3  7,280  3,718  4,070  6,543 
opportunity cost4  4,365  2,040  4,365  4,303 
Pure profit (loss) per crewman  2315  1,678  (295)  2,240 
No. of ordinary crewmen  3  2  4  3.1 7 
Pure profit (loss) to labor 
per fishing unit  15,303  5,934  (2,237)  11,545 
-  -  - 
weighted average  (see text under sharing systems section). 
'~stimated  to be one day per three trips. 
3~quals  daily income times number of fishing dayslyear. 
4~quals  daily opportunity cost (see text) times total dayslyear. 
The calculated profits (and losses) were consistent with those for capital. Crew of small trawlers 
in  Sabang earned significant pure profits; crew of medium trawlers earned less than their opportunity 
wages. 
RETURNS TO THE FISHING UNIT 
Summation of the pure profits and losses for both capital and labor showed that small trawlers 
earned considerably more than their costs and medium trawlers less than their costs (Table 9). 
Although medium trawlers yielded highervalue of catch per trip than small trawlers (Table 101, 
they had higher operating costs, primarily due to their fuel requirements. Medium trawlers spent an 
average of 81,004  on fuel per trip (77%  of the total expenses) as compared with P702 (72%) for 
small trawlers. 
From all indications, small trawlers are potentially more profitable than medium trawlers in 
San Miguel Bay. In  addition to the different fuel costs, the taxes, fees, depreciation and the oppor- 
tunity cost of the investment capital (in  absolute terms) of medium trawlers are higher than for small 
trawlers. These costs contribute to the decrease of the owners' profit, but as long as  their variable 
costs and opportunity costs of labor are covered, they may continue fishing. Table 9. Average  annual  returns in pesos to capital and labor of small and medium trawlers, Castillo and Sabang.  San Miguel Bay 
(June 1980-May 1981  1. 
Sabang small  Castillo small  Sabang medium  All small and medium 
trawlers  trawlers  trawlers  trawlers1 
Owners' pure profit (loss)  12,375  (1,588)  (9,107) 
Labor's pure profit (loss)  1  5,303  5,934  (2,237) 
Pure profit (loss) of fishing unit  27,678  4,346  ( 1  1,344) 
'weighted average (see text under sharing systems section). 
Ownersr Strategies to Increase Profits 
Profitability is highly dependent upon management decisions of the owners.  For example, 
owners usually put much effort into hiring  a reliable and skilled crew,  especially the pilot or maestro. 
Owners always knew the good pilots and sought to attract them. Piracy of crew members, especially 
of pilots, was  rampant in Sabang because there were few good ones. Once an owner secured a good 
pilot, he usually gave incentives to the pilot over and above the formal share and extended help to 
the pilot's family. The owner also helped the other crew to a lesser extent. 
There were several other methods by which owners tried to maximize their profits. The role of 
owners as their own brokers deserves special mention. In addition to the owner's share,  they also 
received the 5% broker's fee.  By acting as their own broker, they would try to get the highest 
possible price for the fish. Owners believe this is not always possible when another individual 
functions as the broker. 
The broker's responsibility is to  sell the fish by secret bidding, collect the money and give it to 
the owner at  the earliest possible time. If the successful bidder cannot pay immediately as is often 
the case with fish processors, the broker may even use his own money to pay the owner in advance; 
frequently the bidder may take weeks to pay. Owners and brokers thus need substantial capital and 
brokers bear considerable risks of 'bad debts'. 
Owners of medium trawlers had the option of selling their catch at Mercedes, on the northwest 
side of the Bay. Small trawlers usually did not risk going to Mercedes because of the rough waters 
they had to pass through to get there. 
A disadvantage of selling the catch in Mercedes was that it was  necessary to hire a broker there 
who would deduct 5-7% commission from the total value of catch. Furthermore, taxes commen- 
surate with the value of the catch were paid and there were also fees for the porters. The cost of 
additional fuel to get to Mercedes was another consideration. Owners who wished to  sell their catch 
in Mercedes usually had means of obtaining information on the prevailing prices there, on the basis 
of which they would decide if it would be more profitable to take the catch to Mercedes and when 
would be the right time to do so. 
One way of obtaining greater value for the catch in Sabang was  in proper timing for landing 
the catch. Trawler owners usually ordered their maestro to land the catch between 2 and 4 p.m. 
when the number of potential bidders was the greatest. If a boat missed this landing time, the owner 
would be forced to wait until the next morning to sell his catch, thus incurring additional expenses 
and possible deterioration in the quality of his catch. 
Finally, one of the most important strategies that owners of trawlers adopted to maximize 
their profits  and minimize their risks was to own more than one trawler. Of the 95 trawlers operating 
in the Bay, 24 were owned by one family and several other families owned smaller fleets. Although 
the small trawlers on average were highly profitable, the survey data showed a wide range of profit- 
ability of individual vessels. While the operating costs per trip showed little  variation among vessels 
(Table lo),  the considerable variation in value of catch per trip among vessels indicated the impor- 
tance of spreading the risk through multiple ownership. Table 10  Value of catch and operatmg costs In pesos per trlp for small and med~um  trawlers. Sabang, San M~guel  Bay (1980-1981  ) 
Total catch value per trlp  1,738  1,947  2.1 57  2,096  1,751  1,341  1,599  1,917  2,092 
- 








Small trawlers In  = 8)  small 
A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  trawler1 
Total  1935  972  984  1,017  1,253  952  832  803  968  11,327  1,312  1,280  1,307  I 1,039 
Average 
Med~um  trawlers (n = 3)  medium 
I  J  K  trawler1 
Average of 
all trawlers 
Av. no. of tripslmonth 
'weighted by number of trips. 
11  10  10  12  8  11  12  11  10.6  8  12  12  10.7  10.7 The factors discussed above-the  importance of selecting the right pilot and crew, landing place 
and spreading the risks among more than a single boat-are  important elements of success for the 
owners of these trawlers in San Miguel Bay. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of techniques and  institutions in resource use. Two patterns of technical change 
have emerged with the increasing population pressure on fishery resources in San Miguel Bay, Philippines. The first is 
intensification of resource exploitation in the relatively congested barrios at the mouth of the Bicol River. This is 
linked to the availability of capital from the marketing sector in these barrios. The second pattern is the expansion 
of exploitation (using less capital-intensive gear)  to the less accessible communities along the Bay. With respect to 
institutional  change,  growing  interdependencies have  resulted  in friction  among  fishermen  (especially between 
small-scale non-trawl fishermen and trawler operators). This has led to  more regulation of the fishery. Specific policy 
options concerning  lessdependenceon intensification and emphasizingdecentralization  of enforcement are presented. 
Introduction 
The primary objective of this paper is  to discuss differential access to productive utilization of 
municipal fishery resources in San  Miguel Bay. By focusing on different conditions of access,  includ- 
ing the institutions that govern access,  the functional differences among users of the resource are 
explicitly recognized. Due to the fugitive nature of the resource (Ciriacy-Wantrup  and Bishop 1975), 
such differences are not based on exclusive property rights over the resource (except in the special 
case of the stationary fishing gear which will also be discussed below). Differential access  is based on 
(a) the nature of the productive technology and access to such technology; and (b) the system of 
formal and informal institutions  that regulate actual fishing activity, employment, and distribution 
in the industry. 
For this paper, the definition of institution used  is "an  ordered relationship among people, 
socially sanctioned, whether formal or informal, that defines rights, obligations, and exposures" 
 his paper was prepared during the author's 1981 fieldwork in the Philippines preliminary to his Ph.D. dissertation on this 
topic during which time he was  associated with the IF  DR-ICLARM project. A theoretical framework and conceptual model for 
examining  technical and institutional change in traditional small-scale fisheries are developed in this dissertation (Cruz 1982) and 
condensed in Cruz (1983). The interested reader is also referred to Bromley (1979). Johnston (1977) and Wilkinson (1973) for 
further discussion of related issues. (Bromley 1979). As  such the definition includes, among others, sharing systems and regulations on 
access and use, and their enforcement. 
The secondary objectives of this paper are:  (1) to discuss the path of intensification of fishing 
effort presently being followed in the San  Miguel Bay fishery; and (2) to indicate the policy implica- 
tions of this analysis. 
The primary data for this paper are based on fieldwork in four of the five municipalities of 
Carnarines Sur that border on San Miguel Bay: Sipocot, Cabusao, Calabanga and Tinambac. Support- 
ing information is based on interim survey reports of the IFDR-ICLARM project. To complement 
the surveys undertaken by the project, the primary technique used in the investigation was  unstruc- 
tured indepth interviews of respondents involved in  the relevant fishing activity in each of the com- 
munities. Choice of the respondent was  purposive and based on their familiarity, as ascertained by 
barrio captains and the UPV (I  FDR)-ICLARM  field researchers, with the history, the operation and 
the institutional arrangements pertaining to a particular gear. 
A short observation of the area was conducted in February 1981, and interviews were made by 
the author during June and August  1981. Table 1 provides a list of 23 respondents with whom in- 
Table 1. Survey areas,  sample size, description of respondents and topics discussed. 
Location  n  Informant  Topic  Location  n  Informant  Topic 
Sipocot: 
Mangga  1  Panke (gill-net) 
operator 
Cabusao: 





Calabanga:  12 
Sabang  Baby trawl owner 




Baby trawl operator 
Sibobo 
General conditions 
of enforcement of 
fishing laws and 
problems of fish- 
ermen in Cabusao  Balonggay 
Systems of marketing 
and gill-net fishing 
in Castillo 
Tinambac: 
History of trawling in 
San Miguel Bay; 
operation of gear 
Sogod 
Design, measurements 
of different trawl  Daligan 
types 
Bagacay 
Bonot-Sta. Rosa  Bukatot (liftnet) 
operator  Cagliliog 
Kalikot (scissor net, 
sakay l  operator 
Panke (gill-net) 
operator 
Sagkad (fish cor- 
ral) operator 
Bubo (fish trap) 
operator 
Banwit (hook and 
line) operator 
Biakus (filter net) 
operator 
Bintol operator 
7  Acting municipal  Liftnet fishing con- 









Baby trawl operator 
Bukatot operator 
Notes:  For the different gear operators, a detailed interview guide was  used. Short interviews with minor informants  are not listed here. Table 2. Ranking of 10 major gear types according  to abundance in selected San  Miguel Bay communities. 
Rank of gear 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Push  Hook  Baby  Mini  Fish  Fish  Filter 
Gear  Gill-net  net  and line  trawl3  Longline  Liftnet  trawl3  pot  corral  net 
- 
Number used1  486  105  68  62  55  47  44  31  18  17 















Data from sociology team. See  Esporlas (1982). 
2~elative  popularity computed as  number of particular gear  divided by number of fishing households in the community;  data 
based on community inventories. Relative popularity of gears (and concentration) in each community can be determined by reading 
across each row.   or distinctions among the various  trawl types,  see  Smith et  al.  (this volume). 'Baby'  trawls include both small and medium 
trawlers; mini trawls are a separate category. 
depth interviews were conducted. Ten gear types were ranked according to number in use. There- 
after the relative popularity of each of the 10 gears in each of the communities was  determined by 
dividing  the numbers of particular gear types by the number of fishing households in the community 
(Table 2). 
Inclusion  as one of the communities in the survey depended on whether a particular gear ranked 
first or second in terms of relative popularity in a given community. Two exceptions were applied in 
the community selection: (1 since fieldwork constraints limited the survey area to Camarines Sur, 
no Camarines Norte communities were included; (2) although gill-nets were most popular in the 
municipality of Siruma, the difficulty of reaching the area was  the basic reason for its  exclusion. 
Unfortunately, no informants for longline could be located in either Balongay or Bonot-Sta. Rosa. 
Consequently only nine gears were actually studied. 
Technical and Institutional Change in San  Miguel Bay 
POPULATlON AND RESOURCE ENVIRONMENT 
The communities bordering San  Miguel Bay have experienced a high rate of population growth 
over the past threequarter century. An annual growth rate of 2.68% characterizes the increase in 
population  of the four survey municipalities  from 1903  to 1975, and population density with respect to total land area in the four municipalities in  the study has increased from 25 to 168 persons/km2 
in the same  period (Philippines (Republic) 1962, 1982). 
With respect to agricultural resources, much of the area is surrounded by hilly terrain which is 
only marginally cultivable or suitable for grazing. The only land suited to rice farming is located in 
the basin of the Bicol River, in the municipalities  of Cabusao and Calabanga. It is thus reasonable 
to presume that a process of resource circumscription in  the face of population pressure is approach- 
ing (if  not actually taking place) due to  the limited area of cultivable land and municipal fishery 
resources. 
TECHNOLOGY AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES 
Aside from the institutions regulating fishing activity, availability of the technology of capture 
determinesdifferential  access to  the resource. In  turn, the factors affecting utilization of a particular 
production technology are:  (1) availability of funds to meet the capital requirement for particular 
gear types; (2)  presence of marketing  capability consistent with  the catch of the gear;  (3)  experience or 
skill in  the utilization of such gear and (4) gear productivity with respect to the fishery environment. 
Capital requirements for each gear type include allotments for the acquisition and maintenance 
of fishing gear. Marketing capability refers to  the capacity of the fish distribution channels to absorb 
a large (or specialized) volume of catch and to provide the necessary credit base on which both fish- 
ing operations and marketing functions depend. Note that for all gear types, disposal of catch is 
usually tied to  a specific landing area,  except in instances when an unusually large volume or value 
of species is caught that is not normally bought at the landing; in  this case fishermen bring such a 
catch to a larger landing where there are more buyers and more cash is available. Also the marketing 
aspect encompasses social and economic ties not wually included in the actual fishing activity, which 
by its nature tends to isolate individual fishing crews or boats from others in the fleet. 
Experience or skill in gear utilization refers to  two sub-components: the first is the amount of 
experience and skill that can be attributed to individual operators or potential operators of gear; the 
second is a broader aspect encompassing the general popularity of gear use  in a particular area and 
the spread of both experience and skill in its  use. 
The fourth factor, gear  productivity with respect to particular resource characteristics, includes 
the importance of particular location differences in the productivity of operation of particular gears 
and the role of gear efficiency as a basic requirement in the adoption of gears in any particular 
location. 
GEAR DESCRIPTION AND CLASSIFICATION 
The capital requirements for each gear are presented in  Table 3,  together with brief comments 
on their operation and where applicable, their special marketing requirements. From the capital 
requirements presented in the table, it is apparent that the trawl gears represent a different group in 
terms of the role of capital. The upper limit  of investments for all the non-trawl gears does not exceed 
P13,000 while capitalization for both the small and medium trawlers exceeds P50,000  per unit. 
This distinction is also apparent in two other aspects. First, except for liftnet operation in 
Cagliliog (the most productive area for such gears in the Bay in 1981), none of the non-trawl gears 
require any significant specialization in marketing capabilities with respect to volume or value of 
catch. Secondly, there is considerable concentration of ownership of the trawlers in  the hands of a 
small number of families; five families owning among them almost half of the 95 small and medium 
trawler fleet (Bailey 1982). Ownership of non-trawl gear  is considerably more dispersed. Thus small 
and medium trawlers represent a level of resource exploitation distinct from the other gears in the 
fishery. 
TRENDS IN FACTORS AFFECTING ACCESS 
The relative importance of each of the above four factors to differential access depends on the 
subsistence (or surplus) characteristics of the fishing community. The usual concept of subsistence Table 3. Gear description and capital requirements. 









'Baby'  trawl 
A stationary net that works best in 
sheltered, shallow waters 
(characteristic of Cagliliog), 
requires a skilled operator in 
the operation of lights and 
the lifting  of the net 
A net set against a current thus 
requiring placement usually at 
the mouth of a river (character- 
istic of Daligan and Balongay) 
A fish corral requiring shallow, 
sheltered waters 
Drift or set gill-net (with motorized  1  3,000 
banca) 
A very small trawl usually powered  9,200 
by a 16-hp engine; operates in 
shallow waters 
A small or medium trawler, usually  55,000- 
around 3 GT in  weight using a  70,000 
135-240-hp engine 
Others: 
Hook and Line  Used for large fish species in rocky  500- 
or coral-bottomed areas; requires  3,200 
knowledge of good fishing ground 
Push net 
Fish pot 
Hand-operated scissor net used in 







Large volume of 
catch to  be 
marketed 
Used for large fish species in rocky  300- 
or coral-bottomed areas  3,400 
'capitalization  figures are approximate for 1981 based on Smith and Mines, this report. Gill-net and liftnet cost includes motor 
boat (10-16 hp  and 5-16 hp,  respectively).  Filter net and push net cost includes non-motorized boat. The upper limits for hook and 
line and fish pot represent inclusion of  a small motor (about 5 hp). 
2~nless  specified in marketing requirements column, specific gear needs no special marketing capability. 
(e.g.,  in farming communities) has connoted production for self-sufficient consumption so  that 
monetization  seldom occurs until the economy moves into surplus production, when both monetiza- 
tion  and accumulation of capital tend to move hand in hand. However given the amount of specializa- 
tion on fishing of production in  the San Miguel Bay area,  the level of monetization is not as impor- 
tant an indicator of the level of development of fishing communities as  in other resource contexts. 
While the communities around the Bay exhibit similar levels of monetization of economic 
transactions of individuals, the level of surplus production differs. This is most clearly observed in 
the function of the marketing sector in the barrio. In  the more developed communities of Castillo 
and Sabang,  marketing is essentially outward-looking, serving the consumer markets of Libmanan, 
Sipocot, Naga or Manila (Esporlas 1982; Yater et al.,  this report); while in the smaller more remote barrios,  marketing is essentially a community subsistence requirement, converting fishermen's 
production into other goods and services for household consumption. 
About two thirds of all Philippine municipal fishermen sell over 70% of their catch (World 
Bank  1980). However, the lack of storage facilities that small-scale fishermen may use  and the 
prohibitive transportation costs of small volumes to  better markets force them to sell to middlemen 
at low prices. Lower prices are often paid to fishermen if  they have availed of operating credit from 
middlemen to purchase fuel or to meet other expenses (Yater et al.,  this report). This indicates that 
the possibility of accumulation from surplus output is strongly linked to the marketing function. 
Thus the role of the marketing sector, with its greater command of available capital, has been of 
growing importance in the determination of the productive technology that is now utilized in the 
Bay.  In this way, the distribution of more productive (and capital-intensive)  gears  is linked to the 
historical spread of development (e.g.,  in the form of all-weather roads) from the Calabanga focus 
(where the marketing sector is most developed due to accessibility to Naga) to Cabusao and Sipocot 
in the west and Tinambac in the northeast. 
TRENDS IN REGULATION 
Aside from the set of factors affecting access discussed above, there has been a trend towards 
increased regulation of use of the Bay's resources. Two examples are cited here. 
The first case  is the stationary gear (particularly for fish corrals) where location guaranteeing 
good catch is a crucial element. Such sites may be held by individuals and in areas where good sites 
are generally available there has historically been no strict institution or rules governing access.  In 
these areas only coordination was  required and this role was  usually assigned to an amonojador, a 
senior fisherman in each community. In the Bay, there has been a tendency for the role of the 
amonojador to shift from informal coordination to one of more formal regulation, and the function 
to shift from the barrio to the municipal level. Differences in roles and functional level were noted 
between the amonojador in the relatively developed (and congested) areas at  the mouth of the Bicol 
River and in the less commmercialized barrios in the northeast portion of the Bay. In Calabanga, for 
example, the amonojadors are not only active, but they even charge fees for their services while in 
Tinambac at the time of fieldwork in 1981, no amonojador was involved in regulating the sites for 
stationary gear. 
A second case  is  the regulation of trawlers. The formal definition of municipal fisheries includes 
waters up to 3 nautical miles (5.5 km) from the shore. Additional depth limitations are set for the 
use of trawling equipment: until 1982, trawlers of more than 3 GT could operate only in waters 
more than 7 fathoms (12.8 m) deep while the lighter ones2 can operate up to  as shallow a depth as 
4 fm (7.3 m) if specifically permitted to do so  under municipal ordinances (BFAR n.d.). 
Based on charts of the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, in the municipal waters of the 
sampled municipalities (Sipocot, Cabusao, Calabanga and Tinambac) maximum water depth in no 
instance exceeds 5 fm (9.1 m). In  fact, only very small portions of these municipal waters exceed 
4 fm in depth (most of these are off Cagliliog in  Tinambac). Thus commercial trawling is illegal in 
most municipal waters.  In Calabanga, where the small and medium trawler fleet is based,  it is 
debatable if any portion of municipal waters is deeper than 4 fm so  that all municipal trawling there 
may be illegal. Illustrative  of the trend towards increased regulation, commercial trawling, which 
includes medium trawlers, was  totally banned from San  Miguel Bay effective mid-1982. 
Of course, regulations on the books do not necessarily mean they are abided by. The potential 
for enforcement is affected by the level of costs (both economic and otherwise) involved. In  actual 
fact, enforcement of the trawling regulations has not been particularly effective in San  Miguel Bay. 
 here is considerable confusion, however, as  to whether rnin~  trawlers must also fish beyond 4 fm. In fact, they generally fish 
in much shallower areas (see Tulay and Smith, this report). EMPLOYMENT AND FACTORS AFFECTING SHARING 
Aside from the factors directly associated with access to the productive use of municipal fish- 
ery resources, institutionsgoverningsharing and disposal of catch also affect, in a less direct manner, 
access to resource use.  For the fishermen who do not have their own gear or who own very simple 
and unproductive equipment (what we  may call "gearless  labor"), employment as a crew member 
is often the only means of ensuring that household subsistence needs are  met. Each gear  that 
requires more than one person to  operate is characterized by a clearly defined sharing system, though 
there is considerable variation within gear types (Villafuerte and Bailey 1982). 
Only a few cases of wage  systems, as for filter nets in Cabusao (see Supanga and Smith, this 
report), were found and there were no instances of leasehold or renting contracts. For crew members, 
the popularity of the sharing system is due to its advantages given the particular economic and 
resource context of municipal fisheries. The critical characteristic of sharing is not the potential 
income it promises for gearless labor but the system's ability to tide over the subsistence fishermen 
during lean periods. The flexibility of sharing is built into the system in the form of the understanding 
that the owner's share may be waived in times of poor catch and "reimbursed"  gradually as produc- 
tion improves. Of course, if a wage system tied to minimum income were established, this would 
assure the same  stability, but sharing has the added advantage of allowing crew members the oppor- 
tunity of benefiting from an exceptionally large catch. 
From the viewpoint of the owner of the gear,  if wages could be set at  minimum subsistence 
levels lower than current crew earnipgs under sharing systems, then wages would be preferred to 
sharing since the owner would monopolize the benefits from a good catch. This would hold true for 
the owner-operators who can closely supervise work. Sharing will only appear  advantageous to 
owners in the case  where the owner does not participate in actual operations and thus cannot 
directly supervise crew members (Hayami and Kikuchi 1980). 
The fact however that sharing systems have been chosen throughout the Philippines even when 
most gears did not have separation of ownership from operation indicates that either labor's bargain- 
ing position has been stronger or kinship  ties  and egalitarian considerations have been more important. 
In addition to these considerations, the growing importance of capital in gear ownership makes 
it reasonable to presume that the trend in San  Miguel Bay will be for more separation between owner- 
ship and operation of gear. Consequently, the current preference for systems of sharing rather than 
wages will be maintained. 
FACTORS AFFECTING SHARING ARRANGEMENTS 
In spite of the general background behind the choice of sharing as a system, it is  still not at  all 
clear what factors are relevant in the actual sharing arrangement chosen. Aside from the sharing for 
the four gear types described by Villafuerte and Bailey (1982), sharing for two other types of gear 
were encountered: filter nets (equal  sharing of net revenue) and hook and line (a third goes to owner; 
the rest to crew). Although the basic formula is for equal sharing between owner and crew, many 
variations occur with respect to the deduction of costs and their definition and with respect to the 
percentage shares effectively chosen. 
Further  study, especially of a quantified nature, is required to investigate the factors determining 
the actual sharing percentages followed. The following variables should figure importantly in such 
an  investigation: (1) the subsistence income required by the households of "gearless  labor";  (2)  the 
seasonality of income with respect to  gear types; (3) kinship (and social) ties among owner and crew 
members; (4) bargaining position of labor; (5) cost of gear acquisition; (6) number of crewmen 
employed; (7)  participation of owner in  operations; (8) requirement for specific skills in operation 
(e.g.,  need for a maestro); and (9) opportunity costs of labor by geographic area. 
Some Policy Implications 
Up to  the present, most of the technological change in  San Miguel Bay has been initiated by 
the private sector and has been generally endogenous in nature. These changes have tended to build on existing techniques or have been gradually diffused from the technologically more advanced fish- 
eries of Manila and southern Luzon. By their very nature, institutions (essentially motivated by the 
search for security in  the face of social and resource uncertainties) tend towards stability and perma- 
nence. Thus,  in periods when the conditions of resource exploitation are abruptly altered, institu- 
tions tend to lag.  Unfortunately, the social or collective action by which institutions are reformed 
is difficult and costly (Hayami and Kikuchi 1980). In addition, exogenous agents,  especially from 
the public sector, often diagnose the problem as essentially technical in nature and thus initiate 
programs (e.g.,  credit for boat motorization) that may merely aggravate the problem. 
Of emerging importance is the crucial issue of the distribution of the benefits from the San 
Miguel Bay fisheries among the various competing users. Until the advent and increased activity of 
trawlers in the Bay during the 1970s, changes in the corresponding institutional arrangements in the 
fishery had not lagged greatly. However, growing conflict between trawl operators and the other 
gear owners in the Bay indicates that the institutional set-up has not adequately responded to this 
technological challenge. 
Programs for both technical and institutional change in  San Miguel Bay should be carefully 
evaluated. In  the area of technology, it has been suggested that first steps should begin with support- 
ing the non-trawl indigenous means of intensification (Netting 1977) or, if  still possible, exploiting 
those more remote areas not fully exploited, since these programs do not impose undue strain on 
the institutional context. 
In the area of institutional change,  the immediate problem is in the field of enforcement. 
Ineffective or arbitrary implementation  of formal rules not only demoralizes those affected in the 
present, but also tends to undermine whatever programs will be introduced in the future. From a 
purely logistic viewpoint, the cost of enforcement is high only because traditional sanctions and 
regulations have not been utilized. This author's impression of the attitudes of fishermen in San 
Miguel Bay is that they no longer hold to an "open-access"  mentality concerning their source of 
livelihood. They appreciate the problems of congestion and overexploitation and,  on the whole, 
accept the growing need for regulation. 
Therefore, the first step in this area is to  encourage decentralization of program implementation 
and enforcement. Consider, for example, the potential role of local leaders. Traditionally the role of 
the barrio officials and of the municipality itself has been minimal in the regulation of resource use. 
The trend, however, istoward increased involvement as problem areas have increasingly shifted from 
the individual to those involving the barrio or municipality. In fact, local municipal governments 
must explicitly pass ordinances to allow trawling in waters between 4 and 7 fm in depth. 
Another potential area of decentralization is linking regulation with landing areas.  Historically, 
most production in San Miguel Bay has been associated with a few landing areas only. Therefore, 
periodic checks on mesh sizes of nets or enforcement of closed seasons or minimum fish sizes could 
be accomplished with minimal expenditure for patrolling of fishing areas. Coupled with a licensing 
scheme, the activities of individual vessels could be effectively monitored. 
To summarize therefore, it is to the area of institutional change that inputs from the public 
sector should now be channelled. The reason is  basic but has been consistently overlooked. Technical 
change is costly, but it often promises benefits to individuals willing to take the risk. Institutional 
change, on the other hand, is not only costly, but  the benefits-often  diffused over a large group-do 
not directly accrue to the innovator. Consequently, the public sector is constrained to view the issue 
of institutional change as essentially a problem of public (or development) finance, to ensure that 
the potential benefits to the majority of fishermen in San  Miguel Bay may be realized. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the pricing efficiency and  related economic aspects of fish processing and  marketing in 
two communities of San  Miguel Bay, Philippines. Salting, dried fish processing and marketing and fresh fish market- 
ing are covered.  Pricing efficiency of the system was  found to be  low. Daily incomes for marketing intermediaries, 
except for a few  large-scale wealthier  fish driers,  were  comparable to those  earned by fishing households in the 
communities. 
It is argued  that the best  hope for  improving processing and  marketing in these  communities lies in group 
activities that  manage  gasoline supply  and  processing to compete with existing suppliers and processors.  Finally, 
recommendations  for uniform weights and measures are made. 
Introduction 
A secondary objective of the economic component of the UPV(I  FDR)-ICLARM multidisci- 
plinary study of the small-scale fisheries of San Miguel Bay was to  examine economic aspects of 
processing and marketing. In particular, the study addressed questions of spatial and form price effi- 
ciency in the system; that is the relationship between (1) spatial price differences and marketing 
costs, and (2)  between form (fresh to processed) price differentials and processing costs. As explained 
in  Smith et al. (this report), the study of marketing and processing was approached in this fashion 
because potential for improvement in the system to the possible benefit of small-scale fishermen 
could more easily be identified than through the more descriptive structural approach as originally 
espoused by Bain (1968) and often applied to Philippine marketing studies (e.g.,  BAEcon n.d.). The study was only partially successful in this approach. As  is true throughout the Philippines, 
fishery products of San  Miguel Bay are often sold by volume rather than by weight. This was the 
case  not only at  the landings in Cabusao but also at  the local markets in Libmanan and Sipocot. 
Accurate measurement of prices per kilogram by species under such circumstances was extremely 
difficult and the method eventually used was  less than perfect. 
Methodology 
The estimation of prices of individual species in multispecies transactions requires prior infor- 
mation on (1)  the total value of the transaction, (2)  its total weight,  (3)  its composition, and (4) an 
index of relative prices. The first three of these data were obtained from sellers at the landings; the 
fourth wasderived from daily inquiries of buyers who were asked to estimate the prices they would 
be willing to pay per kilogram of the major species expected to be landed that day. At the end of 
each day, a specially prepared program (see Appendix 3 of Smith, et al.,  this report) was  used to 
calculate average  prices by species. Weekly  and monthly price summaries were  then prepared. 
Castillo landings, Castillo processors and markets in Libmanan and Sipocot were monitored 
approximately three dayslweek for a 12-month period, February 1980-January 1981. Data collection 
and tabulation were very time consuming and tedious. It  was  a necessary task, however, because 
secondary price data were not available for any of the sampled trading points in Cabusao,  Libmanan 
or Sipocot. Secondary data on prices in Camaligan,  Naga  City and Sagang,  Calabanga from the 
Philippine Fish Marketing (now Development) Authority (PFMA) were collected, which provided 
a check for consistency of the primary data. 
A random sample of Cabusao and Sabang marketing intermediaries for fresh and dried products 
and processors were interviewed during March and April 1981 to collect data on marketing and 
processing costs. 
To summarize, the data that were collected for this marketing and processing study were as 
follows: 
marketing and processing costs 
prices (by major species) at Castillo landings 
prices (by major species) at local markets 
-  Libmanan (fresh and dried)  primary data 
- Sipocot (fresh and dried) 
- Cabusao (dried) 
- Sabang (fresh) 
- Camaligan (fresh)  secondary data 
-  Naga City (dried) 
Cabusao and Sabang are the two major landings along the southern coast of the Bay. They are 
also the most market oriented among the bayside Camarines Sur communities. Consequently, one 
would expect marketing efficiency to be higher here than in the more isolated communities with 
lower volume marketed and fewer buyers. An analysis of the major factors affecting the pattern and 
purpose of marketing for the Bay as a whole can be found in Esporlas (1982). Cabusao and Sabang 
were appropriate foci for this marketing study because the diversity of activity and scale  there 
permited a clear determination of the extent of marketing concentration and thus the potential (if 
any) for restructuring the marketing sector for the benefit of fishermen and consumers. Salting 
TECHNIQUES AND SPECIES USED 
Salting of sergestid shrimp or balao has been a major processing activity in  the San  Miguel Bay 
area for many years. Balao make up 37% of the total catch of the Bay (Pauly and Mines 1982) and 
56% of the landings in Castillo (Smith et at.,  this report). 
Several products can be prepared from balao. The salting done by Castillo and Sabang proces- 
sors is actually only the first step in the conversion of balao into fermented shrimp paste known as 
bagaoong (= bagoong).  However, since there is  no Bicol area market for bagaoong, most of the salted 
balao is shipped to Pangasinan province north of Manila which specializes in  bagaoong preparation. 
Some of the salted balao is  sold locally as guinamos, another shrimp paste which is mashed, sun dried 
and then sold in  cake form (NSDB 1980). Balao that is simply salted (and not fermented or mashed) 
and where the whole shrimp can be seen  is popular with local Bicol consumers. 
After purchase, the balao is placed in a mixing tub, most often an old wooden boat. Salt is 
added to  the balao in an approximate ratio of 1  :4 and then thoroughly mixed. For every can of 
balao (a can is the local measure and weighs approximately 27 kg), 4 liters of water are also added 
to the mixture to increase its  weight and to aid in salt absorption. The resulting product is packed 
for sale in cans with plastic liners. 
COSTS AND RETURNS 
During the survey in April 1981, 13 salting processors in  Castillo and 12 in Sabang were identi- 
fied, of whom seven were interviewed; two had daily sales of less than 750 kg; four had daily sales 
of 1,600-2,000  kg and one had daily sales of 7,000  kg. On average,  these processors had been in the 
business for four years. 
Compared to the average investment costs for a small-scale unit such as  a mini trawler or gill- 
netter, the average investment cost of a balao processor was  low at only P728 (Table 1  ). However, 
operating requirements were considerably higher (Table 2), requiring almost P4,000  daily for balao 
purchases and daily operating expenses (Tables 3 and 4). In  fact,  since many processors advanced 
gasoline to mini-trawl operators and did not receive payment for their product until after sale,  the 
actual capital requirements were  higher. The survey  respondents estimated that approximately 
Table 1. Average investment costs in pesos for salting of balao, San Miguel Bay, April 1981. 
Expected  Average annual 
Average no.  Average acquisition  life  depreciation per 











Average investment costs 
per respondent  =  1  ni Ci  =  P727.70 
Average annual depreciation 
per respondent  =  1  ni Di =  P201.61 Table 2.  Average variable (operating) costs in  pesos for balao salting, San Miguel Bay, April 1981. 
- -- 
Daily cost  %  Annual cost 
Salt 
Plastic bags 




Snacks for laborers 




Table 3.  Daily costs and returns in pesos for balao salting, San Miguel Bay, April 1981. 
Average per processor 
Daily purchases and sales (kg) 
Average quantity purchased 
Average quantity sold 
Percentage weight increase 
Daily costs 
Cost of  balm  purchases 
Prorated fixed costs' 
Variable (operating) costs 
Total daily costs 
Daily returns 
Sales of  salted balao  3,864 
Daily net return to processor's own capital, 
labor and management 
Less opportunity cost of  capital2  1.70 
Daily net return to  processor's labor 
and management 
Per kilogram costs and returns 
Average price paid 
Average direct processing cost sold3 
Average selling price 
Average net return to  labor and management sold 
'~otal  of depreciation (P202) and license fee (P150) prorated over average 192  days of operation per year. 
2~ine  percent of investment cost (P728) and operating capital (P2,8691 prorated daily. 
'~ixed  and variable  (operating)  costs only.  Does not indicate net return to  processor's  own capital,  labor and management. P10,OOO  capital was necessary to enter the business, placing the business on a par with most small- 
scale fishing gear.  A final cost for entering the business is an annual license fee of P150. 
NET  RETURNS 
Residual daily return to processor's  labor and management (after deducting opportunity costs 
of capital) was P122, placing processors in  a separate economic stratum from the fishermen who 
supply the balao,  and on a par with the large-scale fish driers (see below). The number of balao 
processors has remained small due primarily to the high costs of entering this business, far beyond 
the reach of most small-scale fishing households. 
There was  no correlation between processing costs and volume of balao handled. 
Fish Drying 
TECHNIQUES AND SPECIES USED 
The traditional methods of fish drying differ from community to community. In Sabang,  the 
process includes washing, gutting, soaking in brine for 12 hours, and finally drying for 4-5 hours and 
packaging.  In contrast,  the process in Castillo involves dry-salting rather than soaking in brine. 
Most fish dried in Sabang and Castillo are croakers, sardines, hairtail and trashfish. Croakers 
and sardines are the major catch of gill-netters  which predominate in Castillo. In Sabang, where 
trawlers are more prevalent, the major species processed are anchovies and the trashfish bycatch. 
In  Sabang, anchovy landings are in  the early morning, so  the drying process can be completed 
within thesameday. In Castillo, since anchovies are landed in the afternoon, the earliest that effec- 
tive sun drying can begin is the next day.  Ice is sometimes used to preserve the catch. A more 
common process, however,  is to spread the anchovies on the drving trays immediately and leave 
them exposed to the air overnight, completing the process the next day. Since the resulting dried 
anchovies havesimilar physical characteristics to  those which are iced overnight and thus no negative 
price differential, the traditional non-icing method is more economical. Anchovies are  not put 
through the brining process because it would cause softening which would eventually rupture the 
belly portion, altering the physical appearance and lowering the value. 
To determine the weight loss for the major species  processed using traditional methods, 
samples of the product were weighed both before and after drying. The following percentage weight 
recoveries were determined: 
Anchovies  : 60-70%  weight recovery 
Trash fish  :  55% weight recovery 
Sardines  : 55% weight recovery 
Hairtail  :  45-50% weight recovery 
Croakers  : 45-50% weight recovery 
This information was  needed so  that the price of the fresh fish could be adjusted for weight 
loss in  processing before the processing margin was determined. 
COSTS AND RETURNS 
Costs and returns data for drying prorated on a daily basis, are summarized in Table 4 for 26 
processors sampled. The respondents purchased an average volume of 182 kglday at an average total 
cost of P489 or P2.691kg. This average volume probably understated the daily volume handled 
throughout the year because data were collected in April when the peak fishing season had only 
recently begun. However, since daily prorated fixed costs (including  depreciation) represented a 
small proportion of total daily costs, and there was  only weak  evidence of economies of scale (see 
next sub-heading), these figures have been used to estimate per kilo processing costs.  Net returns to Table 4. Daily costs and returns in pesos for fish drying, San Miguel Bay, April 1981 
- 
Below mean  Above mean  All 
Cast~llo  Sabang  volume sold1  volume sold1  processors 
(n  = 11)  (n  = 15)  (n  = 16)  In  = 10)  (n  = 26) 
Daily purchases and sales (kg) 
Average volume purchased 
Average volume sold 
Percentage recovery 
Daily costs 
Cost of purchases 
Prorated fixed costs2 
Variable (operating) costs 
Total daily costs 
Daily returns 
Sales of product 
Daily net return to  processor's 
capital, labor and management 
Less opportunity cost of capital3 
Daily net return to processor's labor 
and management 
Per kilogram costs and returns 
Average price paid 
Average direct processing cost sold4 
Average selling price 
Average net return to  labor 
and management sold 
~ar~in~ 
-- 
I~ean  daily volume sold, is 88 kg. 
'~epresents annual fixed costs prorated over 120 days of operation per year. 
3~ine  percent of tnvestment cost prorated over 120  days of operation per year. 
4~ixed  and variable (operating) costs only. Excludes net return to  processor's own capital, labor and management. 
'(~verage price paid per kg i  percentage recovery) = effective price paid per kg.  Margin per kg = (average selling price per kg 
minus effective price paid per kg). 
a processor's capital, labor and management would vary with volume handled. The average fish drier 
operated 120 dayslyear, and annual costs were prorated to a daily basis to calculate costs and 
returns. 
Major costs for drying included investment, fixed and operating costs. The average capital 
investment of the 26 respondents was P7,011.  However, this figure was very skewed due to  the 
presence in the sample of one processor who had a very substantial concrete storage facility; the 
remaining 25 respondents had an average investment of only P1,563  and this is  a far more reason- 
able estimate of the costs of investing in fish drying in the area. Capital items included the processing 
establishment (kamalig, which usually has a concrete floor, nipa roof and open walls), wooden or 
concrete tubs for brine, drying trays and racks and rattan baskets. The major fixed cast was depr'eciation, averaginQ  P683 anrrually. Other Pixed costs included 
licenses and annual market stall fees which averaged P70. Prorated daily fixed costs totalled P6. 
Daily operating costs averaged P68.30. Major cost items included hired labor (32%  of toea1 
operating costs), salt (27%)  and bad debts (1  1%). Much of the hired labor, especially in the smaller 
operations, was women and children (Yater 1982). Wage  rates were lower in Castillo than in Sabang. 
Bad debts were those debts that processors incurred which they believed would never be repaid. 
Other cost items included containers, ice,  freight for shipping the product to the market, and the 
processor's own transportation fees. 
Fish driers sold an average of 88 kg daily for P646, or P7.34lkg.  Deducting all costs,  including 
opportunity costs of processor's capital (9%  of investment cost), left a net return to processor's 
labor and management of P78lday. Significant differences were found between small processors 
(those selling less than the mean 88 kglday) and larger processors. The latter earned an average net 
return to labor and management of PI72 daily, or almost 10 times as  much as the small processors. 
This was due to the fact tkt both purchase costs and direct processing costs were lower for the 
large processorsand because their volume of business was approximately four times as high as  for the 
small processors. Sabang processors, who dried lower priced species (anchovies primarily), earned 
considerably less residual income per day than did their Castillo counterparts who dried the higher 
'priced croakers. 
EASE  OF ENTRY AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
Except for the largest operations, the investment capital required to enter the fish drying 
business was  less than that required to purchase a gill-net or mini trawl fishing unit. However, the 
daily operating capital required was  higher. To achieve high volume of turnover requires capital for 
advances to fishermen, purchases of fish, direct processing casts, and storage. Consequently, around 
the Bay there were large numbers of small fish drying establishments but relatively few very large 
establishments. In Castillo, there was only one fish drier with the facility for storage of the dried 
product over any length of time. This ability to bulk the product resulted in higher prices received 
by this processor because he was  able to supply transient buyers. All other Castillo fish driers 
sell their product as  soon as  possible because of their need for immediate cash to finance the next 
day's purchases. In some cases,  especially in Sabang,  processors do not pay the trawler operators for 
their catch until the processed product has been paid for by their buyers. 
Exit from the business also was apparently easy,  at least in  the eyes of those fish driers who 
had  made  only small  investments in their businesses.  None thought he would have difficulty 
finding other income earning alternatives-35%  of the 26 respondents would engage in  the buying 
and selling of fresh fish; an almost equal number would invest in small or mini trawlers. In fact, 
many of these small processors were already engaged part-time in  some of these other activities. 
Those who had the least capital invested would engage in such activities as net mending, porterage 
or as hired laborers in another's drying establishment if  they themselves were no ibnger able to 
engage  in the business. 
Examination of economies of scale of opera+tian  in  Mlb  and S&ng  showed &.at scale (in 
terms of volume sold) odly explained 12% of thev~variatian  h  ,average processing costs if  a lirvear 
relationship was hypbthesiSd, and even  less if  a log-log relationship was  assumed. Consequently, 
there were very limited ecdnomies of scale in fish drying which is not surprising given the labor- 
intensive nature of the operation. 
PRICE RELATIONSHIPS 
Each processor dried several species. Consequently, it was  impossible to ascribe the direct pro- 
cessing costs and net returns reported in the previous sections to costs of processing any particular 
species. Further, there was no close correlation between prices of fresh and dried forms of three major 
fish types-croakers,  mullet and herring-over  the 12-month sampling period (Figs. 1-4). Other 
supply and demand factors, not measured in this study, were apparently involved in determining the 
product price relationships. One might be tempted to conclude that there is inadequate flow of 
market price information in the processing sector. However, the difference between the fresh and 
dried fish prices did not show great variation except in banak where there was  a considerable decline 
in the difference after May 1980. 
The difference between the price of fresh and dried fish is termed the mark-up, while the 
processing margin is the difference between the price of dried fish and the price of the fresh input 
adjusted for the weight loss during drying. The processing margin is designed to cover all processing 
Average  mark-up =f  9.3O/kg 
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Fig.  1.  Prices  of  fresh  and dried croaker  (abo)  in  Castillo,  San 
Miguel Bay (1980-1981  ). 
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Fig.  2.  Prices of fresh  and dried mullet (banak) in Castillo, San 
Miguel Bay (1980-1981  1. 
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Fig.  4.  Prices  of fresh  and  dried  herring  (tamban) in  Castillo, 
San Miguel Bay (1980-1981  1. 
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Month costs plus a reasonable return to  the owner's own inputs (capital, labor and management) and risk. 
Risk due to bad debts was already taken into account when processing costs were itemized. Given 
the relative ease  of entry into the fish-drying  business, the reasonably steady mark-ups for these four 
species imply that the market forces of supply and demand have already settled the issue of whether 
or not the processing margin is reasonable given the costs and risks involved. It remains, however, 
that on average processors in  Castillo and Sabang earned daily incomes that were considerably higher 
than the average daily incomes of  fishermen. As noted earlier,  however, large numbers of small pro- 
cessors earn daily incomes in  the P15-20 range which is not much greater than the daily income of 
owners and crew of the gill-netters which supply much of the catch dried by these processors. 
Dried Fish Marketing 
The prices of dried fish in Castillo and the major nearby retail markets of Libmanan, Sipocot 
and Naga City were monitored for a period of one year,  February 1980-January 1981. The purpose 
of this price monitoring was to establish the relationships (if  any) among the prices in  these four 
local markets, because such relationships determine the nature of product flows among the markets 
and the returns that can potentially be earned by middlemen who engage in dried fish marketing. 
Although prices were collected for 13 different dried products, the results presented here focus 
on the four that were generally available in all four locations throughout the year: 
Croaker (abo)  : split 
Croaker (pagotpot)  : whole 
Herring (tamban)  : whole 
Mullet (banak)  : split 
SPATIAL PRICE RELATIONSHIPS 
Prices in Cabusao were  monitored from one to three times per week  depending upon the 
availability of the species. Libmanan and Sipocot prices were determined twice per week;  once on 
the town's market day and once on an ordinary non-market day. Naga City prices were collected 
from the Philippine Fish Marketing  Authority (PFMA). Cabusao prices were obtained from processors 
who were asked to provide us with the pricelkg of their most recent sale.  Libmanan and Sipocot 
retail prices were  obtained from market vendors.  In all three communities,  10-12 sellers were 
questioned on any given day of data collection. The observed prices for these four products are 
shown in the Appendix. The prices were surprisingly stable throughout the year. 
In  all cases,  the relationship among Cabusao-Libmanan-Naga prices was  as expected; that is, 
lowest at the source (Cabusao), higher at  the nearby retail market (Libmanan), and the highest at 
the major city in the Bicol region (Naga). Prices at  Sipocot which is a town along the national road 
between Naga and Daet, Camarines Norte, did not conform to expectations. Before beginning this 
study, it was  hypothesized that Sipocot's proximity to the base of the Bay would lead its retail 
prices for dried fish being sufficiently higher than in Cabusao to warrant regular shipments of dried 
fish from Cabusao to Sipocot. However, during the course of this study, it was  learned that the bulk 
of Sipocot's dried fish supply came from Mercedes in Camarines Norte. Mercedes' prices are report- 
edly lower than those of Cabusao. In  fact, Sipocot middlemen often ship to the Libmanan market. 
For all four dried products, average prices in Sipocot were lower than in Libmanan and in all cases 
except for the split mullet, the Sipocot and Cabusao prices were almost identical. 
Dried fish processed in Cabusao supplies both Manila and the local markets. The largest proces- 
sor in Castillo, who handles an estimated 50% of the dried fish of the community, sells in bulk to 
agents representing Manila buyers. His product is not sold locally. The smaller processors, on the 
other hand, sell in smaller quantities to middlemen who double as retailers in the local markets. The bulk of the sales of small processors is sold to consumers in Libmanan, the third largest municipality 
(after Naga City and lriga City) in Camarines Sur with 75 barrios and a population of over 65,000  in 
1975 (NCSO 1975). Smaller quantities are sold in Sipocot and Naga City markets. It was estimated 
that 50%  of the total Cabusao supply is shipped to Manila, 40% is sold in Libmanan and the remain- 
ing 10% to  Sipocot and Naga. 
Given the observed price differentials, only occasional shipments from Cabusao to Sipocot 
would be profitable; Naga,  with its larger population and retail market,  is better able to  absorb dried 
fish that cannot be absorbed by  the Libmanan market. Just as Libmanan and Manila are the major 
markets for Cabusao,  Naga and Manila are the major markets for Sabang,  Calabanga on the opposite 
side of the Bicol River from Cabusao.  In  Sabang, the same  pattern as  in Castillo prevails; that is, 
large processors sell in bulk for the Manila market, small processors sell in smaller quantities to 
middlemen/retailers who supply the local provincial markets. These major flows of dried fish are 
shown in Fig. 5. Additional information on the marketing of dried fish from Siruma and Tinambac 
can be found in Esporlas (1  982). 
In addition to examining the spatial price differentials to determine trade flows, the extent of 
correlation among the various prices was also determined. A high degree of correlation between 
prices in any two markets implies a highly efficient information network between the two markets 
(Jones 1972). The low correlations found were surprising (Table 5). In  part, this was due to  the low 
variation in prices in any single location. The only product for which reasonable correlation was 
obtained was the split croaker (abo), the major dried product of Castillo, suggesting an adequate 
flow of price information for this species through some of the selected market channels. The 
generally low correlation coefficients imply that either the flow of information was  poor or that 
those middlemen who bought wholesale in Cabusao and sold retail in Libmanan were  able to 
control prices in Cabusao to their advantage. To shed more light on this question, the costs of 
marketing were compared with the price differentials. 
Fig. 5. Dr~ed  f~sh  trade In the vlctnlty of San Mlguel Bay. Table 5. Spatial price relationships for selected species, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
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Split mullet (banak) 
Cabusao-Libmanan  2.21  0.1 7 
Cabusao-Sipocot  1.79  0.44 
Cabusao-Naga  3.62  0.10 
Sipocot-Libmanan  0.42  0.35 
Libmanan-Naga  1.41  0.07 
Sipocot-Naga  1.83  0.32 
'~vera~e  price in  first market minus average price in  the second market. 
'~ased on paired observations of  average weekly prices as shown in  Tables 1-4. 
MARKETING COSTS AND MARGINS 
Variable costs for marketing dried fish were not high (Table 6). The major cost was the trans- 
portation of the middleman who must physically come to Cabusao to make purchases and return 
with them to Libmanan. In  the case of Sipocot, it was  usually Cabusao processors themselves who 
travelled to  the market to sell their product. The fact that there are no regular dried fish middlemen 
serving this route is further evidence that the price differential is not regularly wide enough to war- 
rant anything more than an occasional trip to Sipocot from Cabusao by processors when market 
conditionswarrant it.  The bulk of the product sold locally goes to Libmanan. Other variable market- 
ing costs included those of market fees and freight. 
Based on interviews with dried-fish middlemen, the marketing costs over the Cabusao-Libmanan 
and the Cabusao-Sipocot routes were estimated. Average marketing cost per kilogram of dried fish 
from Castillo to Libmanan was P0.16 and from Castillo to Sipocot was  P0.51.  The higher costs on 
the Sipocot route were the result of the small volume that was  marketed, transportation expenses 
being the same whether 10 kg or 50 kg was transported. Table 6.  Average  middleman daily  costs and  returns  in pesos  for dried fish marketing (Cabusao-Libmanan and Cabusao-Sipocot 
routes). San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Per  middleman costs and returns 
Daily purchases (kg)  33.1 
Daily costs 
Cost of purchases 
Prorated fixed costs' 
Variable (operating) costs2 
Subtotal 
Daily returns 
Sales of dried fish 
Daily net return to middleman's capital, labor 
and management 
Less opportunity cost of capital3 
Daily net return to middleman's labor and 
management 
Per  kilogram costs and returns 
Average price paid 
Average marketing cost 
Average selling price 
Margin 
Average net return to middleman's labor and 
management 
.'~ajor  investment items are  weighing  scale and various containers. Costs of these are  prorated over the average operating 164 
day  /year of the dried fish middlemen.  1  Major costs are  own transportation (P5.67), freight charge  (P1.07). market fees  (P1.17) and bad debts prorated daily  (P1.58). 
3~ased  on 9%  of average PI  .98 investment cost prorated on daily basis. 
Deducting these marketing costs from the daily returns for the two routes for the four species, 
provided a return to the middlemen's capital, labor and risk of P10.24. On average,  Cabusao-Sipocot 
shipments would not be profitable because the average price differential (P0.34) did not cover the 
?0.5l/kg marketing costs. On certain days, such as market days,  however, the price differential was 
sufficient to offset marketing costs, and small shipments would be made along this route. 
Based on the present survey, the average quantity marketed by the middlemen was only 33.1 
kg,  which provided a daily income of approximately P10.13 (after deducting opportunity costs of 
own capital, Table 6). Given this level of income for the 14 middlemen who regularly serve this 
route, it was  not possible to argue that exorbitant profits are being earned.  In  fact, it was  found that 
the prevailing attitude among those who sold dried fish in the local markets (and the fishermen and 
processors who supplied them) was one of live-and-let-live, each recognizing the other's need to 
share in the net returns that could be earned in the marketing system.  Despite the ease  of entry, 
initial  capital requirements of less than P500, the Cabusao-based marketing system is  very reminiscent 
of Szanton's  (1972) observations on the 'right to survive' in rural Philippine markets, be they for 
fish or other produce. 
Middlemen, or rather middlewomen, who handle most of the Cabusao  dried fish supply 
destined for nearby retail markets, earned daily incomes comparable to those of most of the com- 
munity's fishermen. Fresh Fish Marketing 
In contrast to balao salting and dried-fish processing and marketing, fresh fish marketing is not 
a major activity in Castillo, Cabusao. Other than iced shrimp which is shipped from the San  Miguel 
Bay area primarily to Manila wholesalers, most of the fresh fish products from the Bay are sold 
locally. In Castillo, very little of the catch not destined for processing (salting  or drying) reaches 
markets beyond Libmanan and Sipocot. There are  seasonal  variations to this pattern (Esporlas 
1982), but the major market for fresh fish landed in Castillo is Libmanan, and only secondarily 
Sipocot. 
In contrast to the processing activities previously described where there were several large-scale 
businesses, fresh fish marketing over the Castillo-Libmanan route was  handled by a relatively small 
group of 32  women from the two communities, each of whom bought and sold only small quantities. 
These women relied on public transportation, i.e.,  jeepneys  (Fig. 6), to bring their purchases to 
Libmanan. Frequently travelling together in the same jeepney  (only five to eight jeepneys service 
the Cabusao-Libmanan route on a regular basis) the quantities which each can handle were small, 
and at  the time of the survey (April 1981), averaged only slightly more than 10 kglmiddlewoman 
daily. 
The shipments of fresh fish from Castillo to Sipocot were  irregular, but when the relative 
market prices warranted it, fresh fish was  marketed over this route. The average quantity handled 
per middlewoman was somewhat higher (16 kg), but so were their transportation expenses. 
The fresh-fish catch landed in Barcelonita, another barrio in the western extremity of Cabusao 
was almost all marketed in Sipocot and Naga City; very little goes to Libmanan because there is no 
regular public transportation between Barcelonita and Libmanan. The Libmanan fresh fish supply 
thus comes almost entirely from the Cabusao barrios, such as Castillo, in the immediate vicinity of 
the Bicol River. Some pelagic species are also brought into the Libmanan market from Pasacao on 
the Ragay Gulf of the Bicol region. 
For the purposes of the present survey,  14 of the 32 middlewomen who regularly bought fresh 
fish in Castillo and sold them in Libmanan were interviewed. Their total time involvement was 
3-5  hourslday, 324  dayslyear. Those few who used the Castillo tosipocot route worked about twice 
as long, 7-8 hourslday, and approximately the same  number of days per year on average. 
Fig. 6. Jeepneys are used extensively to move fish between communities where serviceable roads exist. Attempts to determine middlewomen daily incomes were made using two methods. First, costs 
and returns based on the April 1981 survey data were estimated; second, spatial price differentials 
were  compared with respective marketing costs. The two sets of data gave  different results as 
reported below. 
COSTS AND RETURNS 
Based on the survey, the average investment costs for these middlewomen was  very low (P35), 
most of the initial expense being for various-sized containers used to  transport the purchases (Table 
7). Major variable costs were for ice and transportation (Table  B), over and above the cost of their 
purchases. Total daily capital requirements ranged from P50 to PI00 plus the credit extended to 
suki customers in Libmanan. No licenses were required for these middlewomen, though each paid a 
daily market stall fee in Libmanan or Sipocot. 
Table 7. Average investment costs in pesos of fresh fish middlewomen (n  = 14) who buy in Castillo and sell In L~bmanan  and Sipocot, 
San  Miguel Bay, April 1981. 
Average annual 
Expected  depreciation 
life  per item (Di) 
Average no.  Acquisition cost 










Average investment costs 
per middlewoman  =  C ni Ci  =  P35.16 
Average annual depreciation 
per middlewoman  =  1  ni Di  =  P38.54 
Table 8. Daily variable (operating) costs in pesos for fresh fish middlewomen who buy in Castillo and sell in Libmanan and Sipocot, 
San Miguel Bay, April 1981. 
Item  Castillo-Libmanan  Castillo-Sipocot 
Ice 
Transportation 
Own fare (back and forth) 
Freight 
Market stall fee 
Miscellaneous (snacks, etc.) 
Total 
Average volume handled (kg) 
Average variable cost per kg 
Average period worked per day (hours) For their three to five hours of daily work, the Castillo-Libmnan middlewomen earned a 
return to their own labor, management and risk of approximately P10; the Castillo-Sipocot middle- 
women who worked twice as long earned about twice this amount (Table 9). 
The above results imply that fresh fish marketing is handled by predominantly low-volume 
part-time middlewomen who earn a daily return comparable to that earned by many of the fisher- 
men from whom they make their purchases. 
PRICES AND SPATIAL PRICE EFFICIENCY 
In addition to interviews of fresh fish middlewomen, the prices of the major fresh fish species 
in Castillo,  Libmanan and Sipocot were  monitored for one year,  February 1980-January 1981. 
These data were supplemented with secondary price data collected by the PFMA at Sabang and 
Carnaligan landings near Naga City. The five major species monitored were the croakers (abo and 
pagotpot), mullets (banak), herring (tamban) and crabs (kasag). The price data for each of these five 
species are shown in Figs. 7-1  1. 
As  noted earlier, the prices of major species from multispecies transactions were estimated at 
the Castillo landings. There were also occasions when these species were sold singly; these prices 
were collected also.  Except in the case of tamban, there was no significant difference between these 
Table 9. Daily costs and returns in pesos for fresh fish middlemen who buy in Castillo and sell in Libmanan and Sipocot, San Miguel 
Bay,  April 1981. 
Castillo-Sipocot 
Daily purchases and sales  (kg) 
Average volume purchased and sold  10.4  16.5 
Daily costs 
Cost of fresh fish purchased 
Prorated fixed costs1 
Variable (operating) costs 
Total dailv costs  49.1 2  98.56 
Daily returns 
Sales of fresh fish  59.10  120.00 
Daily net return to middleman's own capital, 
labor and management 
Less opportunity cost of capital2  0.01  0.01 
Daily net return to middleman's own labor 
and management 
Per  kilogram costs and returns 
Average price paid  4.35  5.1 5 
Average direct marketing cost3  0.37  0.82 
Average selling price  5.68  7.27 
Average net return to labor and management  0.96  1.30  -- 
'~otal  of depreciation (P38.54) prorated over average 324 days of operation per year. 
2~ine  percent of investment cost (P35.16) prorated daily. 
3~ixed  and variable (operating) costs only. Does not include net return to middleman's own capital, labor and management. two sets of prices during the period of observation, so  there was  no price advantage for fishermen 
to sort their catch by species before sale. 
Similar to the analysis of dried fish prices, the extent of correlation among the spatially diverse 
prices was determined for each species based on average weekly prices; in all cases it was  found to 
be low. In no case did the correlation coefficient (r)  exceed 0.75. In most cases,  it was  well below 
0.50.  Even on the Cabusao-Libmanan route no significant correlation was found between prices. 
Sipocot : f  9.43(  1.02) 
Carnaligan: f  5.85(0.43) 
Sabang: P4.82(0.81) 
C~~~  : f  4.68(0.8b) 
C~~~  : f4.39(0.67) 
1980 
Month 
Fig. 7.  Average monthly price for fresh croaker  (abo)  in  selected landings and markets,  San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. Average prices 
for the 12-month period are shown with standard deviation  in parentheses. CMST = Cabusao price for multispecies transactions; 
CSST = Cabusao price for singlespecies transactions. 
Sipocot: f  7.82(1.19) 
Librnonon: f8.08(0.60) 
Camaligan: f  4.39 (0.46) 
CMST: f  3.23  (0.50) 
Sabang: f  3.44(0.74) 
C~~~:  f  3.27(I.V) 
Month 
Fig. 8.  Average monthly price for fresh croaker (pagotpot) in selected landings and markets,  San Miguel Bay,  1980-1981. Average 
prices for the 12-month  period  areshown with standard deviation in  parentheses. CMST = Cabusao price for multispecies transactions; 
CSST = Cabusao price for singlespecies transactions. One cause of these low correlations was the reasonable stability of prices. The implication of these 
findings is that there was either a poor price information network or our price data were inaccurate. 
For  all five species, the data were collected carefully and the relative prices appeared to be reasonably 
correct and consistent, that is,  lower at  the landings (Cabusao, Sabang, Camaligan) and highest in 
the markets (Libmanan and Sipocot). 
Sipocot: f  8.43(0.57) 
Libmanan: f  8.80(0.67) 
C~~~  : f  4.26(0.73) 
Sabong: P  2.6l(O.99) 
F  M  A  M  J  J  A  S  0  N  D  J 
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M  onth 
Flg. 9.  Average monthly price for fresh mullet lbanak) In  selected land~ngs  and markets, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. Average prlces 
for the  12-month period are shown with standard deviation  In parentheses. CMST  = Cabusao price for multispecles transactions; 
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Fig.  10. 
Libmanan: f  162  (0.35) 
Sipocot: f  Zgi'(l.55) 
C~~~:  f  5.3O(O.64) 
C~~~  : P  3.68(0.74) 
Sabang: P  3.30(0.42) 
Carnaligan : f  3.08 (0.30) 
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1980  1981 
Month 
Average monthly price for fresh herrmg ftambanl  in  selected landlngs and markets, San M~guel  Bay,  1980-1981. Average 
prices for the 12-month  period  areshown  with standard deviation In  parentheses. CMST  = Cabusao pr~ce  for multispecies transacttons; 
CSST = Cabusao price for  single-species transactions. --  9- 
Sabang . f  6.3O(  1.08) 
Sipocot: f  6.39(0.74) 
Libmanan: f  5.81  ( 1.33) 
/  Camaligan: f 4.20  (0.59) 
C~~~:  f  3.44 (0.21) 
Fig.  11. Average monthly price for fresh crabs (kasag) in selected landings and markets, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. Average prices 
for  the  12-month  period are shown with standard deviation  in parentheses. CMST  = Cabusao price for  multispecies transactions; 
CSST = Cabusao price for singlespecies transactions. 
Nevertheless, the price differentials for the five species, based on these price data, were generally 
larger than the mark-ups  derived from the prices (purchases and sales) information provided by the 
14 fresh fish middlewomen interviewed in April 1981. Although the middlewomen assured the 
interviewers that the volume and cost data provided were  "usual",  it is believed that both the 
volume handled and the prices received were understated. The cost data provided appeared reason- 
able, based on assessment of 1981 marketing costs. 
It was  concluded that daily income of fresh fish middlewomen on the Cabusao-Libmanan 
route was  probably closer to P35lday. The average price differential for the five species during 
1980-1981 was P3.82lkg. Subtracting direct marketing costs of P0.37lkg (from Table 3) results in a 
return to the middlewomen's capital, labor, management and risk of P3.45/kg, considerably higher 
than the P0.96lkg determined by the survey of middlewomen. 
Finally, the nature of the mark-ups for the five species was  examined, using simple regression 
techniques (P,,  = a! + 0  Py ); there was no consistent pattern. The mark-up between the receiving 
market Y and the shipping market X was constant (Ho  :Of  1 rejected) for abo and banak and appar- 
ently based on a percentage (Ho  :P # 1 not rejected) fbr kasag. For pagotpot and tamban P  was  not 
significantly different from zero,  implying roughly constant prices in Libmanan, regardless of price 
fluctuations in Cabusao. 
One major source of pricing inefficiency in the present marketing system is the practice of 
selling by volume rather than by weight. A second cause of pricing inefficiency is that the sole 
providers of price information to fishermen sellers for fresh fish are the middlewomen themselves. 
Fishermen or their wives have little knowledge of prevailing prices in Libmanan so  the middlewomen 
have a bargaining advantage over the fishermen or female members of their households who sell the 
catch. These two factors, it is believed, are the primary causes of the high mark-ups that prevail 
between Cabusao and Libmanan for the five fresh fish species monitored in this survey. Conclusions 
Catches landed at Castillo, Cabusao fluctuated widely from month to month (see Smith et  al., 
this report). Prices for the major species were <onsiderably  more stable. Fishermen and middlemen 
claimed that the usual inverse relationship bbtween supply and prices did not hold for the San 
Miguel Bay landings. The present survey findings support their contention that when supply was 
high, demand in the form of larger numbers of buyers was also high. When supply was  low, buyers 
were  less likely to frequent the San  Miguel Bay area and demand was  thus also lower. The net result 
of this was  that local prices tended to be  reasonably stable as external demand (i.e.,  Manila), which 
draws on numerous fisheries throughout the country, fluctuated locally. 
To this point, one of the selling methods at the landings, which is unique to the Philippines, 
has not been mentioned. Catches not predestined to particular buyers are sold through a whisper 
bidding system known as bulungan. It has been alleged on numerous occasions that this system 
results in prices paid being lower than would be the case  if  the bidding were open. No evidence was 
found, however, to indicate that this is the case  nor did fishermen complain about this system. A 
careful collection and analysis of price data under alternative selling arrangements would be necessary 
to resolve this issue. The less rigorous observations of the bulungan system made during the survey 
were that it offered flexibility to fishermen sellers (or female members of their households) in 
selecting their buyers. They could, if  they were not satisfied with the whisper bids received, open 
the bidding. They could also select the buyer whom they consider to be most reliable rather than 
necessarily the highest bidder, an important consideration if the seller was  not paid until after the 
buyer has disposed of the purchases. In the assessment of the survey team, changes in the bulungan 
system would have marginal benefits, if any, for fishermen. 
Cabusaors primary links with external markets (as distinct from local provincial markets) are 
through its processed products-salted  balao and dried fish. Although no significant economies of 
scale were found to exist in either of these processes, the fish-drying activity in particular had a 
higher degree of market concentration than any of the other processing and marketing activities in 
the San Miguel Bay area.  In Cabusao,  a single processor had a 50% market share.  In contrast, local 
dried and fresh fish marketing was  performed by larger numbers of small-volume, low-income 
middlewomen. 
Possibilities exist for technical improvements in processing. For example, the traditional drying 
procedures practiced in San  Miguel Bay  communities are quite different from those currently 
recommended by fish processing technicians from the University of the Philippines (NSDB 1980). 
The university technicians recommend a shorter 40-60 minute soaking period followed by a longer 
two- to threeday drying period. The longer soaking period of the traditional method allows more 
water to leach out at this stage which greatly shortens the required drying period. However, the salt 
content of the traditional product is very much higher; 13% by weight in contrast to 5% for the 
university recommended product. The rapid drying of the traditional product causes case  (surface) 
hardening and leaves the inside still moist. The surface salt cakes after two weeks giving the tradi- 
tional product a chalky, white appearance and a hard and brittle texture. It is also more hygroscopic 
than the recommended product because the surface salt tends to absorb moisture from the air thus 
leading to earlier spoilage. 
The process recommended by the university technicians produces a product which is definitely 
of higher quality, but there are several reasons why the traditional process generally persists despite 
several years of extension effort in  Castillo and other San Miguel Bay communities by the technicians. 
First, the traditional product with its higher salt and moisture content is heavier than its recom- 
mended counterpart. Buyers do not yet distinguish between the traditional and the recommended 
product so there is no incentive for the processor to produce a higher quality but lighter product 
because it is sold by weight. Buyers are not too interested either in the higher quality product 
because most of what they purchase is sold through the marketing channels to-the  final consumer within two weeks,  thus before salt-caking and brittleness becomes a problem. Recently, a group of 
women from Castillo have grouped together to obtain a government loan to continue the university 
recommended pt'ocess and there is  hope that both buyers and consumers will come to recognize the 
higher quality product and be willing to pay a premium for it. It  will obviously take some time, 
however. 
For fishing households to benefit from improvements in the processing and marketing sector, 
it will be necessary for them to become more involved in these activities. Because dried fish and 
salted balao are the largest volume products handled by the communities of Cabusao and Sabang, it 
is in this area that the greatest potential exists for group activities of fishing households. Presently 
there is no organized form of cooperation among fishing households and a major barrier to the 
successful formation of group efforts to compete with the large-scale processors will be the large 
operating capital requirement. 
The investment costs for the processing activities are not high, but the fishermen's needs for 
gasoline advances demand considerable working capital of processors. In return for these advances, 
processors receive assurance of supply. Gasoline supply and processing are thus inextricably linked 
in Cabusao and any organization of fishermen in the area  must be able to be competitive in both 
areas. 
In  conclusion, it is  worth reiterating the need for an improved price information network; that 
is,  a means to provide a check and balance to the present system which concentrates all price infor- 
mation in the hands of buyers. Improvement in the municipal monitoring of landings in the form of 
implementation of a uniform system of weights and measures would add considerably to the ease  of 
making price comparisons between markets and locations. This recommendation is of more than 
mere academic interest (although it would certainly aid price analysis considerably) because any 
improved flow of market and price information in the processing and marketing sector will stimulate 
increased efficiency to the benefit of both fishermen producers and consumers. 
References 
BAEcon. n.d. A survey on fish marketing in Iloilo, Bacolod and Zamboanga. A joint research undertaking of the 
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Quezon City, Philippines. 
Bain, J.S.  1968. Industrial organization. 2nd ed. John Wiley and Sons Inc.,  New York. 
Esporlas, A.E.  1982. The seasonality of fishing, marketing and processing, p. 14-24. In C.  Bailey (ed.) Small-scale 
fisheries of San  Miguel Bay,  Philippines:  social aspects of production and marketing. ICLARM Technical 
Reports 9,  57 p. lnstituteof Fisheries Development and Research, College of Fisheries, University of the Philip- 
pines in the Visayas,  Quezon City, Philippines; lnternational Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management, 
Manila, Philippines; and the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan. 
Jones, W.O.  1972. Marketing  staple food crops in tropical Africa. Cornell University Press,  Ithaca. 
NCSO.  1975. 1975 integrated census of the population and  its economic activities: population, Camarines Sur. 
National Census and Statistics Office, Manila. 
NSDB.  1980. Philippine handbook on fish processing technology. National Science Development Board, Manila. 
Orejana,  F.M.  1982. Low-cost  fish processing and the use of appropriate technology in the Philippines, p.  153-160. 
In R.C.  May, I.R. Smith and D.B. Thomson (eds.) Appropriate technology for alternative energy sources in 
fisheries. ICLARM Conference Proceedings 8. 215 p. Asian Development Bank and  lnternational Center for 
Living Aquatic Resources Management, Manila, Philippines. 
Pauly, D. and A.N. Mines, Editors. 1982. Small-scale fisheries of San  Miguel Bay, Philippines: biology and stock 
assessment.  ICLARM Technical Reports 7,  124 p.  Institute of Fisheries Development and Research, College 
of Fisheries, University of the Philippines in  the Visayas, Quezon City, Philippines; lnternational Center for 
Living Aquatic Resources Management, Manila, Philippines; and the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan. Piansay, E.,  Z. dela Cruz and M.  Lizarondo. 1979. Marketing operations of sustenance fishermen in Camarines Sur. 
Agricultural Marketing Report Vol.  1,  No. 1. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Quezon City. 
Szanton, M.C.B.  1972. A right to survive: subsistence marketing in a lowland Philippine town. The Pennsylvania 
State University Press,  University Park. 
Yater, L.  1982. The fisherman's family: economic roles of women and children, p. 42-50. In C.  Bailey (ed.) Small- 
scale fisheries of San  Miguel Bay, Philippines: social aspects of production and marketing. ICLARM Technical 
Reports 9,  57 p. Institute of Fisheries Development and  Research, College of Fisheries, University of the 
Philippines in the Visayas, Quezon City, Philippines; International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Man- 
agement, Manila, Philippines; and the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan. Appendix 
Weekly Average Prices of Four Dried Fish Products in San Miguel Bay Area Markets 
1980-1981 
Table I. Weekly average pricelkg of split croaker (abol  in pesos in selected markets, 1980-1981. 
Date  Cabusao  Libmanan  Sipocot  Naga 









Appendix Table I continued 
Nov 
Dec 
Jan  1981 
12-month average  13.71  14.57  13.73  17.36 
Standard deviation  1.18  1.37  1.04  1.10 
Table ll.  Weekly average pricelkg in pesos of whole croaker (pagotpot) in selected markets, 1980-1981. 
Date  Cabusao  Libmanan  Sipocot  Nags 
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Jan  1981 
12-month average  10.94 
Standard deviation  1.30 
Table Ill. Weekly average pricelkg in pesos of whole herring (tamban) in selected markets, 1980-1981. 
Date  Cabusao  Libmanan  Sipocot  Naga 













Jan  1981 
12-month average 
Standard deviation 
Table IV. Weekly average pricelkg in pesos of split mullet (banak) in selected markets, 1980-1981. 
Date  Cabusao  Libmanan  Sipocot  Naga  -  - 
Feb  1980 












Jan  1981 
12-month average  7.94 
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Abstract 
The  economic  efficiency and  distribution of  benefits from the fisheries of San  Miguel Bay,  Philippines are 
examined  in this paper.  The total  annual  value  of catch from the Bay  in 19801981 was  estimated to be P53.5 
million (US$6 million). Small trawlers, which represented only 3% of the fishing units and employed 7% of the labor 
force were found to earn the largest shares  of total catch value and 50% of the P3 million pure profits, or resource 
rents. The open-access equilibrium of this fishery has  not been reached but further increases in fishing effort would 
reduce economic efficiency and resource rents. 
Attention is drawn to the divergence between goals of economic efficiency and equity and it is concluded that 
serious consideration should  be  given to limiting effective fishing effort in this fishery so  as to maintain positive 
resource  rents  and  to deal with the presently highly skewed  distribution of  benefits that favors  trawlers  at the 
expense of non-trawl  gears. 
Introduction 
This paper has two objectives. The first is to summarize the costs and earnings data presented 
in the other papers in this report so that comparisons between gear types can be highlighted. The 
second is to discuss the implications  of these findings for issues of economic efficiency, equity and 
management of the San  Miguel Bay  fisheries.  A full discussion of management options can  be 
found in  the concluding volume of this series on the San  Miguel Bay fisheries. 
Before presenting the summary findings it is necessary to discuss some of the concepts and 
terms that have been used in this study, in particular the concept of opportunity cost (see also Smith et al.,  this report) because its determination is critical to the evaluation of the economic 
health of the fisheries. Opportunity costs of the factors of production (labor and capital) are the 
returns that could be earned by using these respective factors in the next best activity. Most costs 
and earnings studies omit this cost item (e.g.,  Ovenden 1961; Kurien and Willmann 1982) because 
they focus on financial analyses and residual returns to capital and labor. These  residuals were 
certainly of interest in San Miguel Bay fisheries because they represent the cash  income of owners 
and crewmen.  For owners and crewmen, incomes earned are  the prime factors in determining 
whether they continue to engage in fishing. But to weigh the option of fishing against other occu- 
pations or sources of income, owners and crewmen must compare their earnings with those that 
could be earned in alternative activities; in other words they must compare their returns to capital 
and/or labor with potential returns in the next best use. 
However, Panayotou (1981) has pointed out the dichotomy that exists between conditions of 
entry to and exit from a fishery. The potential entrant to  a fishery may be guided in part by the 
opportunity cost concept but the individual already engaged in fishing may find it difficult to shift 
his assets (i.e.,  vessel and gear) out of the fishery and into some alternative use,  although he could 
consider selling out. Capital is likely to be more immobile than labor under such circumstances. The 
non-owner, for example, has somewhat more flexibility (assuming options for labor exist) than 
owners whose  vessels  and gear  represent sunk costs.  On the one  hand, owners will continue to 
employ their vessels and gear as long as their variable costs are met. A potential entrant to the fish- 
ery, on the other hand, will want to be able to cover both variable and fixed costs. This dichotomy 
explains why existing vessels will continue to  fish even when the profits earned are insufficient to 
attract additional entrants. 
The presence of pure profit is an indication that open-access equilibrium of an open-access 
fishery has not yet been reached. To determine whether any pure profit (rent) exists in the fishery, 
it is necessary to  conduct more than a financial analysis. Opportunity costs of capital and labor 
must be included as costs also and deducted along with other variable and fixed costs from total 
revenues to  determine the pure profit or loss in the fishery. These opportunity costs are sometimes 
treated as  variable costs (for labor) or fixed costs (for capital) (e.g.,  Panayotou et al.  1982). In the 
papers of this report, the three costs (fixed, variable, opportunity) are treated separately, so  that 
readers will recognize the traditional expression of costs and earnings as 'return on investment' 
before opportunity costsof capital are deducted. A fishery would be fully exploited if, after deduct- 
ing fixed,variable and opportunity costs from total revenues, no pure profit (or rent) remains (Fig. 1  ). 
Effort  E 
Fig. 1. An open-access fishery will tend to equilibrium (E)  where total revenues just cover fixed, 
variable and opportunity costs and no pure profit (or rent) is earned. The determination of the appropriate opportunity costs for capital and labor is not an easy 
task. Over- or underestimating either will result in a misrepresentation of the pure profits or loss in 
the fishery. There are those who argue that the true social opportunity cost of labor in small-scale 
fisheries is zero. However, this is not the case  for San  Miguel Bay fisheries because opportunities as 
laborers on rice fields and copra plantations or as piece-workers in processing establishments do 
exist in most communities, albeit at  low wages.  Also, migration of labor out of Bicol to better 
opportunities elsewhere is also possible and indeed is occurring (Bailey 1982). Under such circum- 
stances, one would be hasty to conclude that the opportunity cost of labor is zero (Squire and van 
der Tak 1975). Consequently, for this study, a positive opportunity cost for labor was determined. 
A careful assessment of the risks in these alternative occupations compared to the risks inher- 
ent in fishing has not been made, Therefore, any income earned by fishing labor above its opportu- 
nity cost includes a potential premium for risk. For most alternative activities, the opportunity 
wage was PlOIday. Only in Sabang,  Calabanga was there a higher daily opportunity wage of P15. 
This was  offset by lower wages  in communities such as Siruma, and the PI0  daily opportunity cost 
of labor was used throughout this study as a reasonable average. 
Depending upon location and the level of their capital assets, owners of fishing units have 
varying options for alternative investment. One option is to deposit their capital in the local rural 
bank and earn interest on their savings. This may be the only alternative for those with limited 
capital while those with more could consider a wide range of productive investments, such as fish 
processing,  pig farming or public transportation. Opportunities for alternative investment are 
greater in those communities such as Sabang, Calabanga which have more varied economic sectors 
and are close to markets. Because opportunity costs of capital are a function of the level of capital 
available, ideally a different opportunity cost should be used for all gear types.  In the absence of 
sufficient data to allow this more refined estimation, the 9%  rural bank savings rate was  used for 
analysis of  all gear types. It should be kept in mind that to the extent that this rate understates the 
return that could be earned outside fishing (e.g.,  trawler operators with their high capital assets may 
be able to earn more than 9% elsewhere), it results in an overestimate of the pure profits of that 
gear type. 
For discussion of economic efficiency and equity issues in San  Miguel Bay, it will thus be 
necessary to look at both pure profits (or loss) and actual incomes derived by owners and crewmen 
of each gear type. 
A second major point concerns the extrapolation of costs and earnings from the survey sample 
to  the fishery asa whole. For cost reasons, the sample was drawn entirely from the two communities 
of Castillo, Cabusao and Sabang,  Calabanga. The earnings of fixed gears are certainly location spe- 
cific and this sample of them may not have been representative. For example, it is believed that the 
earnings of stationary liftnets were underestimated (see Supanga and Smith, this report). The mobile 
gears based in these communities, such as small and medium trawlers, mini trawlers and gill-netters 
all range throughout the Bay and thus are believed to be representative of the fishery as a whole. 
The majority of trawlers are,  in fact, based in these two communities. Gill-netters in other commu- 
nities which do not land their catch in Sabang and Castillo may have lower operating costs but it 
was assumed that these are offset by the lower prices that prevail in those more isolated communities 
and that their net revenues before sharing approximate those of the sample. These mobile gears 
caught 75.4% of the total catch of the Bay in 1980-1981. The survey data covered approximately 
11,250 fishing trips. Consequently, it is concluded that extrapolation from the sample is reasonable 
as long as the reader recognizes the possible sources of bias. 
Summary of Costs and Earnings by Gear Type 
INVESTMENT COSTS 
Eight gear types representing 1,587  (or 67%) of the 2,382  fishing units in San  Miguel Bay were 
monitored on a daily basis for 12 months (June 1980-May 1981  ). These eight gears represent the extreme range of investment levels and degrees of capital intensity that prevail in the small-scale or 
municipal fisheries of San Miguel Bay (Table I),  and thus indicate the inappropriateness of placing 
all these gear types under the "municipal fisheries" label. This argument is set out in Smith et  al. 
(this report) and Pauly and Mines (1  982). 
CAP1TAL:LABOR RATIOS 
As can be seen from Table I,  there are really three distinct categories of gear  used in the Bay. 
At the lowest extreme are gears such as scissor nets, cast nets, fish pots and hook and line that have 
investment costs of less than PI  ,000 and low capital: labor ratios. Next is a mid-range group that 
includes the most important of the small-scale gears, with investment costs of P3,500-13,000 and 
capital:  labor ratios of 2,300-4,600: I.  At the highest extreme are small trawlers (classified in the 
Philippines as "municipal"  trawlers because they are less than 3 GT) and medium trawlers (classified 
as  "commercial"  trawlers) which require investments of more than P50,000 and have capita1:labor 
ratios of 11,000-12,000:l.  Capital intensity increases with the level of investment required per fish- 
ing unit. Trawlers are thus labor saving when compared to other small-scale municipal gears. 
Table 1. Investment costs, labor requirements and capital/labor  ratios of major gear types in San Miguel Bay. 
















l~apitalllabor  ratio which shows investment cost per unit of labor. 
DISTRIBUTION OF CATCH 
The catching power of these diverse gears follows the same pattern (Table 2), and it is interest- 
ing to note how the total annual catch of San  Miguel Bay is distributed among the major gear types. 
All catch (including balao) is included in  these computations. Trawlers of all three types harvest 
almost 56% of the total catch; only gill-netters, among the non-trawl gears,  have a significant 
share (19%) of total catch. Biologists argue for the exclusion of the balao catch from total catch 
when discussing distribution among gear types because it is a very distinct fishery and is not charac- 
terized by a high degree of competition among various gear types as  are the other fisheries in  the 
Bay (Pauly and Mines 1982). Gill-netters and small trawlers, for example, compete for many of the 
same species.  If  balao (and hence mini trawlers) are excluded from the total, trawlers catch 41% of 
the Bay's catch with non-trawl gears catching the remainder. Stationary gears catch less than 1  0% of 
the total. For purposes of comparing the value of catch and pure profits by gear types, balao (and 
mini trawlers) will be included in the subsequent calculations. 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE VALUE OF CATCH 
The total annual value of the San Miguel Bay fishery during the 1980-1981  period was  over 
P53 million (Table 3).  Fifty five percent of this total value was  earned by the three categories of 
trawlers. Small trawlers, which represent only 3% of all fishing units, alone earned almost one-third 
of total catch value, an increase over their one-quarter share of total catch by volume because of Table 2.  Catch per trip, average effort and total catch of major gear types in San Miguel Bay, June 1980-May 1981. 
Av.  catchltrip  Av. no. of  Total no. of  Total catch3 










'~akily  (1982) estimatedhedium  trawler catch based  upon a power factor of  1:1.5  over  small trawler catch for the period 
1979-1980. During the record keeping study,  June  1980 to May  1981, the value  of the catchltrip of medium trawlers was  11% 
higher than the value of the catchltrip of small trawlers. Since they caught the same  species  in the same proportion and sold in the 
same  market, it was  assumed  in the above table a power factor of only 1:1.11. The figures differ from those in Pauly and Mines 
(19 2) because the catchltrip for trawlers was  based on a different time period. 
'Based  on Pauly and Mines 119821 but adjusting for our lower catch of medium trawlers. 
31ncludes balao catch of mini trawlers. 
Table 3. Annual value of catch in pesos by gear type, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Annual value of 
catch per fishing  Total number of  Total value of catch  Value per gear type 










2,382  53,457  100 
Based on average annual catch from Pauly and Mines (1982) and an assumed average price of P2.87lkg (from Table 4). 
the more highly priced shrimps that they caught. In value terms, the share of mini trawlers was 
lower than their volume share because of the low price of bolao at the landings (Table 4). 
The level of investment cost per fishing unit is a significant determinant of that unit's annual 
value of catch (Fig. 2). Due to variation in operating costs (especially for medium trawlers) this 
same  relationship does not hold for pure profits (Table 5) nor for cash incomes of owners and crew. 
FACTOR PRODUCTlVITlES 
Two commonly used measures of factor productivity are the volume or value of catch per unit 
of capital or labor input (Kurien and Willmann 1982). Since prices vary depending upon the species 
caught, measuring capital and labor productivities in value terms is preferable to measuring them Table 4. Average price of catch received at landings in  San Miguel 











Small and medium trawlers 
Weighted average prices 
all gears 
all gears except mini  trawlers 
all gears except trawlers 
MlNT  . 
G 
Capital investment per unit (F  ) 
Fig. 2. Relationship  between  capital investment and annual value of  catch for various gear types  operating in  San Miguel Bay. 
Note: S -  scissor  net;  F -  filter net; C -  corral;  L -  liftnet;  G -  gill-netter;  MlNT -  mini trawler;  ST -  small trawler; 
MT -  medium trawler.  The relationship between annual value of catch per fishing unit (V)  and capital investment (I) 
can be expressed as  V = -1  1,497 + 3.95 1 with Fz2  = 0.96. solely in volume terms, because the former indicate the "value  added"  by capital and labor inputs. 
The differences between volume and value measurement of factor productivities can be seen  in 
Table 5. 
Of all the gears studied, the mini trawlers exhibited the highest capital and labor productivities 
in volume terms. Of the medium investment gears, the liftnets had the lowest capital aid  labor 
productivity. Invalue  terms, small and medium trawler labor contributed the greatest "value  added" 
in the fishery. Along with mini trawlers, they also showed the highest catch value per peso invested. 
Although it was not a strong degree of correlation (r = 0.45), there was a positive relationship 
between capital intensity (from  Table 1) and capital productivity in value terms. A positive relation- 
ship was also found between capital intensity and labor productivity in value terms (r = 0.89). 
Finally in value terms, there was a positive relationship between the capital and labor productivities 
(r = 0.78). 
Table 5. Capital and labor productivities of major gear types, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Annual value  Annual volume  Volume of  Capital prodtrctivity  Labor productivity 
of catch per  of catch per  catch per P  Value per P  Volume per P  Value per  Volume per 
fishing unit  fishing unit  operating cost  invested  invested  labor unit  labor unit 









Although these factor productivities are important measures of cost effectiveness, they do not 
account for differences in operating costs.  In particular, in the motorized fisheries of San Miguel 
Bay, it is important to examine energy efficiency. Energy costs include gasoline, diesel, kerosene, 
LPG (fof'lights) and oil. The advantages of stationary gears,  especially fish corrals and filter nets, 
are immediately apparent (Table 6). Even with their higher priced catch, the small and medium 
trawlers ranked among the lowest in  terms of energy efficiency. With further increases in fuel prices 
inevitable and fuel comprising a major operating cost, the advantage should shift further in favor of 
stationary gears, excluding liftnetters which have high LPG expenses. 
Table 6. Energy efficiency of major gear types, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Gear type 
Fuel expenses  Value of catch per P 
per trip1  fuel expenditure 
(PI  (P) 











Includes expenses for gasoline, diesel,  kerosene, LPG and oil. The ultimate measure of the economic health of the fisheries,  however,  is the presence of 
profits. Here, mini and small trawlers substantially outperformed all other gear types (Table 7). 
Table 7. Average annual value of catch,  net revenue before sharing and pure profit (loss) in pesos per fishing unit, San Miguel Bay, 
1980-1981. 
Net revenue  Pure profit 
Gear type  Value of catch  Operating costs  before sharing  All "other"  costs1  (or lossI2 
Scissor net 







--  -  -  -  --  -- - 
Includes fixed and variable costs borne by owners after sharing,  opportunity costs of owners' investment capital and labor and 
opp  rtunity costs of all crewmen (including pilot and machinist on trawlers). For further details, see  preceding papers in  this report. 
%let  revenue before sharing less "all other costs". 
DISTRIBUTION  OF PURE PROFITS (LOSSES) 
Not all gear types earned pure profits during the 1980-1981  period, although there was  P3 
million overall in pure profits shared among five gear types. All other gears incurred losses or broke 
even,  though as noted earlier this does not mean they earned no incomes for their owners and 
crewmen. It simply means that the sum of all costs,  including opportunity costs, was  higher than 
the value of their catch. There was  a very skewed distribution of these pure profits (Table 8) even 
more so than the distribution of catch by volume and value. Over 85% of the pure profits of the San 
Miguel Bay fisheries are earned by the mini and small trawlers. If mini trawlers are excluded, small 
trawlers earned 77% of the pure profits, with gill-netters, fish corrals and filter nets sharing the 
balance. 
As discussed in  detail in Villafuerte and Bailey (1982), there is  a higher degree of concentration 
of ownership in the trawler fleet than among other gear types of lower investment cost. This concen- 
Table 8. Pure profit (loss) by gear type in pesos in the San Miguel Bay fisheries, 1980-1981. 
-  - -  - -  - -  - - - 
Pure profit per gear type 
Pure profit (loss)  as  % of pure profits only 
Pure profit (loss)  Total number  Pure profit (loss)  per gear type as  (P4,030,900) 











~rom  Table 7. 
'pure  profit of other gears assumed to be zero on average. tration of asset ownership results in significant concentration of the benefits of the fishery in the 
hands of a few. The P1.8  million pure profits earned by the 75 small and 20 medium trawlers was 
earned by approximately 35 families. Almost one-half of these pure profits were earned by five 
families. In  contrast, the P0.25  million pure profits earned by the gill-netters were shared among 
350 fishing units owned by several hundred families. 
In contrast to the mini and small trawlers, medium trawlers were unable to cover all of their 
costs. This was  primarily due to their larger engines and higher operating costs (see Navaluna and 
Tulay, this report). Because of these losses by medium trawlers, there was  no correlation between 
investment costs (or capital intensity) and pure profits (Fig. 3). 
Investment cost /fishing unit ( fl) 
Fig. 3. Relationship between investment costs and pure profits (or losses). 
Note: S -  scissor  net;  F -  filter  net; C -  corral; L -  liftnet; G -  gill-netter; MINT -  mini trawler; ST - 
small trawler; MT -  medium trawler. 
Fuel Expenditures, Government Taxes and Resource Rents 
Annual fuel and oil expenditures by the various fishing units of San Miguel Bay were approxi- 
.  mately P18.5 million in 1980-1981. These expenditures were split almost evenly between diesel fuel 
for the small and medium trawler fleets on the one hand, and gasoline for non-trawl fishing units on 
the other. These expenditures represented 62% of the operating costs of all fishing units (68%  for 
gill-netters and 61% for small trawlers) and 37% of the entire costs of the fishery during the period 
under study. These costs are based upon actual fuel expenditures by fishermen. However, a significant part 
of the price of regular gasoline and diesel fuel to  a lesser extent represents government taxes (Table 9). 
Consequently, to call the full fuel expenditures of fishermen a "cost"  is not strictly correct; rather 
the tax represents a  share of the resource rent (or pure profit) that accrues to  the Philippine govern- 
ment. This tax is used by the government in part for road construction, energy exploration and 
special projects; part is also rebated to the oil refineries to cover currency devaluations and increased 
crude oil costs (the wholesale prices of all fuels are controlled by the government). 
Not only is  the government's share of the resource rent quite high (approximately P5.5 million) 
and more than the pure profits earned by the San  Miguel Bay fishermen, it is derived primarily from 
sales to non-trawl and mini-trawl fishing units, because the tax is higher on the regular gasoline that 
they use than on diesel fuel. The non-trawl fishermen are paying a disproportionate share of the 
fuel taxes,  a fact that further skews the distribution of benefits from the fishery in favor of the 
small and medium trawlers. 
Moreover, the price that the gill-netters and the mini trawlers pay for gasoline (85.5511) does 
not reflect its  true cost to most of these fishermen. As  pointed out in Yater (this report) and Tulay 
and Smith (this report), fishermen who obtain fuel on credit often receive lower prices for their 
catch when selling to  the middleman who provided the credit. The data tend to illustrate excessive 
oligopoly/oligopsony profits in the provision of fuel. Therefore, fuel dealers are also earning part of 
the resource rents over and above the 853.5 million value of the fisheries, which reflects prices 
actually received by fishermen. The exact amount of these oligopolyloligopsony rents cannot be 
determined. However, if  the gill-netters and mini trawlers received on average 10% less for their 
catch than they would have done under a more competitive environment, these profits could be as 
high as  PI  .9 million, less the cost of the credit provided by the gasoline dealers. 
Incomes 
Cash incomes of owners and crewmen are determined by the sharing system in use for the gear 
in question, and are a function of the catch value and costs. During the period observed, monthly 
cash  incomes of non-fishing owners ranged from PI46 to P1,693  and those of ordinary crewmen 
ranged from PI  64 to P599 depending upon the gear type used (Table 10). These cash incomes are the 
net revenues to owners and crew after sharing, less the fixed and variable costs (including opportu- 
nity cost of capital) borne by owners out of their share. These incomes can be compared with labor 
opportunity costs to determine if labor is making a greater contribution to the national economy by 
Table 9. Gasoline and diesel expenditures and taxes for all fishing units, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
San Miguel Bay 
Approximate  fishery 
fuel price per liter  Total tax  Tax as  %  fuel expenditures  Total tax 
San Miguel Bay (1981  per liter1  of fuel price  (1980-81)~  revenues 
(PI  (%I  (P)  (P) 
Regular gasoline 
Diesel 
9.2  million 
9.4  million 
4.18  million 
1.35  million 
Total  5.53  million 
'source:  Caltex Head Office, Manila. Fuel tax is imposed at the wholesale level. 
'~xtrapolated from operating expense data monitored by the project's economics module.  Please refer to the preceding papers 
in this  report for  additional details on fuel expenditure as  percent of operating expenses for eqach  of the major fishing gear types. Table 10. Average monthly cash  incomes in pesos  of owners and crewmen by gear type after sharing and payment of all fixed and 
variable costs1, San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
No. of months  Income of owners2  '  Income of  l  ncome of  Income of 
Gear type  operated  Non-fishing  0wner-operator3  pilot (maestro)  machinist  ordinary crewman4 
Scissor net  3  n/a  133  n/a  nla  n/a 
Gill-net (motorized)  12  271  516  245  n/a  21 8 
Stationary liftnet  4  (77315  (54315  230  nla  1  64 
Fish corral  7  740  947  n/a  nla  207 
Filter net  12  175  348  n/a  n/a  1  736 
Mini trawler  12  432  877  445  nla  342 
Small trawler7  12  1,693  n/a  810  698  599 
Medium trawler  12  146  nla  482  400  339 
1  Opportunity costs of owner's  labor and capital and opportunity costs of crewmen (labor) not yet deducted.  Based on average 
nuqber of months of operation. 
L~fter  deducting fixed and variable cost$  that must be borne by owner. This is owner income per fishing unit. 
30wner-operator receives owner's share plus one crew share (pilot's share if applicable). 
40rdinary crewmen who own no fishing assets,  except in the case  of gill-netters, where ordinary crewmen may contribute nets. 
5~oss. 
'part-time  only. 
7~eighted  average of Sabang- and Castillo-based trawlers. 
being used in fishing rather than in some alternative activity. With the exception of liftnets, ordinary 
crewmen on all other gear  types earned at least their opportunity costs.  Because the absolute 
incomes earned are low (with  the possible exception of small trawler crew), this is a reflection of 
the fact that low opportunity wages  prevails in the area (Bailey 1982). 
It is worth noting that the incomes reported here are not household incomes, which may be 
higher depending upon the number of fishing units owned or used and the number of working 
members in the household. These monthly cash incomes do,  however, provide an indication  of the 
extent of low incomes in the capture fishery sector,  and are  most certainly below the poverty 
threshold established by the Development Academy of the ~hilippines.' 
Discussion of Implications 
The key points in the preceding sections of this paper can be summarized in three figures that 
depict the distribution of total annual catch (Fig. 4), total annual value of catch (Fig. 5), and pure 
profits (Fig. 6) among the various gear types used in San  Miguel Bay. The shares of resource rents 
accruing to  the government and gasoline dealers are not shown. The dominance of the trawlers in 
all three distributions is readily apparent. Small trawlers in particular earn large shares of total 
catch, value and pure profits, and since they catch many of the same species as  other small-scale 
non-trawl gear,  these shares are earned at  the apparent expense of the other gears. 
The trawlers are also the most efficient of all gears used in San  Miguel Bay, their capital and 
labor productivities are the highest of all gears.  If  the management goal of the San  Miguel Bay  is to 
maximize economic efficiency, every effort should be made to encourage the continued operation 
of trawlers, although a limit on their numbers would probably have to be considered so  that the 
rent (pure profits) they presently earn would not be dissipated with the entry of excessive trawlers. 
However, it is clearly not equitable that 75 small trawlers owned by approximately 35 families 
and employing 375 crewmen earn more pure profits than the remaining 2,300  fishing units used by 
-- 
'~he  DAP poverty threshold for a family of  6 in 1971 was  P5.000 (Abrera 19761. In  current terms. adiusting for inflation. the 
1980 threshold would be just over PI  5.000. Stationary liftnet 
scissor net (0.9)-  1  -Fish  corral  .  - 










Fig. 4. Distribution  of total annual catch (19,000 tonnes) by major gear types (includ- 
ing balao), San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
Stationary liftnet 










Fig.  5.  Distribution of  total  annual  value of catch  (P53.5 million)  by rnajor gear  types 
(including balao), San Miguel Bay, 1980-1981. 
5,100  fishermen. Whether or not this highly skewed distribution of benefits should continue is 
clearly a political decision. The final project report of San Miguel Bay fisheries (Smith et al.,  in press) 
explores management options in  considerable detail; it fully integrates the biological, economic and 
sociological aspects in discussion of the management alternatives that might be considered by 
policymakers. The only point needing emphasis here is that there is  a marked divergence between 









Fig. 6.  Distribution  of  pure  profits  (P3 million) among competing gear  types, excluding those 
that  incurred losses  (i.e.,  medium trawlers, scissor  nets and stationary  liftnets), San  Miguel Bay, 
1980-1981. Also  excluded  is  the  P5  million share  of the resource rents earned by the govern- 
ment through taxes on regular gasoline and diesel fuel. 
The distinction being drawn here is somewhat of an oversimplification because although these 
pure profits are retained by a small group of trawler owners, much may in fact be reinvested in the 
local economy, generating additional employment for the community as a whole. However, shifting 
the distribution of benefits in favor of the majority may not have a significant negative impact on 
this multiplier effect. A definitive answer to  this question requires an examination of capital flows, 
investments and savings patterns among the Bay's fishermen, a study which has not yet been con- 
ducted. Nevertheless,  as pointed out by Pearce  (1978), "employment  in secondary and tertiary 
occupations is generally related to the level of the catch, and is not necessarily affected by the 
organization of the fishery itself". 
What are the implications of the preceding economic analysis for management of San  Miguel 
Bay fisheries? Based on 1980-1981 conditions, the results show that open-access equilibrium has 
not been reached because pure profits are being earned on average by gears that exploit the Bay. 
However, in absolute terms, the value of pure profits (P3 million) is small relative to the total value 
of the fisheries (P53 million). There has also been a considerable increase in effective fishing effort 
in the Bay over the past decade in the rapidly expanding trawler fleet, motorization of gill-netters 
and the introduction of mini trawlers. Despite this increase  in effective effort, some pure profits are 
still being earned, but there is little room for further expansion. 
Because there are no historical data on costs and earnings in San  Miguel Bay fisheries, it cannot 
be determined definitively if  the Bay is economically overfished. However, it is believed that further 
increases in effective fishing effort will certainly reduce economic efficiency and resource rents by 
raising costs and will ignore the equity issues raised here. Consequently, the major decision that  . 
must be faced by those responsible for managing the Bay is how to allocate the benefits from this 
fishery among the competing users. A positive step in this direction should include the recognition 
that the present "municipal fisheries"  label  is inadequate to reflect the diversity of economic 
conditions found among the various diverse gear types lumped in this single category.  Increasing 
loans to small-scale non-trawl fishermen without simultaneously reducing effort among other gears 
will have only a negative effect. What is needed is an approach that limits the effective fishing effort 
in the Bay, and which addresses questions of overfishing and equity simultaneously. References 
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